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Introduction 
It is October, 5th 2011, Saturday morning at around five o´clock. The day is breaking. I have 
arrived by car at my destination: Petrou Ralli street number 23 in Athens. The place is 
isolated and relatively far away from the city centre. Next to the noisy freeway some dusty 
and untrafficked lanes snake along into nothingness. The whole area is bleak and deserted. 
There are hardly any buildings, no shops, and no houses - nobody lives here. A van appears 
swirling up some dust behind it while it crosses the large and sandy car park. The vehicle is 
swallowed by a gate and disappears within an enclosed area of what might be a warehouse 
of a factory. Stonewalls run along wide distances, encircling spaces, blocking sight and 
movement.  
There is only one large building complex that is conspicuous in this wasteland. On top of it is 
a waving blue and white striped flag. It is the Greek national flag - a powerful symbol. The 
national emblem on this building indicates the importance and authoritarian power inherent 
in this architecture. The prominent building is the police directorate or the so called Greek 
Ministry of Citizen Protection, hereafter MoCP. The high security space is enclosed by 
cement walls and large fences. At its front, back and side there are several gates with control 
points, which are guarded day and night by policemen carrying heavy guns. Nobody can 
leave or access this space without permission.  
On one side a large crowd of people has congregated. Watching from a little distance I can 
see around 80 people- most of them men, but also a few women even with small children 
and babies. They are all waiting in front of the high fence and a closed gate. The fence marks 
an insurmountable separation line between those people outside and the police guards 
inside. Some of the people outside try to get closer to the gate and seem to push with 
different force towards it. Others sit on the ground with their back leaned at the fence. 
Suddenly the struggling gets rough and it seems that only the strongest can push through to 
the first lines.  
Most of these people have spent the whole night waiting at this site, without seats, without 
any form of shelter, totally unprotected from cold or rain. Many are carrying blankets or 
sleeping bags with them. In these surroundings access to basic facilities is lacking – there is 
not even a public toilet. The place is full of waste and the wind swirls ragged plastic bags.  
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The many people are all foreigners from different countries. All the men, women, and 
minors have come here for one reason only. They are in search of international protection 
and want to submit an asylum application. The submission of an asylum claim for the whole 
Attiki area can only be done at the MoCP in Athens. Asylum seekers are kept in these 
deplorable conditions, and must wait for long periods under the control of the Hellenic 
Police. At 6 o´clock a group of police guards appear in front of the crowd and try to disperse 
the people by shouting at them. In a swift and rough action the guards pick out only a few 
individuals that are brought inside. After a few minutes of loud shouting and turmoil the 
procedure is over. In a highly unorganized, aggressive and random manner about 20 
individuals are chosen and taken into the interior of the police station. These are the lucky 
ones who will be able to submit an application and register their asylum claim today.  
Direct face-to-face encounters between the policemen inside and potential refugees outside 
the fence are rare. Although caught up in the same process there is a strange absence of 
human relations or personal contact between the police and the waiting individuals. 
Policemen avoid talking with these people, ignore their questions, and avoid eye contact. 
The striking indifference and disconnection is according to Gregory Feldman (2012) typical in 
modern forms of migration management since it allows the transformation of migrants into 
static and dehumanized policy objects. Immediate personal engagement with refugees or 
migrants would “only expose to attack the moral arguments underpinning the official´s 
power position and that of the juridical, political, and economic system they represent 
“(Feldman 2012:5).  
Many of my informants stated that several refugees arrive on Thursday at the MoCP in the 
hope to gain a good place, which might increase their chances to register for asylum 
(Interview with Katherina Komita, lawyer at the GCR, March 20, 2012; Interview with Spyros 
Risakos, director at Aitima, March 20, 2012). According to several local NGOs an 
extraordinary small number or about 20 to 25 individuals are selected each week (ibid). 
These people can submit their application by filling out an official form in the asylum office. 
In exchange for five photographs the bureaucrats in the asylum office will issue the applicant 
a pink card. This foldable card, printed on pink paper is the official identification document in 
Greece and designates an individual as an asylum seeker. By ascribing a temporal legal status 
to its holder, the pink card protects asylum seekers from forced deportations. Furthermore, 
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the document gives asylum seekers throughout the asylum process the right to work, free 
access to public health care, and access to the public education system. However, jobs in the 
formal sector remain unattainable for most foreigners, even with the necessary documents. 
Employment for refugees and asylum seekers can often only be found in the shadow 
economy in form of unstable and low paying jobs. According to the law holders of a pink 
card are entitled to public health care services. However, in practice the personnel in public 
hospitals are often unaware of this fact, or due to the lack of interpreters in hospitals 
medical treatment for foreign patients remains uncertain.  
An official date for the upcoming asylum interview is also printed on the pink card that the 
applicant receives. While Greek asylum law stipulates that the first interview must take place 
within three months, in practice asylum seekers often wait up to one year to get their case 
initially examined (Interview with Spyros Risakos, director at Aitima, March 20, 2012; 
Interview with Vasilis Ververis, legal consultant at the group of lawyers, February 12, 2012).  
However, it should be emphasise that the majority of the refugees assembled in front of the 
MoCP could not register their cases. For them it is totally unknown how long it will take until 
their cases will be registered and finally processed. Most of the refugees who have been 
waiting in front of the MoCP for hours, or even days, are left without any official registration 
or any explanations. Finally, the police guards go over to chase away the remaining refugees 
by threatening gestures and loud shouting. The police tell them to “leave” and “come back 
next week”, which sounds like mockery and scorn after an utterly degrading procedure.  
The architecture of the high security building and the force of the Greek police have 
effectively prevented these refugees to access the asylum office and the asylum process. 
With this form of administration and with these modes of regulative practices the Greek 
state violates international refugee law which foresees the unhindered access to a fair 
asylum procedure. In this form of refugee management Greek authorities deprive regularly 
large numbers of refugees from their fundamental rights and entitlements. With these 
practices the Greek state considerably decreases the protective capacities of international 
law and undermines the international refugee regime.  
These initial descriptions were given for the purpose of illustrating and underlining the 
difficulties asylum seekers face with the essential task of submitting an asylum application to 
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Greek authorities in the MoCP. In these regulated practices the Greek state excludes large 
numbers of potential applicants from the asylum procedure. Fact is that the MoCP in Athens 
accepts not more than 25 asylum applicants, once per week on Saturday 6:00 am. This 
institutionalized practice is indicative of Greece´s general migration management. It shows 
how the Greek state can govern over refugees and asylum seekers with authoritarian power 
and constantly breaches national and international legal frameworks.  
According to estimates of local NGOs, 80% to 90% of all asylum seekers in Greece 
agglomerate in Athens and try to submit their application to the MoCP under the described 
conditions. It seems that the Greek state has established structures that hinder asylum 
seekers from free access to the asylum system and violates fundamental rights and legal 
entitlements of refugees.  
The asylum application process in Athens is inefficient, arbitrary, violent and humiliating for 
each individual in need of protection. This ethnographic study reveals, however, that it is not 
only the initial phase of the asylum procedure but the whole asylum process that remains 
characterised by inefficiency, arbitrariness and painstaking bureaucratic processes.  
Although the Greek state has accepted the 1951 Refugee Convention and incorporated its 
norms into domestic law, the Greek state seems to suspend this legal order continuously and 
transcends laws unpunished. The asylum practice in Petrou Ralli illustrates that sovereign 
power plays an important role in the overall control and management of refugees and 
asylum seekers in Greece.  
The present study will explore and examine the ways in which the Greek state governs over 
the alien bodies of Afghan refugees and asylum seekers. The overarching aim is to shed light 
on the exercise of state power in the field of migration. In particular, the study investigates 
the Greek refugee regime, by looking closely at two aspects: migration management at the 
Greek borders and the Greek asylum system in Athens. The investigations are guided by the 
central question of the relation between the Greek state and Afghan refugees in terms of 
power. This study seeks to problematise the use of the state power in the political domain of 
migration and asylum. The aim is to increase the knowledge regarding the question of the 
role of violent state performances in the current Greek migration management. Through a 
reading of key texts by Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben and contemporary 
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anthropological discussions on sovereignty, modern states and transnationalism, this study 
tries to reveal moments and constellations in which the Greek state acts as the sovereign 
against Afghan refugees. The study seeks transparency in respect to how the Greek state 
exerts power on foreign bodies, transcends the legal order and demonstrates or re-affirms 
its superiority.  
In his compelling work Homo Sacer (1998), Giorgio Agamben elaborates on the paradox of 
sovereignty and the problematic role of sovereign power in modern democracies. His 
treatise on sovereignty had a profound impact on this study and provided a suitable 
theoretical lens which could be held in front of the ethnographic material collected in 
Athens. A critical conclusion of this research is that the Greek state moves continuously in 
the governance of refugees beyond existing national and international laws and that the 
state of exception has become an essential political rationale in the field of migration. In 
accordance to Agamben´s gloomy outlook, the findings in Athens indicate that unlawful and 
rouge state behaviour have become a constant element in the Greek management of 
refugees. It must be stressed that the findings presented in this work, have emerged only 
from a small scale and thus must be regarded as preliminary insights that need to be further 
assessed by more extensive follow-up studies.  
Personal Motivation  
Greece`s financial crisis has turned into a political crisis and made the country slip into deep 
economic, political and social turmoil. The heightened public attention given to the Greek 
economic struggle is owed to the fact that the crisis in Greece has not only shaken the 
Hellenic republic but it has shaken the whole European Union and its foundational pillars. 
Despite the cut of debts, repeated large scale financial injections and a strict austerity policy 
the functioning of the Greek state has become totally dependent on external financial 
resources. In the course of the past four years the recession in Greece has deepened and its 
economy has shrunken drastically. The negative economic climate in Greece has intensified a 
host of other problems, which have received only minor attention by European media. One 
of these neglected issues is the situation of refugees and asylum seekers in Greece. 
In the Greek media immigration is one of the most discussed topics. Immigrants in Greece 
are generally presented as a matter to which the economic crisis has lent extra weight. 
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Immigrants have become the scapegoats for all kinds of political shortcomings, and an 
increasing political radicalisation on migration matters is observable. Media and politicians 
throughout all parties speak indifferently about migrants and they know only one word to 
refer to migrants: “(lathro)metanastes”. A negatively charged term which can be best 
translated as clandestine or illegal migrants. Even in discussions about refugees or asylum 
seekers the term lathrometanastes is usually applied, instead of the more accurate term of 
“prosfiges” which means refugees. The fact that the figure of the refugee or the asylum 
seeker hardly appears in public discourse is indicative of the degree to which the existence 
of refugees in the Greek society is denied and their hardship and difficulties are ignored.  
For many years the Greek state has turned a blind eye to the increasing presence of 
immigrants and refugees within its national territory. The current situation of refugees in 
Greece is no doubt a result of political denial and policy failures of the past. Neither the 
Greek state with its institutions nor the Greek society in its awareness, have adjusted to the 
new arrival of immigrants and refugees at their doorsteps. Nevertheless, the presence of 
these foreigners in the country persists and has brought transformative processes for the 
Greek society with irreversible effects. Despite the harsh critique of several NGOs on 
Greece´s migration policies and considerable pressure of the EU on Greece to comply with 
European standards the Hellenic Republic can still not be rendered as a safe haven for 
refugees (see Skordas and Sitaropoulos 2004).  
Large scale immigration is a rather a recent phenomenon in Greece. Immigration intensified 
in the 1990s and was connected with the disintegration of the communist regime, and the 
former Yugoslavia, as well as political unrest in different African countries and the Middle 
East (A. C. Danopoulos and C. P. Danopoulos 2004; Gropas and Triandafyllidou 2005; IOM 
2008). The heightened immigration pressure on Greece has exposed lacking immigration 
policies, the weaknesses of the Greek border control and the underdevelopment of the 
Greek asylum system. Unquestionable Greece has turned into a major recipient of refugees 
and asylum seekers within the EU. Despite this fact Greece has failed to establish a 
functioning asylum system that can secure the protection and human treatment of refugees. 
For many years Greece´s official recognition rates of asylum claims at first instance have 
remained below 1% (Amnesty International 2010; IOM 2008; UNHCR 2011b). This rate is 
extremely low and raises severe doubts about a fair examination of asylum claims in Greece. 
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At the end of 2010, the Greek government passed new laws and developed plans for far-
reaching asylum reforms. Those political commitments remain empty rhetoric as long as the 
laws have not been fully implemented and the enacted reforms show considerable 
improvements.  
Many European newspapers, as well as national and international NGOs, have repeatedly 
reported on the shocking conditions in overcrowded detention centres and an overall 
degrading treatment of refugees in Greece (Amnesty International 2010; Die Zeit 2010; IOM 
2008; Migreurop 2009).  
At the Greek side of the river Evros dead bodies of immigrants are frequently washed up 
(UNHCR 2010:7,8; IOM 2008:55), and it is estimated that in 2011 more than 1.500 people 
drowned or went missing in their desperate attempt to reach Europe by sea (UNHCR 2012). 
In reaction to these events and deficits, Athens became a focal point of demonstrations in 
2011. Different refugee groups openly protested at the beginning of the year against the 
violation of their rights and their severe mistreatment by Greek authorities. Some of these 
refugees made recourse to radical forms of protest such as squatting, hunger strikes and 
moth sewing. In the last year, open protests of immigrants and refugees have become rare 
in Athens. This is less connected with the improvement of their situation but more with the 
rise of anti immigrant attitudes and also increasing racial discriminations and racist violence 
against foreigners in Greece. The current social climate is charged by mutual mistrust, 
anxieties and severe tensions between immigrants and Greeks. The rising acceptance of the 
ultranationalist party Golden Dawn that won 7% of the votes in both parliamental elections 
clearly reflects the intensification of an anti-immigrant climate in the Greek society. 
Furthermore, Golden Dawn members have instigated organized violent attacks against 
immigrants in Athens, Patras and elsewhere. As a kind of informal militia Golden Dawn 
members have started to patrol several neighbourhoods in Greek cities in order to “protect” 
Greek citizens from “dangerous” and “criminal” migrants. Such anti-democratic alignments 
and increasing racial-discrimination affect all foreigners in Greece extremely negatively 
irrespectively of their legal status. In light of Greece´s massive economic downturn and the 
political instability and political radicalisation the situation of refugees and asylum seekers 
might further exacerbate. 
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 In short, the economic crisis in Greece combined with Greece´s institutional unpreparedness 
to intensifying immigration movements, lacking policies or delayed political actions and 
reforms in the field of migration and asylum have resulted in alarming predicaments of 
refugees and asylum seekers in Greece (Amnesty International 2010; Migreurop 2009, 
2010). The recent developments in Greece and a pre-existing interest in forced migration 
and refugee studies were the decisive factors that prompted this ethnographic research. 
 
Research Object and Research Questions 
This section will give an outline of the research object and guiding research questions. 
Basically, this research project set off in an ethnographic study of the everyday lives and 
protection problems of Afghan refugees and asylum seekers residing in the urban setting of 
Athens. From this angle the relationship between the Greek state and refugees was 
explored. A major concern of this research was how the Greek state deals with refugees and 
asylum seekers inside its territory and what are the actual state practices in the domain of 
migration.  
In the course of the anthropological research, the empirical investigations were directed into 
two particular aspects of Greece´s migration management: border control and asylum. 
Anchored in an ethnographic study of Afghan refugees and asylum seekers in Athens, the 
present work gleans views on the modes of governance which the Greek state has installed 
in respond to alien bodies on its territory. It seeks to illuminate the workings of state power 
and the practices of the Greek state in the management of refugees and the legal and 
political realm of migration. The anthropological investigations into Greece´s refugee 
management are embedded in contemporary theories on sovereignty, modern nation states 
and the configurations of power within states.  
In form of a bottom up approach, the experiences and conditions of Afghan refugees will be 
linked with a particular form of governance of the Greek state and bureaucratic practices or 
quasi-juridical processes in the field of migration and asylum. This study tries to reveal the 
protection problems of Afghan refugees created by a specific form of governance and by 
particular structures of the Greek asylum system and the current asylum practice.  
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The overarching aim is to capture the distribution of power in the relationship between the 
Greek state and Afghan refugees. The present work tries to reveal to which extent the Greek 
state has incorporated excessive and violent performances of power in its governance of 
migrants and has established a slow-motion and arbitrary bureaucracy that determines the 
lives of refugees.  
A few remarks on the terminology must be added. The term refugee will be applied in the 
context of this research broadly to all those individuals who became uprooted from their 
original social, economic, and political contexts. Hence, the term refugee in this research is 
used not strictly in conformity with the legal category of the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of refugees. As many commenters have underscored the legal refugee definition is of 
very limited scope, since it was carefully designed not to violate the state´s 
sovereignty(Chimni 2009:16; Fuglerud 2005:304; Shuman and Bohmer 2010). The term 
refugee, here, designates, above all, people, who are in search of save haven and escaped 
from contexts characterised by violence and prevailing social or political insecurity. 
The definition of violence is in this context also broadly chosen. It includes physical violence 
originating from state authorities or other members of society, structural violence caused by 
structures and institutions that produce inequalities, and discursive violence enshrined in 
the discursive practices and dominant public and political concepts that generate exclusion 
and hatred. 
Contemporary Research, Aims and Contributions 
Before directing the attention to a small sample of literature that was relevant to the 
elaboration of this research it is useful to stress in a first step why anthropological 
perspectives on the study of refugees are of special value.  
While human migration is not a new phenomenon, today´s world is on the move like never 
before. The increased mobility of people and the intensification and acceleration of their 
movements has become a dominant feature of the modern world (Jacobsen and Landau 
2003; Nyers 2006; Papademetriou 2011a; Zolberg and Benda 2001). Parallel to the increasing 
significance of this phenomenon, studies on migration have been growing and in particular 
the study of refugees has become a major field in contemporary anthropology (Colson 
2003:1). Since the movement of people is a phenomenon of both, high political significance 
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and high socioeconomic complexity ethnographic research in the field of refugees can make 
valuable contributions (Nyers 2006; Papademetriou 2011b). The strength of anthropological 
studies lies in their potential to establish links between political, economic and social 
processes and it is the interrelation of these processes that loom especially large in the field 
of migration (Papademetriou 2011b). Anthropological perspectives can help to make the 
complex interplay of these interwoven processes more transparent. Anthropological studies 
have a large potential to reveal multidimensional aspects and can describe their 
manifestations in concrete settings and promote a better understanding of complex linkages 
and wider transnational connections.  
The remainder of this section sketches out some of the academic perspectives in the field of 
migration and refugee studies that provided points of departure for this work. The literature 
in the field of migration is, of course, enormous and the task consists of only briefly pointing 
out some relevant literary contributions from which the present work has considerably 
drawn. Besides, some research gaps in the disciplinary field will be exhibited and it will be 
shown in which ways this study could make new contributions.  
In recent years, several anthropologists started to investigate particularly the situation of 
urban refugees. The reason for it is that large cities attract growing numbers of refugees and 
other migrants today. Urban centres generally provide better economic opportunities and a 
higher degree of anonymity. Also pre-existing community structures can be found in and 
around cities that attract increasing numbers of refugees. In 2006, the Journal of Refugee 
Studies released a Special Issue on refugees and asylum seekers in urban areas. The articles 
in the issue deal with different livelihood and protection problems as well as the 
counterstrategies of urban refugees and their social impacts on the receiving societies in 
four developing and four industrialized countries (Jacobsen 2006:273). All these studies have 
shown that refugees actively develop strategies to reduce their predicaments. A very 
interesting overlap of these studies in this issue was that host societies would actually 
benefit from refugees if they were allowed to lead productive lives, absent from legal 
restrictions, permanent insecurity and social marginalization (Banki 2006; Campbell 2006; 
Dryden-Peterson 2006; Grabska 2006; Hopkins 2006; Landau 2011). These articles with their 
critical conclusions gave important impulses for the development of my research project. 
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The compelling insights of these articles influenced the generation of new questions and 
new explorations in the urban setting of Athens.  
Although the study of refugees in urban contexts was given more attention in the past years, 
it still remains a rather under-researched area (Jacobsen and Landau 2003:196). 
Furthermore, there is less research done on urban refugees in industrialized countries than 
in developing countries. In particular, research of urban refugees in EU countries remains 
thin. However, especially European countries have shown exceptional difficulties with the 
acceptance and integration of immigrants in their countries. Relatively independent of the 
policy strategy - multicultural strategies in Scandinavian countries or the Netherlands, 
models of glaring neglect like in France or delayed efforts like in Germany - in nearly all EU 
countries non-European migrants share the common lot of economic, political and social 
marginalization (Papademetriou 2011b:25-26; Smith 2011; Wikan 2002). Hence, research 
within EU countries is of high relevance and the generated insights should be utilized to 
inform the public, to reduce social tensions, minimize social conflicts and to advise 
policymakers. It seems that studies on refugees and migrants in European countries are still 
in their infancy and more research projects should venture into this area in future. 
Within the EU, Greece has turned into a pulsating zone of refugee and migration movements 
from East and South. Due to the current economic, political and social difficulties in Greece 
the situation of refugees and migrants has become precarious. As initially mentioned 
xenophobic and racist attitudes are rising, social cleavages are deepening, and the 
proliferating and increasing social receptiveness for radical and extremist politics have 
created an explosive climate in Greece. Academic research and thorough investigations into 
the current social, political, and economic processes must be pursued in order to deescalate 
the situation in Greece, prevent conflicts, reduce tensions, and inequalities in the Greek 
society. 
In the past, ethnographic research on refugees in Greece was mainly limited to refugees of 
European or Greek-ethnic origin, such as Loizos´ ethnographic studies on Greek Cypriot 
villagers. Loizos focused on refugee livelihoods and the experience of displacement and 
exile, as well as lasting political insecurity and the impact of these circumstances on health 
(Loizos 1975, 1981, 2008). The fact that refugees in Greece usually live a life in permanent 
political insecurity and in constant fear of refoulement for years seems to bear some 
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resemblance to the experiences of Loizos´ Cypriot refugees. Another extensive fieldwork on 
Cypriot refugees was carried out by Zetter. His work is valuable with regard to his theoretical 
contributions. Zetter introduces and revises the concept of refugee labelling. This theoretical 
framework distinguishes between forming – transforming and politicizing the legal category 
of refugees, a perspective that critically informed this research (Zetter 1991, 2007). The 
anthropologist Michael Herzfeld (1992) produced a very interesting study on bureaucracy 
and the bureaucratic handling of identity in Greece. A question he tries to answer in his 
classic work is: “How does it come about that in societies justly famed for their hospitality 
and warmth [like Greece] we often encounter the pettiest forms of bureaucratic indifference 
to human needs and suffering” (Herzfeld 1992:1)? Even a decade later Greek bureaucracy 
seems to produce the same indifference to which Herzfeld has referred in his study. In 
another more recent study on bureaucracy within the Swedish welfare state the 
anthropologist Mark Graham (2003) has investigated into the role of emotions in 
bureaucratic encounters. Interestingly is that also Graham who focused in his research on 
the response of civil servants to refugees also points out at an emotional and empathetic 
erosion of bureaucrats due to their everyday contact with refugees and their misfortunes. 
These studies were critical for my own research project in Athens, since they increased my 
sensibility and attention for bureaucratic practices in order to gain fresh insights on a 
widespread problem.  
Additionally, Michel Foucault offered with his concept of biopolitics (2010 [1987]) and his 
critical writings about powerful institutions indispensible and highly valuable perspectives 
that influenced this research profoundly. Foucault´s writings to the workings of power in 
society had a great impact not only on this research, but on anthropological theory in 
general. Especially his studies of the modern states and modern techniques to objectify 
subjects are highly valuable in the context of this research. Also this research is concerned 
with the current dividing techniques of the Greek state, in particular the classificatory 
processes in the context of asylum that specifies between individuals and contains some and 
exclude others (Shore 2005:239; Alonso 2005:28).  
Also Giorgio Agamben´s Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and bare Life (1997) was highly 
illuminating for this research. Agamben elaborates on sovereign power that is deeply 
entrenched in the antithetical principles of violence and justice. Agamben´s analysis 
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sensitizes us, that the sovereign “is the point of indistinction between violence and law, the 
threshold on which violence passes over into law and law passes over into violence 
”(Agamben 1998:32). Foucault and Agamben´s theory were carried into many 
anthropological studies and were connected and elaborated in new ways. The legacy of both 
thinkers is highly overt especially in the theories of political anthropology and one of its 
subfields sometimes referred to as the anthropology of the state. In this subfield, 
anthropological analyses seek to focus on every day practices, different forms of 
representation, public discourses, the exercise of power and its effects - according to Sharma 
and Gupta (2006) these are the “modes through which the state comes into being”(Sharma 
and Gupta 2006:27). Several scholars have argued that approaching and analysing states 
through the lens of bureaucrats and their social-cultural practices is a rewarding strategy; in 
this way deeper understanding of the diffuse ways in which power and governance works 
will be promoted (Sharma and Gupta 2006:27; Shore 2005:239). Following these advices I 
tried in my own research to understand how power is exercised over refugees and asylum 
seekers by looking closer at the practices of state officials and bureaucrats empowered by 
the Greek state. A special focus was given to the bureaucratic encounters of asylum seekers 
and their lawyers in NGOs.  
In a globalized world states also remain powerful players. States play crucial roles in the 
transnational movement of people and the management of populations. As many authors 
have stressed, states intrude nearly into all aspects of our existence (Krohn-Hansen and 
Nustard 2005; Gupta 2006; Shore 2005; Blom Hansen and Stepputat 2005). The recently 
growing interest of anthropology in sovereign power has resulted in gripping insights and 
unsettling theories. Ethnographies of the state are highly relevant in today´s world. 
Sovereign power is constituted within states and must be analysed from within. Yet, since 
the influence and power of states reaches far beyond their territories it is also important to 
analyse states within a transnational frame (Krohn-Hansen and Nustard 2005; Sharma and 
Gupta 2006b). This is why the analysis of the migration management in Greece will also be at 
certain points related to the larger transnational frame of the European Union which 
impacts Greece´s domestic policies. 
All in all the development of this research project was only possible through a broad 
spectrum of anthropological literature, sketched out here very briefly. The present work was 
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inspired by many different authors, has drawn from their ideas and picked up aspects from 
their theories in order to build upon these academic foundations. 
 
The Work in Brief  
This work will explore the ways in which the Greek state governs over Afghan refugees and 
asylum seekers. The ethnographic study aims to examine and problematise the existing 
power relations between the Greek state and Afghan refugees. As such it makes 
investigations into the Greek refugee regime by looking closer at two aspects: the migration 
management at the Greek borders and the Greek asylum process and practice in Athens. The 
central argument of this study is that Afghan refugees and asylum seekers can be subjected 
to violent state practices and excessive forms of state power. In the field of migration 
management the Greek state acts as the sovereign and moves beyond the law in order to re-
affirm the legal and political order which has been challenged by the foreign bodies of 
refugees.  
Chapter 1 gives an outline of the methodology the study has relied on and introduces central 
theoretical perspectives that animated the process of analysis and interpretation. It seeks to 
increase the transparency of the study and tries to make comprehensible how the 
knowledge production in this ethnographic research has been pursued. 
Chapter 2 critically reflects on the 1951 Refugee Convention and its Protocol. It reveals the 
scope of the world´s refugees and stresses that the vast majority of the people who take 
exodus remain in developing countries. The chapter underlines that states around the world 
have become increasingly averse to refugees and try to deflect or block unwanted migration 
movements. Additionally, it will be emphasised, that as long as the sharp inequalities in 
today´s world remain people will move. As long as the root causes for migration are not 
tackled, especially western governments must not evade their legal obligation towards 
refugees which is the only moral ad hoc response.  
Chapter 3 offers some background information on Greece´s migration history and decisive 
moments in it. It examines the recent regularization programs, on the basis of which the 
Greek government has turned a previous illegal immigrant population into a legal one. The 
chapter further addresses the of question why the regularization programs have not been 
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fully successful and why the phenomenon of illegality has persisted in Greece until today. 
The task is to show that the Greek state will need to address the migration phenomenon in 
more constructive ways especially since the state will depend for economic and 
demographic reasons on a stable level of net immigration in the future.  
Chapter 4 seeks to situate Greece within a larger transnational migration system of the EU. It 
stresses the increasing inabilities of nation states to control migration movements, which 
has in turn increased the significance of transnational cooperation in the field of migration. 
Furthermore, the success of the envisaged harmonization of EU migration management will 
be questioned and attention will be drawn to diverging national interests, unequal migration 
challenges, and different policy efforts that persist among EU member states.  
Chapter 5 will explore the Greek migration management by looking closer into its border 
regions. The aim is to shed light on the migration practices and how Greek authorities 
actually exert their power over refugees. It is argued that the current Greek migration 
discourse and its inner logic and assumptions provide a footing for roughish state behaviour 
in the response to migrants and refugees that are generally constructed as threats and 
dangers. Furthermore, it will be argued that the Greek border regions constitute zones of 
exception in which any crime against illegal immigrants can be committed with impunity. By 
showing the increasing application of biometrics in the field of migration it will become clear 
that the use of disciplinary power in the field of migrations intimately intersects with the use 
of sovereign power. Besides, the chapter will critically examine the readmission agreement 
between Greece and Turkey. It seeks to shed light on the formal and informal deportation 
practices connected to this bilateral agreement. The overall aim is to show how the Greek 
state constantly overrides national and international laws which provides the basis on which 
it is argued that exceptionality has become a constant element in the Greek migration 
management.  
Chapter 6 will explore and examine the asylum process and current asylum practice in 
Athens. It explores the institutionalized practices of asylum and the treatment of applicants 
in the asylum process. It focuses on the provision of legal aid and the bureaucratic 
encounters between refugees and lawyers such as other important agents involved in the 
asylum process. By looking closer at the different stages in the asylum process the unequal 
distribution of power and stark power asymmetries between the Greek state and asylum 
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seekers will be revealed. The aim is to further illuminate the power relations between the 
Greek state and Afghan refugees throughout the asylum process. The chapter concludes by 
casting some light on the wider social context in which asylum seekers and refugees are 
generally embedded. This serves the purpose to expose the inhumane consequences of the 
underdeveloped asylum system and the slow and gruelling bureaucratic processes in Greece.  
In sum, this work provides critical perspectives on the way how the Greek state is governing 
over Afghan refugees and asylum seekers on its territory. It will interpret the ethnographic 
material through contemporary political and anthropological theories that grapple with 
question on sovereign power, nation states and transnational processes. It seeks to offer 
some fresh insights on the configuration and manifestation of power in the relationship 
between the Greek state and Afghan refugees. 
 
Chapter 1  Methodology 
 
The ethnographer does not, however, translate [cultures like] texts the way the 
translator does. He must first produce them. Text metaphors for culture and 
society notwithstanding, the ethnographer has no primary and independent 
text that can be read and translated by others. No text survives him other than 
his own. 
 
 Crapanzano 1986: 51 
 
Crapanzano´s words remind us that ethnographic accounts are always something created 
and in this sense they are somehow fictional. In anthropology ethnographic accounts 
constitute primarily representations that correspond fairly with the phenomena of the social 
world. With Writing Culture (1986) anthropologists have started to drop their aspirations for 
creating holistic accounts (Clifford and Marcus 1986). Contemporary anthropology has 
embraced multivocality and allows frictions and fragmentations of social realities that are 
constructed through human encounters and experiences. 
The following chapter has three major goals. First it will give some information regarding the 
research site and how access to informants could be found in the field. Secondly, a brief 
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outline of the set of methods the ethnographic study has relied on will follow. For this small 
scale qualitative research, data was gathered in a combination of different methodological 
tools. The major methods were participant observation, interviews, tape recording of 
interviews, analysing texts (in the form of academic literature, field notes, different kinds of 
documents, and statistical data), and also to a small extent photographing. Thirdly, a very 
short introduction will be given into central theoretical perspectives that animated the 
analysis and interpretation of the collected ethnographic data. Concepts such as sovereign 
power, biopolitics and particular forms of state governance have been central in the analysis 
and have informed the knowledge production and the generation of deeper insights beyond 
the surface phenomena.  
Research Site and Fining Access 
It seems to be useful to start with some general information regarding the fieldwork and 
research site before an outline of the applied methods will be given. The ethnographic 
fieldwork for this research was carried out in the urban space of Athens for a total period of 
four months. The fieldwork was split up into two field trips, each period lasting about two 
months. The first period of fieldwork in Athens started in early September until the mid of 
November 2011 and the second period of fieldwork started in early February until the end of 
March 2012. While the ethnographic fieldwork was temporarily restricted, it was 
nevertheless pursued with the explicit goal of deep immersion into the everyday life of 
Afghan refugees in Athens and the overall social and political context refugees are 
embedded in. 
At an early stage of the research it turned out that refugees and asylum seekers in Athens 
often live their live either in prevailing legal insecurity or in illegality which made researching 
them challenging.  
In order to find access to Afghan refugees and enhance my learning about their experiences 
and life circumstances, I pursued intensive research in a range of carefully selected locations 
such as specific NGOs, state institutions or the Greek Orthodox Church. These locations were 
the critical sights in which my key informants were embedded and ethnographic encounters 
could naturally take place. It is also worth mentioning that due to safety reasons my 
research activities were, especially in the beginning, mainly carried out inside of NGOs or 
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other institutions. Places where immigrants or refugees in Athens usually gather or live are 
mostly relative dangerous areas with a low level of public security. The police are either not 
present, seem to tolerate or collaborate with criminal networks that are rampant in several 
urban areas of Athens. Especially for me as a young female researcher it was simply too 
dangerous to hang around in public places with a high concentration of immigrants where 
illegal activities (e.g. drug dealing, drug consumption, prostitution, violent behaviour) were 
also rampant. Thus for the sake of my own safety, the encounters with Afghan refugees 
were initially restricted inside of institutions. However, at a later stage, when contacts had 
been established and going on for a prolonged time, the research encounters with refugees 
were also extended to the outside, into public spaces or in a few cases also into the private 
homes of refugees or asylum seekers. 
Besides, the access to Afghan refugees was further levelled by my personal engagement in 
different Greek NGOs supporting refugees or asylum seekers. I volunteered at two local 
NGOs, Helping Hands and The Greek Council for Refugees (GCR) where I was responsible for 
different tasks and activities. My voluntary work in the NGO Helping Hands lasted for a 
period of two months, three times a week. This NGO that supports predominantly Afghan 
refugees responds to their very basic needs in the form of hot meals, distribution of cloths, 
shower and laundry facilities, and providing a safe place for social gathering and information 
exchange. Being a volunteer inside of this NGO immediately gave access to key informants. I 
could engage in natural conversations as well as in informal observations with refugees and 
NGO staff. In this way I gleaned views and information about the lives of refugees in Athens. 
Also the fact that I could often encounter in this NGO the same Afghan refugees on a regular 
basis has further facilitated the development of closer relationships. 
 I was also given the chance to volunteer for about two weeks in the The Greek Council for 
Refugees (GCR). The GCR is the only NGO in Greece that exclusively supports asylum seekers 
and provides free legal assistance and also social and psychological support to them. My 
main task during these weeks consisted in online-research, which should prove and 
illuminate the political and social background of particular asylum cases. Besides, I could also 
observe the everyday encounters between GCR lawyers and asylum applicants and I was 
given the chance to be present during counselling of refugees and the preparation of asylum 
interviews.  
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Furthermore, I participated in a free Greek language course for asylum seekers as well as in a 
workshop for female asylum seekers in which needlework was produced. Both of these 
programmes were provided by Doctors of the World (mdm) whose main task consists in 
providing free primary health care to all marginalized groups, and additionally supply shelter 
for asylum seekers.  
Due to my active involvement in several NGOs and their programmes, both my access to 
Afghan refugees and asylum seekers was levelled and also access to the staff working in 
these NGOs. The development of closer relationships not only increased the willingness to 
participate in my research but also the quality of the interviews. The conversational 
language was mainly English, while sometimes easier conversations with refugees were 
pursued in Greek. However, due to the fact that most Afghan refugees only speak Farsi or 
Dhari conversations with refugees were often only possible with the help of a third person 
who functioned as an interpreter.  
Research Methods  
What follows in this section is an outline of the different research methods used in this 
study. It should be emphasised that throughout the whole research project the aim was to 
strike a balance between methodological soundness and ethical correctness which are 
deemed of equal importance. Besides, all contributors of this research have been informed 
about my research endeavours and have participated on the basis of their free consent. In 
the following the research method used in this study will be briefly presented and a few 
words will be added regarding the strengths of the particular method and why the method 
was considered as an appropriated tool for data collection in the give context.  
Once more it should be underscored, that this anthropological research cannot be 
representative. It draws only on a small number of Afghan refugees and their experiences 
and also only on a small number of social workers, psychologists, lawyers, associates and 
community leaders. In all, thirteen interviews were carried out which could be recorded and 
subsequently transcribed. However, the ethnographic material was further supplemented by 
a much larger number of informal conversations that were pinned down in the form of field 
notes and constitute, together with the transcribed interviews, the corpus of data on whose 
basis analysis was undertaken. The reason for relinquishing larger samples of participants 
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especially in the respect to Afghan refugees was also owed to the awareness that dense 
ethnographic data could only be achieved through relationships of trust. Only through 
trustworthy relationships and a special social sensitivity on the side of the researcher, 
sharing of difficult experiences can be possible (K. M. DeWalt and B. R. DeWalt 2002:13). 
Thus the emphasis was rather put on the quality than the quantity of my encounters and 
relationships with Afghan refugees and asylum seekers.  
Despite undeniable weaknesses, it must also be emphasised that this anthropological study 
has evolved in a large commitment to the matter and above all to the people participated in 
it. To use James Clifford´s words this ethnographic study was incited by ethic and socio-
political concerns, and is conducted as an “analysis of past and present practice out of a 
commitment to future possibilities” (Clifford 1986:3).  
 
Participant Observation 
Participant observation is the prime method in anthropology and at its heart lies a deep 
immersion into a certain mode of life for an extended period of time (Sulka and Robben 
2007:2). Also in this study the method of participant observation constituted a central 
research tool. As a non-extrusive research method it served as an appropriate tool to 
research among Afghan refugees in Athens who are politically and socially marginalized. 
Finding access to refugees and gaining their trust was much easier by engaging naturally 
with them and encountering them in an environment familiar to them like that of NGOs. 
Based on direct human encounters in the field, data was collected by informal 
conversations, informal observations and the direct participation in various activities ranging 
from common language lessons to having a cup of tea together. Immersing myself into 
naturalistic settings of refugees´ everyday life, the engagement in non-artificial forms of 
conversations combined with a detailed recoding of such field experience in form of field 
notes allowed a systematic analysis of the collected data and the formulation of more 
abstract perspectives on their basis (K. M. DeWalt and B. R. DeWalt 2002:1-4). 
The strength of the method is that it can produce very rich and deep knowledge on the basis 
of the field experience which is extremely dense. While the pinpointed field notes contain 
only a small fraction of the actual field experience, the anthropologist has conserved in his 
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memory a much larger contingent of information (in verbal, behavioural, or sensual form) 
which remains part of the anthropologist´s deeper knowledge (Sulka and Robben 2007:8). 
Ultimately, participant observation is the attempted synthesis of inside subjectivity and 
outside objectivity, which is achieved by the ethnographer´s constant shifting between 
subjective involvement and objective detachment (ibid:2). Exactly through the connection of 
these two opposing perspectives ethnographic representations can produce deep insights 
that allow the revelation of hidden meanings, underlying patterns and the construction of 
abstracted theories (ibid:6).  
Interviews 
A further essential tool of knowledge production in this qualitative study provided the 
method of interviewing. I conducted more or less formal interviews with Afghan refugees, 
asylum seekers, various NGO staff including volunteers, social workers, psychologists, 
lawyers, associates or community leaders.  
With Afghan refugees and asylum seekers, I engaged predominant in natural conversations 
or conducted open-ended interviews. In my encounters with refugees and asylum seekers I 
naturally engaged in every day conversations with them. Natural conversations are both “a 
basic mode of human interaction” and an important research method of obtaining 
knowledge (Kvale 1996: 5). “Through conversations we get to know other people, get to 
learn about their experiences, feeling, hopes and the world they live in”(ibid). This form of 
interviewing was chosen as a central research method since it gave refugees the space and 
confidence to converse freely about those aspects of their experience they wanted to reveal 
and deemed personally important.  
Nevertheless, any form of conversation remains always the interaction between at least two 
interlocutors. “Neither elaborated narratives, nor one word replies emerge without 
provocation” (Rapley in Silverman 2006: 112). In order to achieve rich data in such every day 
conversations with Afghan refugees key competences were above all, attentive listening and 
giving refugees the necessary space to talk while at the same time raising important 
questions and also sensitive issues without intimidating the interlocutor too much (Korf 
2004: 279). Moreover, interpersonal skills like empathy, compassion or patience were also 
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central in such encounters and conversational interviews (Wolcott 2005:4; Sulka and Robben 
2007:5).  
All these skills were of course equally important in the open-ended interviews conducted 
with Afghan refugees. While also this form of interviewing is rather conversational, it was yet 
characterised by a higher degree of control by the interviewer in comparison to that in 
natural conversations. Although questions are still formulated spontaneously, the open 
ended interview evolves a stronger orientation of a mental framework of certain central 
questions or core aspects that are of high significance for the research (see Kumar 1996: 
109). 
Generally, it is to stress that the process of interviewing is always a collaborative act 
between the interviewer and the interviewee. Only in a common effort a certain body of 
knowledge and a better understanding of the human experience and different life realities 
can be constructed (Davies 1999:97-98; Silverman 2006:112). 
While I also informally conversed with NGO staff, like social workers, psychologists, lawyers, 
associates or community leaders I additionally conducted at least one structured or semi-
structured interview with each of these informants. The interviews lasted approximately 1 to 
1 ½ h. For this purpose a set of pre-formulated questions out of a list of mainly open-ended 
questions was asked, usually in combination with additional questions that evolved out of 
the context and could be raised spontaneously. A clear advantage of this interview form was 
that it provided information on a set of pre-determined questions which makes the 
subsequent comparison and analysis of the data much easier (see Kumar 1996: 109). A 
special strength of these interviews was also the production of in depth information on 
central research questions and that they could be tape-recorded and transcribed. As a 
consequence this allowed for a different or higher level of analysis and scrutiny which could 
not be equally reached in other interview forms which were usually not audio-taped and 
only pinned down in the form of field notes.  
However, the content of both the informal interviews, which were subsequently transcribed 
from memory, and the formal interviews that were recorded and transcribed constitute the 
material basis of further analytic and interpretive work. In general the material was read and 
re-read like a text with the explicit effort to discern certain segments or units in the broader 
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context that can be grouped into general themes. Subsequently these thematic units were 
further lifted up onto more abstract levels by reductions and condensations. This process of 
abstraction allowed the discerning of certain patterns or inconsistencies between the 
different narrations and experiences and the theorization of the ethnographic material (see 
Thompson 2000:272). 
Photographing 
As mentioned the research also used and experimented to a small extent with 
photographing as a visual method. According to Pink, images can also be considered as 
“visual texts” that can be similarly interpreted and analysed. I sometimes used my own 
photographs of places or people in Athens in interviews with refugees or NGO staff, in order 
to generating further descriptions, receiving explanations, or inciting narrations. According 
to Pink, photographs such as the “experience of producing and discussing them, becomes 
part of the ethnographic knowledge” and facilitate the production of deeper insights (Pink 
2007:21).  
Method of Analysis 
In subsequent desk based research all collected material was systematically analysed and 
animated by political and anthropological theories on sovereignty and biopolitics. In order to 
develop more abstract and theoretical perspectives three steps of analysis were taken. 
Firstly, interviews and field notes were summarized in textual units and scrutinized for 
reoccurring and dominant themes. In this process these themes were further generalized 
and the collected data was proved and increasingly structured around major thematic units. 
Secondly, a higher level of abstraction was reached by reductions, reformulations and 
condensation of essential bits contained in the major themes. In a third step, general 
categories were developed in approximation to existing theories. Since the overarching goal 
of this study is to explore the relationship between the Greek state and Afghan refugees in 
terms of power, the analysis was generally guided by a search of manifestations of power or 
a vacuum of power. Lacking power was measured e.g. in terms of lacking agency, lacking 
(good) choices, lacking awareness, or lacking of assets (that can have various forms e.g. 
financial, social or physical). These categories were carried into the collected material to 
assess and measure the manifestation or lack of power (see Collinson 2003:10-11). 
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Applied Theoretical Perspectives  
In recent years, anthropology made modern states an important object of inquiry and joined 
long ongoing academic debates on this issue. The new interest in states mainly arises from 
the recognition of the central role of states in people´s live simultaneously to globalization 
processes. Ethnographic research in this subfield has opened new ways of thinking about 
states, and provided academia with fresh analyses and new concepts of the modern state in 
various parts of the world. 
The process of analysis was dominantly informed by current anthropological theories on the 
state, sovereign power, and biopolitics. This section outlines some of those theoretical 
strands which have significantly informed the process of data analysis and have facilitated 
the theorization of the ethnographic material.  
A point often emphasised is that within an increasingly global and transnational world the 
nature of states has changed. Also the relationship and power distribution between states as 
well as the relationship and power distributions between states and individuals have 
changed. Anthropology and ethnographic research can make contributions by exploring 
these changes and new configurations of power relations (Shore 2005:235). Also this 
ethnographic study seeks to explore the relationship between the Greek state and Afghan 
refugees in terms of power. It finds its footing in the direct experiences of Afghan refugees 
and asylum seekers. Also in a globalised world states remained political key players who can 
exert tremendous power. States play a powerful role in all people´s life and they intrude into 
nearly all aspect of our existence (Krohn- Hansen and Nustad 2005: 21, Gupta 1995: 375, 
Shore 2005:235). This insight provided an important point of departure regarding the 
theorization of the ethnographic data collected in Athens. A fundamental characteristic of 
modern western states are their biopolitics. The concept of biopolitics profoundly influenced 
anthropology and the production of new anthropological theories. The concept was initially 
developed by Michel Foucault and provided a focal lens also for the analysis of the collected 
data. Foucault defined biopolitics as the attempt, to turn human life itself into a central 
political object. Since the 18th century, efforts in Europe have increased to govern subjects´ 
very bodies in most effective political rationality and in order to form the population that is 
needed. This new form of governmental practice is modelled according to principles of 
market economy and economic calculation. It aims at gaining maximum results by governing 
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as little and as least costly as possible (Foucault 2010). With the modern age biopolitics and a 
new form of governance emerged captured in the concept of governmentality. According to 
Foucault, governmentality basically describes a domain of relations, in which conduct of 
subjects is regulated by disciplinary power. This new way of ruling allows to govern bodies 
and populations with unprecedented rationality and calculation (Foucault 2010). 
Foucault has embarked in his work on an inquiry of power and how power works within 
society. His strategies for analysis regarding this question have clearly influenced the present 
study into the nature and distribution of power between the Greek state and Afghan 
refugees. Foucault also carefully studied the various techniques applied by modern states in 
order to objectify their subjects (Alonso 2005: 28). Based on this coercive power the state 
fundamentally controls individuals and populations within its territory (Shore 2005: 239). 
The fact that the state is endowed with the legitimate force to insert or exclude human 
beings into the political order, provided important perspectives that structured the analysis 
of the ethnographic data. 
While Foucault renders the new mode of governing through disciplinary power distinct from 
pre-modern, sovereign power that governs with the exertion of archaic violence several 
contemporary scholars e.g. Thomas B. Hansen, Finn Stepputat or Giorgio Agamben disagree 
with such a tidy distinction. Recent perspectives and theories have questioned a clear 
distinction between pre-modern sovereign power and modern disciplinary power (Agamben 
1998, Hansen and Stepputat 2005, Alonso 2005:28). Exactly these two concepts of sovereign 
power and disciplinary power provided indispensible analytic categories in order to structure 
and analyse the collected ethnographic data. 
Hansen and Stepputat, for example, argue in their edited volume Sovereign Bodies (2005) 
that sovereign power in its dire and violent form has never became a relic of the past. They 
claim that violence “still remains the hard kernel of modern states” and this becomes 
especially apparent in times of crisis (2005: 1). 
Also Agamben rejects in his work Homo Sacer (1998) Foucault´s notion of a civilization of 
modern politics. For Agamben western politics remain traversed by the “absolute and 
inhuman character of sovereignty” (Agamben 1998:101). According to Agamben sovereign 
power reached an unprecedented excess in the creation of concentration camps of the last 
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century. This is the point when biopolitics turned into thanatopolitcs, when supreme power 
is nothing other than the decision on death. Agamben argues that the camp has survived in 
metamorphoses and has actually become a new and stable element in the political structure 
of nation states. Moreover, Agamben argues that the most elementary operation of 
sovereign power is the production of “bare life”. Bare life which is embodied in the figure of 
homo sacer can be exposed to unsanctioned violence and any act committed against bare 
life no longer appears as a crime. This unsettling theory which derived from an impressive 
analysis of western political culture since the Ancient Greeks had a strong impact on this 
ethnographic study. In the analysis Afghan refugees in Greece have been viewed through the 
focal lens of homo sacer, as a form of life stripped off of fundamental rights and excluded 
from the political community.  
Many commenters have discerned the power to exclude individuals from the political order 
as a central feature in the governance of modern states. The Greek state clearly refuses to 
inscribe migrants and also refugees into its political order. This ethnography attempted to 
shed light on the effects of the political exclusion of Afghan refugees in Athens. Increasing 
groups of refugees remain despite their physical presence largely excluded from the polis 
and bear indeed a strong resemblance with the figure of homo sacer.  
On the basis of ethnographic inquiries Hansen and Stepputat (2005) arrive at a similar 
conclusion like Agamben: “the right to exclude and punish “strangers” has become a political 
common sense, [...] that defines the political frontlines on immigration in Europe “(2005: 
11). They suggest that an understanding of sovereignty, which resides in the state or in state 
institutions must be grounded in an exploration of the de facto practices and exercise of 
sovereign power within states (ibid:2). Following this advice the ethnographic study was 
particularly cautious about the de facto state practices in respond to refugees and state 
violence exercised on refugee´s foreign bodies in which sovereign power manifests.  
This was a very short introduction into those theoretical perspectives on sovereign power, 
biopolitics or modern forms of state governance that have informed and animated this 
anthropological study. Especially the process of data analysis benefited immensely from 
these theoretical perspectives. In the light of these perspectives the ethnographic material 
could be viewed in more abstract terms which facilitated the revelation of larger patterns 
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and central categories in which the relationship between the Greek state and Afghan 
refugees could be captured. 
Chapter 2  Refugees – A Worldwide Phenomenon  
 
A significant feature of our increasingly globalized world is the intensified and accelerated 
movement of people (Nyers 2006:ix). Better transport systems, the relatively cheap costs for 
long distance travel and sharp disparities of living conditions between countries have fuelled 
global migration and lead to relentless growth in the international movement of people 
(Papademetriou 2011a:1).The reasons why people migrate are broad and diverse. This 
section will focus on refugees that are a special group of migrants and the reasons why 
people take exodus. The chapter will open with reflections on the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and its Protocol. First, it gives an outline of the legal definition of a refugee and it considers 
the implications of the legal framework for states and refugees. Additionally, it throws some 
light on the historic process behind the refugee regime. Later, some numbers regarding the 
scope of the refugee challenge will be provided and the distribution of the world´s refugees 
will be discussed. Besides, the stance on immigration taken by the EU and its member states 
will be briefly considered. After a call for long-term strategies as the necessary response to 
global migration challenges, this section will finally close with some perspectives regarding 
the assets and drawbacks of the current refugee regime. 
The group of refugees accounts only for a very small proportion of less than 10 % of global 
migrants in total (Papademetriou 2011b: 19). The legal definition of a refugee is given by the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, hereafter Refugee 
Convention. In Article 1 A (2) the term refugee defines a person who, 
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a 
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence [...], 
is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.  
 
 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, UNHCR 1951 
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The Refugee Convention and its Protocol is a widely accepted international legal instrument 
that clearly defines who a refugee is, by ascribing fundamental criteria to this category. The 
definition sets the standards on which basis it is to decide who deserves international 
protection and who does not. The Refugee Convention was designed as a remedy against 
human rights abuse with the intention to protect those individuals, whose own governments 
fail to protect them or might even be the very source of their persecution (Schmeidl 
2001:79; Shuman and Bohmer 2010).  
If an individual takes flight from his/her country of origin grounded in the five above 
mentioned reasons he or she has the right to claim asylum abroad and is eligible to 
protection by a foreign government. While the Refugee Convention strictly speaking entails 
the right to claim asylum, the right to grant or reject asylum is solely reserved to 
governments (Fuglerud 2005; Shuman and Bohmer 2010: 6,7). In other words, the power to 
decide over asylum claims resides within sovereign states which is a problematic issue. As 
many authors have underlined, it needs to be acknowledged that international asylum law 
was carefully designed not to conflict with the sanctity of sovereignty (Chimni 2008; 
Fuglerud 2005; Shuman and Bohmer 2010). It should be added, that most governments read 
the Refugee Convention as it would explicitly demand for an element of personal 
persecution of an individual to be recognized as a refugee (Fuglerud 2005; Nyers 2006; 
Shuman and Bohmer 2010). Although the qualifying feature of the refugee category remains 
the lacking protection of one´s own government, it is to emphasise that persecution is often 
only one among several other reasons for exodus. Forced migration is usually provoked by a 
bunch of heterogeneous factors spanning from poverty, environmental degradation to 
lacking economic opportunities, generalized violence and persisting conflicts (Koser 2007; 
Schmeidl 2001; UNHCR 2006). The majority of today´s refugees are driven out of their 
countries of origin by multiple factors (political, social, economic, environmental). The often 
commonly made distinction between the two categories of a political refugee and an 
economic migrant is misleading and must be treated with caution since it constructs a clear-
cut line in highly complex and fuzzy realities (Koser 2007; Szmagalska-Follis 2010).  
Despite forceful critique of the Refugee Convention in respect to its definitional limitations, 
its restrictive interpretations, and its contested suitability for contemporary refugee groups, 
the legal text has remained over 60 years the untouched corner stone of the international 
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refugee regime. Designed as a response to the European refugee crisis in the aftermath of 
The Second World War, the Refugee Convention has been firmly anchored in the prevailing 
European conviction “that control over people´s movement across borders is an inherent 
and essential component of [...] nation-states”(Fuglerud 2005:302). Certainly borders are in 
many circumstances essential in order to meet a variety of human needs and cannot be 
simply regarded as unjust obstacles (Smith 2011:11).  
Noteworthy is, that the Refugee Convention was created when western governments were 
heavily burdened by a moral guilt and national shame; guilt and shame because of the 
genocide and mass atrocities during the second world war and because of their denial or 
only lukewarm acceptance of millions of refugees escaping from totalitarian regimes. In 
order to prevent similar crimes against humanity in future and safeguard individuals from 
state violence the international community has worked out the 1951 Refugee Convention in 
a common effort and also launched other revolutionary legal instruments of global scope 
(e.g. 1945 UN Charter, 1948 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) (see Ignatieff 2001). 
The European historic experience was formative for the process of institutionalizing refugee 
protection. With the 1967 Protocol the refugee protection regime lost its previous 
geographical and temporal limitations and became truly international(Sainz-Pardo 2002:24). 
Yet, not all government which have previously accepted the Refugee Convention have 
subsequently accepted also its Protocol (see e.g. Turkey).  
Despite its imperfection the Refugee Convention has remained of great importance 
regarding today´s refugee challenge. There are no other protection instruments for refugees 
of similar political weight. International refugee law offers “one remedy for human rights 
abuses” even though it is a very inefficient method (Shuman and Bohmer 2010:7). In the 
remainder of this chapter attention will be drawn on the scope of today´s refugee 
phenomenon and the distribution of refugees within the world. 
The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that at the end of 
2010, there were 15.4 million refugees in the world. The category of refugee entails in these 
statistics those people that are recognized as refugees either by the 1951 Refugee 
Convention or by the 1969 OAU Convention on Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa; the number includes also those individuals given subsidiary forms of protection or 
those who live in refugee-like situations. Among all refugees 10.55 million fell under the 
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mandate of the UNHCR while 4.82 million Palestinian refugees fell under the mandate of the 
UNRWA. 
On top of the number of refugees, UNHCR registered 837.500 asylum seekers and 27.5 
million internally displaced people. The category of asylum seekers includes those people 
who have applied for asylum and are in the process of status determination (UNHCR 2011a). 
It is interesting to see that the vast majority of the world´s refugees - four-fifth of the total 
number- that appear in these statistics actually remain in their region of origin and are 
absorbed mainly by less developed countries (ibid: 2). Thus the statistical data are conflicting 
with imaginations of surges of refugees flooding western shores - pictures frequently 
conjured up by the media or by politicians.  
In the case of the European Union media attention is also predominantly directed to a few 
targeted EU entry points that seem to create misleading impressions of rapidly increasing 
illegal immigration and massive refugee influx into the EU. While certain regions like Malta, 
Lampedusa, and the Evros region in Greece have faced intensified migration pressure, the 
entering of large numbers of refugees and illegal immigrants is however locally confined to a 
few gateways into the EU (Morehouse and Blomfield 2011:11,12). While the number of 
asylum applicants has increased in several EU members states the total number has 
remained relatively stable in the past years (see UNHCR 2007). For most EU countries 
increased immigration is a very recent phenomenon. In the politics and media of EU member 
states migration looms very large (Papademetriou 2011b:14). The difficulties in accepting 
immigrants in Europe might be connected to an unfamiliarity of most EU countries with 
immigration processes (Smith 2011: 3,11). 
Disputes over immigration in Europe are running high and many EU countries have retreated 
to defensive state-policies in order to fence out the economically and culturally undesirable. 
Also wider EU policies seem to pursue restrictive policies to keep unwanted immigrants at 
bay. Gregory Feldman outlines in his work The Migration Apparatus (2012) how the EU tries 
to achieve this goal to seal off its territory from unwanted migrants by disparate policies in 
form of border surveillance, biometric information technology and circular migration 
programs. The EU migration apparatus has been installed to further consolidate the EU as a 
sphere of prosperity, reserved for a fading proportion of a few percent of the world´s 
population. EU policy measures try less to rectify the economic inequalities and imbalance 
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between the global North and the global South, which set large scale migration in motion in 
the first place. EU policies rather seek to block or divert unwanted migration movements 
(Feldman 2012). 
The predominant focus of EU on migration control mechanism and restless efforts to curb 
illegal migration into EU territory are directly running counter to the rights of refugees 
enshrined in the Refugee Convention (signed by all EU member states and adopted into EU 
legislations) (see Karamanidou and Schuster 2011). The detections of illegal border crossings 
along the external EU borders are well documented by Frontex. Since 2008 until 2011 the 
number of detected illegal border crossing has oscillated between 100.000 and 160.000 
(Frontex 2012:10). The actual stock of illegal migrants residing in the EU cannot be proved. It 
is estimated at 1.9-3.8 million for the year 2008. This number is relatively low, viewed in 
comparison with the United States with an estimate of over 11 million illegal migrants living 
within US territory in the same year. It needs to be added that the EU population with 
approximately 500 million people is also of considerably larger scale than that of the United 
States with approximately 300 million (Morehouse and Blomfield 2011:1). 
With recourse to these numbers it becomes obvious, that presentation of illegal immigration 
into EU territory as a process being out of control is a crude exaggeration of the current 
developments. Also the number of lodged asylum claims within the EU, reveals that the EU 
remains still of minor importance as a destination for asylum seekers in a global comparison. 
All 27 Member states of the affluent EU registered in 2009 247.330 and in 2010 240.410 
asylum seekers in total. In 2011 there were 277.370 asylum claims registered, which showed 
a 15% increase in comparison to the previous year. Since 2008, it was the first time that the 
total number of asylum application in the EU increased again (UNHCR 2012: 2,7,8). 
Furthermore, this increase seems to be connected to the social and political upheavals and 
insurgencies in a number of North African countries during the Arab Spring and is probably 
less a sign of a lasting trend (Morehouse and Blomfield 2011:11).  
Migration movement and refugee movement follow usually similar routes. Refugees 
frequently travel alongside migrants in so called mixed migration flows. National 
governments seem to fear that they will attract more illegal immigrants by liberal asylum 
procedures. But the influx of illegal immigration is probably less influenced by asylum 
regulations than it is influenced by market demands for unauthorised workers 
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(Papademetriou 2011a:3). Similarly even if refugee movement can be influenced and 
deflected by national and transnational legislations and policies it will not be possible to stop 
refugees in their movement since their reasons for crossing national borders are too serious. 
Refugee movements remain predominately determined by interstate wars, internal conflicts 
and oppressive regimes in their countries of origin (Schmeidl 2001:73).  
After the attacks of September 11, 2001 and subsequent attacks or attempted attacks in 
London, Madrid and elsewhere, western governments´ security concerns have moved to the 
top of the political agenda (Papademetriou 2011b:25). As Wendy Brown aptly writes the 
contemporary time is “featuring capacities for destruction historically unparalleled in their 
combined potency, miniaturization and mobility, from bodies wired for explosion to nearly 
invisible biochemical toxins”(Brown 2010:20). In this era, asking where the security threat is 
seems less appropriate than asking where no security threat is. In respond to these 
developments, debates on refugees and asylum seekers are often framed in terms of 
security. Harsh and intolerant treatment of refugees and immigrants, violations of refugee 
and other human rights have often become justified measures in the cloak of necessary 
security policies of states.  
Another interesting detail revealed by the UNHCR, is that the countries that absorb the 
largest absolute numbers of refugees are in contrast to common believes not part of the 
wealthy western world. In 2010 the two top countries were Pakistan with 1.9 million and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran with 1.1 million refugees within their national boundaries. Besides, 
Pakistan hosted also the largest relative number of refugees in relation to the size to its 
economy. In comparison whole Europe hosted at the same time 1.6 million refugees, 
300.000 less than Pakistan and only 500 000 more than the Iran (UNHCR 2010:65). Thus an 
irrefutable fact is that the more prosperous western countries are dealing only with a 
relatively small fraction of the world´s refugees, despite ample resources and higher 
capacities to socially and economically absorb refugees.  
There are no doubts that the arrival of refugees and asylum seekers on a large scale causes 
at the beginning additional costs to the receiving states –both in economic and social terms. 
Large scale immigration can challenge the receiving society´s sense of identity, and it often 
exposes the weaknesses in the structure of governance and laws (Papademetriou 2011b:15). 
The economic and social integration of refugees are simultaneous processes and can only 
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succeed jointly. However the integration of refugees is usually an intricate affair which 
success depends largely on smart policies, continual efforts and the receiving government´s 
capacities in social, economic, political and administrative institutions. Integration process 
that shows infertile does not only affect immigrant groups in terms of marginalization, 
discrimination and increasing segregation but it also affects the host society negatively by 
decreasing political and economic stability and by waning social coherence (Papademetriou 
2011a:26; Wikan 2002).  
A general development is that states- not only in the west but also in the “rest of the world”- 
have become increasingly averse to refugees and have shown a lack of political will to accept 
these people (Shuman and Bohmer 2010; UNHCR 2006). Many states recourse in times of 
increased immigration pressure to highly restrictive asylum policies, conservative 
interpretations of the Refugee Convention, intensified border control and forced 
deportations even to countries at war (Fuglerud 2005:296). These rigorous and deeply 
undemocratic strategies might exclude refugee from political protection and legal 
entitlements but it cannot put an effective halt to their arrival. Economically and 
democratically advanced countries cannot turn away refugees and exhort other undesirable 
migrants to stay at home without serious commitment to long term investments in order to 
reduce the root causes of their flight (Papademetriou 2011b:33). Refugees have severe 
reasons, such as serious human rights violations, war and lasting insecurity, internal conflicts 
and prevailing violence. Refugees are likely to try to reach safe soil almost regardless of the 
risks entailed to their journey. As mentioned, governments often attempt to shield 
themselves off from people in desperate need of protection by highly restrictive asylum 
policies, increased border surveillance, detention camps, forced deportations, bilateral 
agreements or the construction of new walls. These strategies are unlikely to show the 
desired effects, such political moves are only likely to undermine essential rights, increase 
the death toll for flight and produce other unforeseen negative side effects. 
It is arguable that at a certain point in the modern era asylum became somehow more 
understood as an act of charity than a legal obligation (Fassin 2005; Pickering in Fuglerud 
2005:302). This is a dangerous misconception and the international community, national 
governments and in particular prosperous democracies must accept once and for all their 
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irrefutable responsibilities and moral obligations towards refugees (Pogge 2006:710; Zolberg 
2001: 14).  
In today´s conflict ridden world refugee protection remains of utmost importance and it is 
the only humane response to people in search of safe heaven. Moral conduct and ethical 
obligations towards human suffering are central motives in the Refugee Convention and 
should be embraced by democratically advanced societies. It is worth adding that academic 
studies have shown “that refugees are less likely to flee from states that infringe on their 
political and civil rights than from states that threaten their lives”(Schmeidl 2001:81). In the 
Refugee Convention political and civil rights are prioritized over socio economic rights (Nyers 
2006; Sainz-Pardo 2002). Initially, the Convention was overly praised for its universal outlook 
and its moral grounding. Looking closer at the document, reveals inherent moral 
inconsistencies whose discussion will be the remaining task in this chapter. 
The moral inconsistencies lie above all in the circumstance that political reasons are the only 
legitimate ones on which grounds a human being deserves international protection (Nyers 
2006:51;Pogge 2006). People who take flight and seek refuge in fear of starvation, 
environmental degradation, or extreme poverty cannot recourse to the Refugee Convention 
or any other equally powerful international protection regime. The moral tension is striking 
when we ask the simple question why should our moral and legal obligations towards 
individuals whose lives are threatened by oppressive regimes be of greater weight than our 
moral and legal obligations towards individuals whose lives are threatened by malnutrition 
(Pogge 2006:712)? We should be aware that the annual number of political refugees 
admitted worldwide dwarfs in comparison to the number of people who remain in 
desperate need. In our world there are thousands of millions people living and dying in 
extreme poverty. The plights, the suffering and the perishing of the global poor receive very 
limited concern and are widely accepted as an unchangeable condition (ibid:711-717). The 
point I intend to make here is, that there is no reason to regard the alleviation of the 
suffering of political refugees as morally more important than the suffering of people in 
desperate need. However, this abstruse moral hierarchy is entrenched in today´s 
international legal frameworks and especially in the current international refuge regime 
(Nyers 2006:51;ibid 2006:712).  
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Having pointed out these issues, we should be also aware that accepting political refugees in 
host societies is actually only a very small contribution. In a way it shows the failure to apply 
the proclaimed moral standards and human rights in the actual political practice of modern 
states and the international community. It is to underscore, that beyond the righteous 
concern over political refugees in its current definition there should be at the same time a 
sincere concern for the world´s poor. Alongside to the protection of refugees, governments 
and the international community should pursue long term measures to reduce worldwide 
poverty, violent conflicts, and the large-scale suffering in the world. Only by combating the 
word´s structural and economic imbalance the underlying causes for unwanted migration 
and large scale exodus can be reduced (Papademetriou 2011b:33; Pogge 2006:713-715; 
Zolberg and Benda 2001). Large scale population movements in general are mainly driven by 
instability, weak governance, protracted conflicts, persisting and sharp declines in economic 
opportunities and impoverishment of large proportions of society. The political, economic 
and social conditions in migration source countries are of much more significant than the 
characteristics of the receiving countries (UNHCR 2006:17). Hence, to reduce unwanted 
migration in the long term the only effective strategy will be to tackle the root causes of it. 
Such long term strategies must entail the reduction of inequalities between countries; 
combating extreme poverty, creating better living conditions and establishing new and more 
rewarding job opportunities in less developed parts of the world. This cannot be achieved 
without restructuring our entire global economy, sharing the world´s resources more equally 
and facilitating worldwide democratization. Many scholars have argued that this is the only 
route to effectively alleviate the world´s suffering and curb unwanted population 
movements in the long term (Nyers 2006; Papademetriou 2011b; Pogge 2006; Zolberg and 
Benda 2001). The ambition of these goals is certainly high, yet they are not unachievable. 
Also in a pure economic logic, due to a shrinking population the economic and political 
supremacy of the west will not be sustainable in future and the highly unequal distribution 
of the world´s resources will also destabilize the peace in the developed world. 
Yet, as long as these sharp inequalities on a global scale have not been reduced, the 
acceptance of refugees must be fully accepted as an undeniable responsibility for 
governments, especially in the more affluent parts of the world. Despite its limited scope the 
Refugee Convention is an important political contribution. Especially prosperous 
democracies such as the European States or the US must finally accept their obligations 
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towards refugees in need of protection. Only if the refugee regime is respected by 
governments of the world, especially of those of more prosperous and more powerful 
states, the legal instrument will remain of political weight for the international community 
(Hindness 2005:245). Instead of changing the Refugee Convention which I personally believe 
would only weaken its international acceptance and cause more harm than do any good, I 
advocate for additional international laws that could improve and compliment the imperfect 
refugee regime with its very limited scope. Yet all these measures are more or less 
preliminary solutions that must not gloss over the pressing need to reduce the global 
economic imbalance and structural inequalities. 
One special value of the Refugee Convention might be visible once it is conceived as an 
incentive in order to fight for more liberal rights and more equality within one´s own society. 
Viewed in the light of a safety guarantee for individuals that seek to defend their liberties 
the Convention might promote the internal struggle for more justice in societies and 
encourage standing up for one´s rights. In this way the conventional refugee status appears 
as a kind of reward for the heroism of freedom fighters that are important agents in the 
internal democratisation process (Nyers 2006:50-51).  
Chapter 3  Immigration towards Greece and its Implications  
 
Migration histories of countries and people differ widely. Today, migration seems to affect 
all countries of the world and has come to touch the lives of nearly all people. Regarding 
Greece, until fairly recently it has been nearly unaffected by immigration in a large scale. 
However, in the past years immigration processes had significant impacts on the country, 
and have changed its social constitution considerably. The following account will provide 
some glimpses on decisive moments in Greece´s migration history. The initial focus is set on 
the regularization programs through which the Greek government converted a previously 
illegal migrant population into a legal one. This background will give the foundation on which 
the success and shortcomings of the Greek migration management can be discussed. Further 
aspects that will be explored are the persisting phenomenon of illegality, the particular 
structure of the Greek economy and the demographic development of the country. The 
chapter concludes with some critical perspectives on the Greek Orthodox Church in the 
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context of migration and an attempt to frame the recent immigration processes in Greece 
less in national and more in global terms.  
Migration in the Past and Present, Impacts and Recent Political Response 
 
When I first came to Greece I had this feeling and I thought that this could be 
my second or third homeland. I say second or third because I have lived for 
many years in Pakistan. There I felt very much at home. However here in 
Greece it is completely different. [...] The Greeks don´t see the refugees as 
equal to them, sometimes even not as full human beings. This is why you can 
never feel at home and you can never fully integrate. I have tried so hard, I 
have learned the language fluently, I went to school. I have been studying and 
working here. I have been living with Greeks for so many years but it is not 
permitted to become one of them – impossible!  
Actually I think the problem is the lack of experience of the Greek society with 
others or outsiders. They have no experience with migrants and they are not 
open to them. They fear of their country. They don´t like it that you are here, 
that you are among them. You come from outside, and they feel superior. You 
will never be one of them - you will never be on the same level with them - and 
this is the whole problem.  
 
Interview with Jaheed, Afghan asylum seeker, March 22, 2012  
 
These are the words of Jaheed, an Afghan asylum seeker in his late 20s who has been living 
for more than ten years in Greece. A lot of disappointment and grievance seem to be 
contained in these words. Until the time of writing Jaheed´s asylum claim has remained 
undecided. Listening to Jaheed´s full story, it is impressive how much this strong-willed man 
has achieved in spite of all the obstacles and difficulties in his way. After more than a decade 
amidst Greeks his memory carries clear imprints in negative form such as the experience of 
animosity, being undesired, and being looked down upon. In Jaheed´s reflections one might 
get a sense of how it feels to live as an Afghan refugee in Greece. The explanation provided 
by the young and educated men why Greece has such severe difficulties to come to terms 
with the increasing presence of immigrants and why Greeks cannot easily accept the social 
and cultural changes entailed to migration, deserves to be taken seriously.  
A glimpse at Greece migration history will reveal that Jaheed´s statement about the lacking 
experience with immigrants holds a certain truth. Since independence in the late 1820s, 
Greece has been most of the time, a country of emigration. This changed only in the 
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beginning of the 1990s, where the number of migrants increased drastically. Since that time 
Greece has become an undeclared but de-facto immigration country and can register at least 
three decades of net migration inflow (European Commission 2008: 4,5). 
The persistent arrival of immigrants since the 1990s induced a relative fast and significant 
shift in the composition of the population. Referring to national census data, Jutta Lauth 
Bacas (2010) shows that in 1991 the percentage of foreigners was about 1% while a decade 
later in 2001 the percentage of foreigners has risen to 7%. She estimates that in 2010, 
approximately 10% of the total population are foreigners (Lauth Bacas 2010:149). Greece is a 
country with about 11.3 million people in total. Similarly, Anna Triandafyllidou and Michaela 
Maroufof (2009) state, that nowadays about 10% of the Greek population, are immigrants. 
Triandafyllidou and Maroufof provide a second estimate at 900.000 immigrants. In this 
number those immigrants of Greek ethnic origin are excluded (Triandafyllidou and Maroufof 
2009: 17).  
The fact is that in the early 1990s Greece turned from a migration sender to a migration 
receiver country. For a relative small country with 11.3 million people these demographic 
changes have profound social, economic and political implications. As mentioned, Greece 
was previous mainly affected by emigration. In 1850-1908 about 800 000 Greeks have left 
the country. After the post-war period, and a destructive civil war in 1946-49, nearly 1 
million Greeks emigrated since 1945-73, due to poverty, high unemployment and political 
repression. 
Greece migration turnaround in the 1990s was connected to dramatic political and social 
transformations in Europe at that time. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
disintegration of the former Republic of Yugoslavia displaced millions of people which in 
corollary rapidly increased the migration influx towards Greece. Besides, Greece´s steadily 
growing economy was also a significant factor in Greece´s changing role from a sender to a 
receiver of migrants (A. C. Danopoulos and C. P. Danopoulos 2004: 100-102). Greece´s fast 
economic progress throughout more than two decades was possible through massive EU aid 
in form of infrastructural spending (at about 3 billion € annually until 2006), available since 
1981 when Greece joined the EU (A. C. Danopoulos and C. P. Danopoulos 2004; Fakiolas 
2003:2). The overwhelming majority of the newcomers during the 1990s arrived illegally in 
Greece and were Albanian nationals. The geographic proximity, significant wage disparities 
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and abhorrent economic and social conditions in Albania explain why so many Albanians left 
for Greece (Danopoulos and Danapoulos 2004: 103). The second largest ethnic group among 
Greece immigrants are Bulgarians yet comprising a much smaller share of the total 
immigration population compared to Albanians (Trindafyllidou and Maroufof 2009: 17). 
On the other side, the clear demand by the Greek economy for a bigger labour force has 
significantly facilitated these migration movements. Although most of the immigrants 
entered the country illegally and there has been never an official recruitment program by 
the Greek government, the migrants were instantly absorbed by the Greek labour market - 
despite lacking residence permits or official contracts (Lauth Bacas 2010). The immigrants 
were mainly inserted into the construction and agricultural sector and other low paying jobs 
which suffered from labour shortages. Since the Greek government was devoid of a 
legislative frame for migration management and the Greek economy simultaneously 
demanded a larger labour force, illegal immigration and illegal hiring became the standard 
(European Commission 2008; Lauth Bacas 2010).  
The Greek state seemed to be caught unprepared to deal with the rising levels of immigrants 
and did not do much against the political and economic nexus producing illegality. The first 
law on immigration was passed in the early 1990s (that has remained in force until 2001) 
focusing mainly on the restriction of immigration and expulsion of illegal migrants (A. C. 
Danopoulos and C. P. Danopoulos 2004: 113; Triandafyllidou and Maroufof 2009:34). In the 
mid 1990s the number of migrants residing and working illegally in the country has been 
estimated at half a million. The common phenomenon of illegality has not been addressed in 
a sound way until the end of the 1990s (European Commission 2008:6). In 1998 the Greek 
government implemented its first regularization program by which illegally residing 
immigrants could gain a limited stay and work permit under specific requirements (valid 
passport, proof of stable employment, continuous residence for at least 12 months). This 
first regularization procedure was only of very limited effectiveness, and led to a new 
immigration law in 2001, providing a second opportunity for regularization. A third program 
followed in 2005 (European Commission 2008; Lauth Bacas 2010). More than half a million 
foreign workers and their families could gain valid residence and work permits in these 
regularization programs (Tzioukas in Lauth Bacas 2010:151). About 70% of the total 
immigration population who could legalize their stay in these programs were Albanians 
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(Lauth Bacas 2010:151). Today Albanians are more likely to reside legally than illegally in 
Greece (European Commission 2008:22). Other major countries of origin in these 
regularizations are Ukraine, Pakistan, Georgia, Egypt, Russia, India, Moldavia and Philippines 
(ordered according to declining percentage of the total share). Hence, the Greek state has 
granted legal status to a large percentage of an initially illegal residing immigrant population 
through three regularization programs in 1998, 2001, and 2005 (Lauth Bacas 2010:151). This 
legal transformation which followed a political decision clearly shows the state´s coercive 
power to incorporate a certain group of foreigners - in this case labour migrants- into its 
political community.  
Surely, the legalization of the unauthorized labour migrants intersected with certain state 
interests. Once legalized, the foreign workers paid taxes and contributed substantially to the 
ailing social security fund which needed to be propped up (European Commission 2008:31; 
Lauth Bacas 2010:155). Lauth Bacas (2010) describes it as a win-win situation between 
immigrants and the Greek state, the first gaining more rights and a better social security, 
while the latter increased the number of contributors to the social security funds, increased 
tax revenues and introduced more equality and fairer competition in the labour market 
(Lauth Bacas 2010:155). Besides these positive effects, the regularization procedures are 
also marked by several flaws. A crucial problem is that post 2005, illegal residing immigrants 
cannot apply for regularization outside of a new regularization program, even if they fulfil 
the necessary requirements (European Commission 2008:13). Additionally, the 
regularization was connected with considerable costs for immigrants (about 150€ for 1 year 
permit, and 300€, 450€ for 2 and 3 year permits). The fee was not redeemed in case an 
applicant failed in the process. The relative high cost and the risk of paying the fee without 
obtaining the permit might have deterred a considerable number of immigrants that decided 
as a consequence to remain illegally (European Commission 2008:17; Fakiolas 2003:4). Other 
immigrants could simply not fulfil the necessary requirements. In general the whole 
administrative process was opaque, very time consuming and due to a shortage of staff 
extremely slow (European Commission 2008:27). It was not unusual that immigrants 
received their permit after it had already expired and immigrants where applying for 
renewal before they obtained the permit. This produced a grey zone of semi-legality among 
immigrants (Triandafyllidou and Maroufof 2009: 37). The bureaucratic practice in the 
regularization programs seems to epitomize the essence of Greek bureaucracy. Ineffective 
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management and shortages in skilled personnel seems to be deep rooted problems of the 
Greek state and its administrative apparatus. On top of everything, there is this puzzling 
phenomenon that regularized migrants have fallen back into illegality. The reason behind 
this perplexing return to illegality - involuntarily or voluntarily - has not been explored yet. 
Considering all these aspects, the clear success of these regularization programs must be 
contested (European Commission 2008:27). Also Lauth Bacas (2010) underscores a point of 
friction in these regularization processes which deserves closer consideration. Bacas speaks 
of a bias of the regularization in favour of applicants who had identification documents. The 
result was that large numbers of foreign workers from Pakistan (19.300), India (13.500), or 
Philippines (11.000) with valid passports succeeded in gaining legal residence permits, while 
other non-European migrants who arrived without documents were illegible for 
regularization and have been trapped in illegality ever since (Lauth Bacas 2010:151,161). In 
this process only a person who possessed an official document was granted social and 
political rights. People without identifying documents, were denied the chance to re-
establish a political identity and re-gain the rights attached to it. Next to the power of 
inclusion the state has equally the power of exclusion. Only the prerequisite of a valid 
passport allowed for the Greek state´s favourable treatment. It seems that people without 
identification challenge the national order and constitute disquieting figures for states. 
Individuals without identification papers break the continuity between birth and nation, and 
cut the link between man and citizen, which are the fundamental categories on which the 
state order is based on (Agamben 1998:131,134). Also the majority of Afghan refugees seem 
to belong to this disquieting and subversive class since they often arrive without passports in 
Greece. Some of them never had documents, or their passports were kept by smugglers, 
they might have left their passports behind in the rush, or they destroyed them in order to 
conceal their identity rather than to reveal it. In any case once lost, it is extremely difficult to 
reclaim a political identity, and to regain political relevancy in a state and its society. It is as 
paperless people had effectively lost their identities, when they crossed the border into 
foreign sovereign space. Only the state, not the human being concerned, is empowered to 
decide if one can regain a political status or if the individual will be politically effaced 
(Browne in Feldman 2012:128).  
The production of a political identity is generated by the bureaucratic apparatus and 
depends on a preceding political decision of a state. As Michael Herzfeld (1992) has shown, 
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the basic function of bureaucracy is the generation of taxonomies in order to act upon them. 
In this form of organization people are also grouped into different categories that are 
aligned with certain rights (see Herzfeld 1992). After knowing Jaheed for a while it became 
obvious that he has somehow been crushed by the slowly turning clogs of the Greek 
bureaucratic machinery. In a strange mixture of rebellion and surrender he comes to an 
excruciating realisation about this liminal state he has been kept for more than a decade. 
I still haven´t received any answer regarding my asylum claim. Actually I am 
very tired of it, somehow I don´t even care anymore, if they accept me or not. I 
tried... I have the right, but they don´t respect it. I don´t need these papers, 
without papers I exist too, I only don´t exist in their bureaucratic system, but I 
don´t care anymore.  
If they want, they can send me back to Afghanistan, I know if they want they 
can even kill me. They could do anything to me, take everything from me. 
Somehow they have taken my life for 11 years. If you have authority, you can 
do anything - this is the worst thing.  
 
Interview with Jaheed, Afghan asylum seeker, March 22, 2012  
 
Only through bureaucratic processes politically effaced people can re-establish a valid 
identity and be re-inserted into the political community as an officially acknowledged 
member. Jaheed bluntly enunciates the dire implications for someone who does not exist in 
the state´s official register and in its bureaucratic system. The possession of a positive 
political identity is an essential safeguard against injustice and violence by the state or other 
social actors. A legal status can protect the human body from excessive state power and the 
state´s ability to kill with impunity. The human body as a site of sovereign power leads 
straight to the figure of homo sacer that was thoroughly analysed by Agamben. Illegal 
migrants and refugees seam to bear great resemblance with the figure of homo sacer, or the 
bare life that is excluded from the normal political order. Bare life is stripped off of every 
political status. It dwells in the threshold between nature and politics, natural and political 
life and it can be killed with impunity (Agamben 1998). The point to stress is that only states 
can link the bare life in a human body with an ascribed political status. By this political act 
the human being is inserted into the normal political order of the state. Human beings who 
came to inhabit the obscure space outside the normal juridical order find themselves in a 
zone of exception in which no act committed against them appears any longer as a crime 
(ibid:171). The following chapters of this work will reveal based on various ethnographic 
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accounts that Agamben´s gloomy outlook is actually very much a reality in Greek migration 
politics and practice. 
The discussion so far has shown that Greece´s regularisation programs even though 
combined with a policy of expulsion could not solve the problem of illegality. It has also 
shown that Greek migration management has suffered from its onset on from a lack of 
distinctive, coherent and comprehensive strategies. Furthermore, the implementation of the 
regularization programs was severely impaired by a highly ineffective bureaucratic 
apparatus. Greece´s migration challenge has not yet abated. While in the past the illegal 
immigrant population was dominated by Albanian nationals, today its composition seems to 
be more mixed. Many NGO workers in Athens have stressed that since the beginning of the 
21st century, the number of migrants from the Middle East, Asia and Africa has increased. 
Since then also the migration routes have changed and the main pathway runs nowadays 
from Turkey to Greece. Also official reports are in line with the assessments made by NGOs 
(see European Commission 2008; see Frontex 2011). 
 
Persisting Illegality of Immigrants and the Demographic Gap  
A major reason why illegal immigration to Greece has persisted is connected to a 
malfunctioning visa system that largely blocks legal entry to Greece. Thus the majority of 
immigrants enter the country illegally. Once arrived, they cannot regularize their stay and 
they cannot work legally. In order to survive they enter the shadow economy and get 
involved in all kind of black labour, sometimes also in criminal activities (European 
Commission 2008:23; Lauth Bacas 2010:156). These structures also pave the way for the 
exploitation of these people who lack an official status. Employers usually belong to those 
who profit from such a context. Those who hire illegally make double gains since they pay 
reduced salaries to the illegal labourer and they can drop security payments, which 
otherwise would have to be paid. Also the majority of Afghan asylum seekers who actually 
have the right to legal employment are mostly engaged in Greece´ shadow economy.  
I met a very nice teacher and he could help me to find a job in construction. It 
was a small company. The teacher accompanied me there. I remember - I had 
everything with me: all the necessary documents, like the work permit, medical 
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and language certificate, the pink card and so on.... However they did not want 
the papers, but they gave me the job. Without a contract but I took it. 
 
 Interview with Ghafour, Afghan asylum seeker, February 27, 2012 
  
Although Ghafour, a young Afghan male, could present all the necessary documents and 
although he could get legally employed, he ended up disappointed. Even the social 
connections to locals, a good level in Greek and all necessary papers did not lead to a legal 
job. In fact, not a single Afghan asylum seeker I interviewed during my research was legally 
employed. Furthermore, the NGOs with job placement programs lamented the great 
difficulty of such a task. Some NGO workers have stressed that “until the 2004 Olympic 
Games it was still relatively easy to get immigrants a job, but the employment situation has 
worsened soon afterwards. And the economic crisis hit migrants even harder than Greeks” 
(Interview with Christina Ziakas, social worker at YRE, September 14, 2011).  
The Greek economy grew steadily until the end of 2000. With the Olympic Games in 2004, 
the demand of cheap labour ran high due to the infrastructural upgrading of Athens that had 
to be completed on time. Since 2009 the Greek economy went into recession and has 
spiralled into a persisting economic downturn. Greece has always had a relatively large illicit 
economy. It is estimated to be twice the size of most northern EU countries, whose illicit 
economy is put at 12-15% of the total economy (Fakiolas 2003:1). In short, the growing 
presence of illegal immigrants in Greece is on the one hand the result of the very structure 
of the Greek economy and on the other hand the result of shortcomings in Greek migration 
policies. The stock of those people who arrive and reside illegally in Greece is difficult to 
estimate. The following paragraph provides some estimates by different authors regarding 
this issue. According to Triandafyllidou (2005) in the year 2004 the number of illegal 
migrants in Greece was around 300.000 (Triandafyllidou in European Commission 2008:50). 
In the European research Clandestino (2008) the stock of illegal migrants is estimated at 
280.446 for the end of 2007 (European Commission 2008:54). Following an estimate 
provided by Thanos Maroukis (2012) the number of illegal immigrants is at 350.000 for 2010 
and 390.000 for 2011. In opposition to the other estimates, Maroukis` calculations take also 
those migrants into account who will lose their stay permit and fall back into illegality. He 
claims that in 2010 20.000 and in 2011 62.411 immigrants will not renew their stay permits 
and laps back into illegality (Maroukis 2012).  
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Immigration has become a hotly discussed issue and the central topic of public and political 
debates in Greece. Immigrants are framed or equated with criminals and are often blamed 
for the severity of Greece´s economic problems. The new government has promised to 
respond with the necessary force to combat illegal migration. New detention centres were 
built close to Athens, and they are getting filled up with the many illegal immigrants the 
police regularly round up from the city centre. At the beginning of August 2012 the country 
launched one of its largest seep-operation against illegal migrants. Only in Athens 4.500 
police men were deployed to hunt down illegal immigrants. In less than 72 hours 7.000 
immigrants without sufficient documentation were caught and detained. About 2.000 of 
them are kept under arrest and the government went over to forcefully return some of 
those people who were recently detained (The Guardian 2012). 
There is little chance for Greece to solve its problems connected with illegal migration by 
such radical, costly, and authoritarian methods. Once illegal immigrants become expelled 
from Greek to Turkish territory (a practice based on a bilateral agreement since 2001) 
migrants often simply slip back to the Greek side due to highly porous borders. The recent 
large-scale sweep operations are not only inefficient and costly but they are likely to further 
fuel xenophobia and racism in the country. Such spectacular and threatening performances 
of state-power are according to Wendy Brown (2010) the state´s attempt to disguise a 
sovereign power which is in fact waning. Globalisation, which unleashed uncontrollable 
forces, weakened the state´s abilities to control borders and contain the nation (Brown 
2010). However public discourse in Greece seems not interested to disentangle the wider 
connections that play a role in the current migration processes. An important fact that is left 
unsaid in the current migration discourse is that the Greek state needs to fill a gap in its 
national demography. The country´s population growth rate is close to zero, and it has a 
rapidly aging population. Due to the economic crisis youth emigration set on, which further 
weakens the country´s active labour force. In this context Greece is actually in need of 
immigrants and the productive powers of migrant workers will be indispensible in order to 
secure the functioning of the Greek state (Fakiolas 2003). The Greek government will have to 
establish a legal framework in which immigrants can be legally incorporated into the Greek 
society. Certainly the state needs to apply more constructive strategies in the field of 
migration entailing also policies in which illegal immigrants can obtain residence rights and 
get the chance to become part of the Greek nationhood (Lauth Bacas 2010:156). 
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Nationalist Ideology and Global Connections of Migration Processes 
Greek politics and the Greek society seem to have severe problems adjusting to the global 
processes that arrive at the country´s doorstep. Immigration and other global and 
transnational processes seem to have fostered an omnipresent fear that the persisting 
immigration processes will dissolve or contaminate the Greek nation. Discourse about 
immigration in Greece displays a distorting openness to extreme measures “in defence of 
the migration threat”. The voices of those who state, that illegal migration in Greece must be 
answered with tighter border controls, massive detention, expulsion or other militant 
strategies are numerous and powerful. Such pathways are however not only suggested by 
radicals but also the highly influential Greek Orthodox Church is inclined to more radical 
measures in the field of immigration (A. C. Danopoulos and C. P. Danopoulos 2004:114). It is 
to stress that the Greek Orthodox Church has a very strong infiltrating power on the Greek 
society and it is a key agent in the production of the Greek national identity and national 
consciousness (Chrysoloras 2004; Karakasidou 2002: 182,183). The Orthodox Church still 
constructs the Greek nation as homogeneous and pure. It infuses the Greek society with an 
ideology of cultural, linguistic and religious homogeneity. The Orthodox Church plays also a 
central role in commemorating days, national holidays and religious feasts that are 
important events for every Greek and evoke strong patriotic feelings as well as a clear 
identification with the Greek nation (Chrysoloras 2004; Karakasidou 2002:178). This national 
ideology does not only hamper the integration of foreigners but it gives rise to a hyper-
patriotism and also seems to over-determine xenophobia. The Greek Orthodox Church has 
always been the carrier and preserver of the cultural legacy of the Greek people. The Greek 
population, moreover, seems to be held together by an alleged superiority of its cultural 
traits (Karakasidou 2002: 184). Also Jaheed seem to have referred to this feeling of 
superiority in his initial statement. The Greek Orthodox Church and its ideology have 
tremendous influences on the Greek society but also on Greek politics and should not be 
underestimated in its mind programming power.  
As a final remark it is to stress that many migrants are forced to relocate due to economic 
and political forces that have destroyed domestic economies, natural environments or have 
produce wars, protracted conflicts and political chaos. Greece is part of the European Union 
which plays an important role in the global economy and hence, also in the production of 
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violence, poverty and insecurity in our increasingly shared world. Talking about an 
“immigration crisis in Greece”, which is a label used in Greek or European discourse seems 
to be a hegemonic strategy to externalize the process, instead of locating the phenomenon 
of migration into a larger system of relations to which Greece and the EU themselves belong 
(Feldman 2012:86). It seems that Greece must learn to accept the social change entailed to 
population movements and finally deal with the phenomenon of migration in more 
constructive ways.  
Chapter 4 Migration Policies and their Manifestations on 
Transnational and National Level 
 
When Afghan refugees arrive here in Greece the problem is there is no system, 
there is no support, no information, nothing. Most of them arrive illegally, often 
by smugglers. Once caught by the police or border guards they are arrested or 
put into detention centres. Most of the detention centres are in appalling 
conditions – they are overcrowded, there are no proper sanitary facilities, awful 
hygiene, no medical care, no translators, only police. 
 
Interview with Yunos Daktar, leader of the ARCA, March 12,2012 
 
A major problem is that Greece has been lacking the institutional and political infrastructure 
to deal in responsible and ethical form with migration movements. Like in most other 
southern European countries, Greece´s migration regime and immigration controls have 
been far less developed compared to northern European countries (Triandafyllidou and 
Maroufof 2009). However, what is described in Greek news and TV programs as the “lost 
control” over immigration movements is more an exaggeration than a reflection of reality. 
Today, most nation states seem to suffer from increasing difficulties or lacking abilities to 
contain and control migration movements. Effective migration management seems to 
require nowadays cooperation and coordination between receiving and sending states 
(Brown 2010; Feldman 2012; Weil 2006). For this reason, also the EU and its member states 
have increased their transnational cooperation and common efforts on immigration within 
and also far beyond EU territory. Gregory Feldman´s pronouncement that the EU has 
created a space in which migrants are “dealing with the combined forces of EU member 
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states rather than anyone of them alone” should give rise for some scepticism and sounds 
especially in respect to the research findings in Greece rather inaccurate (Feldman 
2012:62,63). 
This chapter will provide some reflections on the role of nation states in respect to 
transnational migration processes. The task is to emphasise two interrelated points: on the 
one hand, states remain powerful actors in the field of migration, and the other hand, states 
have become increasingly unable to contain and control migration by national efforts. The 
discussion will highlight the increasing importance of transnational cooperation in migration 
management and look at the current efforts and policies the EU and its member states have 
made in this respect. The aim is to situate Greece within a larger EU migration system and 
show that diverging national interests and disparate policy efforts and policy success persist 
within the transnational union. Additionally it will be show that these differences in 
migration policies between EU states and also unexpected policy side effects can create 
tensions within the EU and obstruct the envisaged harmonization and common migration 
policy. In the previously chapter the scope of the illegal migrant population residing in 
Greece was discussed. This chapter will draw attention to the scope of illegal migrants 
crossing Greek borders without authorization. The chapter concludes by problematising the 
Greek government´s reluctance for policies that could transform illegal immigrants into legal 
ones in respect to the Greek state´s heavy dependence on immigrants in future.  
Gregory Feldman ( 2012) argues in his non local ethnography The Migration Apparatus that a 
device or an apparatus of transnational migration management has emerged within the EU. 
This migration apparatus is composed of various and disparate parts. It significantly 
regulates channels and controls the cross border movement of people. One of Feldman´s 
central arguments is that previously unconnected national migration management systems 
are increasingly integrating within one larger transnational apparatus and that the EU 
migration management is moving towards an overall convergence (Feldman 2012).  
It cannot be denied, that on a migration policy level the EU has been moving eagerly towards 
common standards and increasing convergence. Yet, I disagree with the notion of a relatively 
smoothly operating transnational system of migration management in the EU, that could 
channel and control human cross border movements in systematic ways and minimizes 
unwanted circulation of migrants, as it is argued by Feldman. The task here is to show that 
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Feldman ignores the fact that these policy structures have not yet manifested on (all) the 
grounds of the 27 EU member states. Glimpses into Greek migration management gleaned 
through this research have shown that large disparities remain particular in areas, e.g. 
border control, asylum, detention conditions between EU countries as well as the 
proclaimed EU policy aim and national political outcomes. Not all national migration systems 
of EU member states seem to work properly, or are in its migration infrastructure equally 
developed. 
Feldman´s ethnography is overly concerned with an abstract policy world and the lofty 
terrain of EU policy making, pursuing the goal that “bodies are circulating in an orderly 
fashion” on EU terrain (Feldman 2012:20). Feldman´s research investigates into the 
processes and mechanisms of a systematic migration regulation within the EU. In the 
attempt to grasp analytically how disconnected actors are specifically related in a 
transnational system Feldman uses the concept of an apparatus, which was originally 
developed by Michel Foucault. In the Foucauldian sense an apparatus is a mechanisms 
through which power operates and affects society (Foucault 2006: 542). It has strategic 
functions and certain key imperatives which form its overall matrix. Foucault defines the 
apparatus as a  
heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural 
forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific 
statements, philosophical, moral, and philanthropic propositions [...].The 
apparatus is the system of relations, that can be established between these 
elements. 
 
Foucault 1980:194 
 
Inscribed into a system of power the apparatus aims at the manipulation of relations of 
forces by directing them in particular ways, or by stabilizing, blocking or utilizing them. As a 
complex mechanism it issues certain types of knowledge and is simultaneously conditioned 
by them (Foucault 1980:196). By manipulating relations of forces the apparatus ultimately 
aims at the domination and control of the society and the maintenance of power (Foucault 
2006: 545). 
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Also Feldman´s apparatus is constituted by disparate elements and is structured by very 
specific relations that hold these scattered elements together. A discerning feature of 
Feldman´s apparatus is its mediative capacity between disconnected actors despite a central 
authority.  
While the EU has made certainly progress towards harmonization in immigration policies, it 
cannot be denied that several areas that the research in Greece has shown (e.g. asylum, 
detention standards, legal immigration, border surveillance) remain weak points, where 
harmonization is minimal and large gaps cleave between de facto national policies and 
common EU policy goals. The Greek example might be indicative that the EU migration 
apparatus is traversed by severe tensions and conflicting forces of power originating from 
various EU member states. For this reason it seems that the formation of a common EU 
migration management is much less tidy as Feldman has proposed.  
Also Patrick Weil stresses that EU member states can find themselves sometimes in direct 
competition with one another or they produce undesired side effects for each other (e.g. no 
legal reforms at all, or legalizing all illegal immigrants). The research in Greece seems to 
support his argument that “immigration remains a subject to unanimity and the [EU] 
Member States retain a considerable margin of manoeuvre to adopt their policies” of 
diverging national interests (Weil 2006: 89). Moreover, many scholars have argued for an 
ungovernability of global and transnational processes including migration movements. 
Globalisation and its related processes have created dynamism of tensions. The tension 
arises partly due to a selective legalization and criminalization of transborder flows and is 
increased by domestic politics that seek to ensure security and order for their national 
territories (Alonso 2005). However, at a time of historically unparalleled capacities for 
destruction modern states` ability to guarantee security and protect their population on a 
given territory, seems to be more a comforting illusion than a political reality (see Brown 
2010). Today´s world is traversed by diffuse and antagonizing forces that foster, on the one 
hand a process of deterritorialisation, since modern states source their goods and services 
for their economies not nationally but globally and they are driven increasingly by neoliberal 
imperatives. On the other hand, the very same forces foster also a process of 
reterritorialisation, by which states seek to reassert their power within their territories 
(Alonso 2005: 29,35; Brown 2010). According to McKeown “flows and borders are often in 
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tension” and so is the whole global landscape which is structured by flows and barriers, that 
also divide poorer from richer parts of the world (McKeown 2008:8) . This dynamism of 
tension seems to have its source in opposing but simultaneously running processes that are 
deeply entrenched in the liberal mentalities of governments. The inherent tensions and 
discrepancies in liberal values often materialize at the exclusion of some groups of the world 
from participating which resonates also in tensions between states and individuals e.g. 
refugees (McKeown 2008).  
It is important to recognize that also Greece is affected by a dynamism of various tensions. 
For example the country is located at the south-eastern external EU border. Viewed on the 
global map it is a point where a dividing line runs between save EU space, an economically 
privileged and prosperous sphere versus poorer, politically less stable countries, with less 
economic opportunities and less liberties or social justice. These inequalities are impulses for 
immigration movements towards Greece which constitutes an important entry point into 
the EU. All this shows that the implementation of immigration policies depends also within 
the EU first and foremost on the member states. Hence, nation states remain crucial players 
in the transnational movement of people and its management (Bislev 2004; Sharma and 
Gupta 2006a).  
It is interesting to note, that illegal immigration seems to affect countries relatively 
independently of their specific immigration policies. Moreover, immigration processes seem 
to persist also in times of economic insecurity – this seems to hold particularly true for 
Greece (Fakiolas 2003:1). States are not overly powerful and it must be also stressed “that 
even the richest nations in the world are unable to contain and control these movements” 
(Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 18).  
In the last years the Greek state has encountered severe difficulties to guard and control its 
national borders. This has several reasons. It is not due to an increase of the overall number 
of illegal immigrants into the EU. Many of my interview partners have stressed that Greece´s 
special geographic features and particular position make it especially difficult or even 
impossible to secure and control the country´s borders. Mrs. Ziaka from Youth against 
Racism in Europe (YRE) for example gives a clear picture of Greece´s geographic situation 
and the challenges arising from it.  
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First of all Greece is located between Europe and Asia Minor and for many 
different migrants throughout the world it is one of the most important gates 
into Europe. It has more than 15.000 km coastline and more than 2.000 islands 
- some of them are only a few hundred meters away from Turkish mainland. 
Considering all this it becomes clear, that the police or border guards cannot 
successfully control the borders. In the past years increasing numbers of 
migrants entered Greece illegally over sea and stranded mostly on the islands in 
the Aegean Sea. Yet, we see in a recent trend a shift away from the sea 
borders. This started approximately two years ago, well it seems that more and 
more people choose to enter Greece over land at the Greek Turkish border 
where the river Evros needs to be crossed. Of course both of the paths bear 
high risks: People get missing, many drown in the waters, nobody knows how 
many have already lost their lives. 
 
Interview with Christina Ziaka, social worker at YRE, September 14, 2011  
 
Mrs. Ziaka makes it clear that diverse migration flows originating in different parts of the 
world bundle up in Greece which has turned into a central entry point for migrants and 
refugees heading towards the EU. The Greek state´s gate keeping operations have largely 
proved futile and are likely to fail also in future.  
It is important to note, that while other pressure points (e.g. Spain or Italy) of the EU have 
shifted, Greece has remained for several years a major entry point for illegal immigration, 
irrespectively of its shrinking economy (Morehouse and Blomfield 2011:11). While the 
number of undetected immigrants is hard to estimate, the numbers of detected migrants, 
available in public reports and often quoted by Greek politicians in front of running TV 
cameras can give some reference points. According to Frontex the overall detections of 
illegal border crossings over the external EU borders have since 2008 until 2011 oscillated 
between 100.000 and 160.000 (Frontex 2011: 9). 
 Greece, a relatively small and poor country within the EU, became in 2008, the main 
gateway for illegal immigrants. The number of detected illegal border crossings into Greece 
has increased again in 2009 from previously 50% to 75% of the EU total (Frontex 2010a:12). 
Illegal immigration into Greece reached its peak in October 2010, where it accounted “for 
90% of all detections of illegal border crossings to the EU”(Frontex 2010b). As Mrs. Ziaka 
mentioned, the inflows of illegal migrants have notable shifted in the past years from 
Greece´s sea borders to the Greek-Turkish land border. Apprehensions at the land border 
increased from 10 % in 2008 to over 35 % in 2010. In the same period the number of 
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apprehensions at the maritime borders in the Aegean Sea fell by 2010 under 5%, hinting at a 
continuous trend towards the entrance route over land (Kasimis 2012). 
 An interesting detail in this context is also the fact that the land border with Turkey is 
actually Greece´ shortest border stretch. Yet, in 2010 entire 47.706 detections were 
reported in this region by Greek authorities, marking a new peak of illegal border crossing in 
the EU. For comparative purpose previous peaks climaxed at 30.000 detections in 2006 at 
the Canary Islands or at around 30.300 in 2008 on Lampedusa (Frontex 2011: 14). These 
numbers clearly show that illegal immigration towards Greece has persisted during the last 
years despite the EU and the national Greek policy aim to curb undesired inflows. The 
deliberate interventions of the Greek state and cooperative efforts of the EU could not 
prevent illegal migrants from coming.  
Due to Greece difficulties or inabilities to keep unwanted migrants and refugees at bay, 
Frontex intervened in 2010 for the first time in EU history by sending its Rapid Border 
Intervention Team (RABIT) into Greek borderland. From November 2010 until March 2011 a 
total of 191 officers of several EU member states were deployed to re-establish control over 
the Greek borders (Frontex 2011:16).The Frontex joint operations and increasingly 
aggressive policing practices in Greek border areas and Greek national maritime zones might 
indicate an increasing militarized approach in order to keep unwanted migrants out of 
Greece and EU space. Such aggressive policies are according to Rosas an attempt to restore 
an injured state sovereignty (Rosas 2006) .The largely unsuccessful struggle against 
undesired immigrants in Greece, further indicates that EU cooperation on border 
surveillance is unsuccessful.  
Immigration towards Greece flows predominantly through illegal channels due to the 
government´s failure to open up alternative circuits through which migrants could legally 
enter the country. Legal avenues for non European migrants into Greece are both, 
malfunctioning and extremely narrow (European Commission 2008: 13).Considering these 
aspects, it seems to reveal that Greece` administrative and legal structures that are linked to 
the management and regularization of migration remain lacking - or at least under-
developed. This underlines Greece´s lethargic manner regarding the implementation of 
important policy measures. It also shows that in fact EU member states progress with very 
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different pace with the task to create necessary structures in order to manage migration 
effectively and ethically on a national and EU level. 
 
Summing up, it can be concluded that EU member states and their national governments are 
differently challenged by immigration and respond with very different strategies, varying 
degrees of political engagement and success in the field of migration. Greece at the EU´s 
southern margin seems to be particularly challenged by immigration and has been less 
equipped (technically, institutionally, legally or administratively) than other EU members to 
deal with immigrants. Despite the emergence and configuration of a common EU migration 
management regime, looking closer at Greece it seems premature to argue for an overall 
harmonization of national migration systems in the EU. A seamless integration of national 
systems into a smoothly working EU migration apparatus remains a task for the future. In a 
final remark it should be stressed that until now, the Greek state has not taken any 
determined political actions in order to regulate its illegal migrants. Greek migration policies 
remain especially undecided on question such as how to deal with foreigners on its territory, 
how to decide on their political status and how to regulate their access to the Greek labour 
market. Greece has become a country of immigration and the Greek government will not get 
around solving those issues. The undeclared truth is that the Greek state is in need of 
immigrants and a certain level of stable net immigration. This seems to be the only feasible 
way for the county to sustain the state´s functioning in the future, preventing the collapse of 
an ailing Greek welfare system, reinvigorating the economic development through cheap 
labour, and outbalancing the shrinking of the active population. 
Chaper 5  Managing Migrants and Refugees 
This chapter will explore the Greek migration management by looking closer at the Greek 
state´s performances in the border regions. The discussion will show that the Greek state 
has, although part of the EU, still remained the primary agent regarding the implementation 
of migration policies. Investigations into the de facto practices of the Greek state´s migration 
management try to uncover how and in which form state agents exert their power over 
refugees. Due to the fact that established practices are always somehow embedded in 
discourse, the first step will be to explore the current discursive practices in Greece linked to 
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immigration. The aim is to establish a connection between the current discourse on 
migration in Greece and the Greek migration policy and practice. It is argued that the current 
discursive practice on migration paves the way for rough and extreme state actions against 
illegal immigrants. By focusing on the border regions the chapter will illuminate some 
aspects in the Greek migration control and migration management. The border regions have 
been revealed during the research process as hidden spaces or zones of exceptions, in which 
individuals can be stripped off of rights and the Greek state can rule with roguishness and 
excessive force. The aim here is to show that exceptionality seems to play an important part 
in Greek migration management and that the inclusion of Agamben´s bare life seems to be 
an important element in contemporary Greek migration practice. In the subsequent section 
the increasing application of modern surveillance technologies in form of biometrics in 
Greek and EU migration management will be discussed. The aim is to underscore that the 
Greek state employs in the field of migration disciplinary power alongside with sovereign 
power. Besides, it will be shown how refugees and migrants in Greece easily slip from the 
realm of disciplinary power into the realm of sovereign power and how the Greek state 
refuses to inset refugees permanently into the political order. In the final section Greece´s 
bilateral cooperation efforts with Turkey and the aligned practices will be critically assessed. 
The overarching goal of these investigations into different aspects of Greek migration 
management will be to reveal how the Greek state routinely violates human rights and 
constantly overrides international and EU law in its de facto migration practices.  
Discursive Constructions of Immigrants - a Foothold of State Power 
Immigration is one of the most heated topics on the agendas of many governments around 
the world. Also in the EU and its member states debates on immigrants, refugees and asylum 
seeker have become a touch stone issue (Fakiolas 2003; Koser 2007: 234). Especially in 
Greece it is fiercely contested and disputed over migration. Nowadays, migration issues have 
their permanent place in the daily political culture in Greece. Even among Greek politicians 
or other state officials a blatant anti-migration rhetoric is not unusual anymore. In the 
interview with the UNHCR associate, Mrs. Nanou points out how widespread the anti 
immigrant rhetoric is also in Greek politics and connects the current rhetoric with the rising 
anti-immigrant attitudes, xenophobia, and racism in the Greek society.  
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In the context of the economic crisis refugees become easily scapegoats. It is a 
highly politicized environment and migrants and refugees are usually the ones 
to blame [...]. They are strongly linked with criminality, insecurity, degrading 
conditions in certain neighbourhoods and so on. Even politicians use an 
undisguised anti-migration rhetoric and the public attitudes are influenced by 
it. So, what we see is that xenophobia is on the rise and also racism is on the 
rise. These are really serious problems right now here [in Greece].  
 
Interview with Stella Nanou, public information associate at UNHCR Greece, 
March 28, 20012  
 
For example Nikos Dendias the current Greek minister of Citizens' Protection recently stated 
in an inflammatory rhetoric that Greece´s “immigration problem is maybe even bigger than 
the financial one”. In his antagonising speech he warned about the “invasion of immigrants” 
that have brought “[Greece´s] existence [...] under threat” and he referred to the migration 
issue as a “bomb at the foundations of the society and of the state” (Athens News, August 6, 
2012). Dendias´ populist speech is indicative for the current discursive practice on migration 
in Greece. Both, official discourses and media reports on contemporary migration tend to 
paint a picture, which conveys the message that the contour of contemporary migration is 
absolutely unprecedented and come to threaten the very fundaments of the Greek society 
and the Greek nation. The Greek migration discourse displays facts in a highly selective and 
short-sighted manner by which a certain type of reality is constructed. While the Greek state 
and the media play dominant roles in these discursive projects the voices of migrants and 
refugees are largely excluded. According to Foucault, “[t]here is no pre-discursive providence 
that makes the world well-disposed towards us”(Foucault in Nyers 2006: 7). In other words, 
the world is structured and becomes comprehensible only by discourse. This is the reason 
why, critical perspectives on the discursive practices and discursive constructions of migrants 
in Greece are highly valuable. Contemporary migration discourse in Greece is infused by a 
dichotomizing rhetoric that stigmatizes all migrants without any distinctions. Antagonizing 
oppositions between citizens and foreigners, the righteous and the criminals, insiders and 
outsiders, friends and enemies are frequently used. Migrants and refugees are 
predominantly constructed as dangers for the nation state and as social outcasts that lack 
moral and social capacities. As a consequence of the projection of immigrants as dangers 
and threats in every day discourse, social life in Greece is also infused with distrust and fear, 
decreasing sympathy for immigrants, increasing hostility, and hardening separation lines 
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between the immigrant and Greek population. As Peter Nyers has stressed “[w]ith 
sovereignty, self other-encounters can readily be transformed into self-enemy 
confrontations” (Nyers 2006:3). The current antagonizing and separating rhetoric plays also 
an important role for contemporary Greek migration politics. The Greek state has declared 
to fight unwanted human cross border flows which became one of the government´s key 
tasks. In the state´s purported logic political success regarding the immigration issue will in 
consequence alleviate the country´s economic and social problems. 
 The Greek state went over to intensified inner city sweep operations and mass arrests of the 
undocumented in newly built detention facilities near to Athens. The government also 
proclaimed to intensify deportation practices of all those who get caught without papers. 
The Greek state seems to have recently adopted a harder line on illegal immigration. It seeks 
for technical and rapid solutions for the “migration problem”. It must be acknowledged that 
the current rhetoric in the media and official discourse paves the way for roguish state 
actions and extreme state measures against illegal migrants. In the light of the current 
discursive practice, the state is presented in the role of the protector of the nation and of 
the Greek socio-political order. Through a particular kind of discursive construction of 
immigrants in the public sphere the Greek state gains a foothold where it can tackle the 
“migration threat” by the exertion of sovereign power presented as a necessary means of 
defence. This argument remains a central theme in the following discussion in which 
ethnographic insights shall provide the necessary substance for this somehow radical claim. 
By focusing on Greek border regions the next section seeks to expose those practices in the 
current migration management which seem to be more a manifestation of sovereign power 
than of disciplinary power. 
 
Refugee Management in Greek Border Regions 
 
In a way Greece became the dumping ground for all the people other European 
states don´t want or don´t need and at the same time Greece has been turned 
into the policeman of Europe and of course every policeman is a very cruel 
person. 
 
Interview with Vasilis Ververis, legal consultant at the group of lawyers, 
February 12, 2012  
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The border regions were revealed in the course of this research as hidden spaces or zones of 
exceptions, where the Greek state governs with excessive force and where individuals can 
be totally stripped off of any rights. In the following section it will be argued that particularly 
in Greek border lands archaic sovereign power manifests itself regularly. A central argument 
is that exceptionality has come to play an essential part in Greek migration management. 
Moreover, it will be argued that those excessive and violent state performances show a 
sovereign power which is in fact in the process of its decline.  
Historically state sovereignty has been fundamentally embedded in territory. According to 
Foucault premodern states were more dependent on territory and the production of the 
soil, while modern states have shifted their attention more on subjects´ bodies and their 
operations (Foucault 2006:546, 2010). However, such pronouncements that globalisation or 
modernity will lead to a demise of the state and make territorial aspects of nation states 
irrelevant turned out as inaccurate. Although much of the globalisation literature of the 
1990s argued in this vein, modern states have remained politically strong and the state´s 
power still resides partly in its territory (Bislev 2004; Krohn-Hansen and Nustard 2005). 
There is still a strong, even though not “unbroken link between state power, sovereignty, 
and territory” that has remained since ancient up to modern times (Hansen and Stepputat 
2005:2). Also the Greek state is an example for the continued importance of national 
territory in politics and especially in the field of security and immigration. With the rise of 
the Greek nation state in the early 19th century the Greek community which has been 
previously only ideologically defined became after the Greek war of independence also 
territorially more concrete. The subsequent strong national awakening among Greeks was 
also a deliberate separation from a painful past inflicted through the Ottoman occupation 
(Karakasidou 2002:186). The concept of being Greek is usually defined by three things: being 
of Greek origin, being Greek orthodox and speaking Greek as the mother tongue 
(Chrysoloras 2004). However, it seems that there is also an increasingly strong place based-
identification among Greeks. It might be amplified by the endurance of Greek classic culture 
in age-old artefacts and concrete material forms on Greek historic lands. Different concepts 
of the relation between place and people can have an impact on both, the representations 
of migrants and the development of migration policies (see Brun 2001). The Greek national 
consciousness or national identity that consists of different aspects like language, religion, 
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origin, place and so on seem to provide a large range of elements that can be politically 
instrumentalized and can be activated to support certain political aims, new imaginaries, and 
myths of the past and the present.  
The strong national consciousness in the Greek society is also reflected in the increasing 
popularity of nationalist politics and the unsettling success of the far right wing party Golden 
Dawn (or Chryssi Avgi). Since the last parliamental election of the 17th June 2012 Chryssi 
Avgi is represented in the Greek parliament and has become the third largest political power 
with growing tendency (Die Zeit 2012). Frequent discussions with Greeks have shown that 
the current immigration process is often perceived as an assault on a previously 
predominantly mono-ethnic Greek population. The majority of the Greek population seems 
to desire stricter regulations of their national borders. However, the global condition that 
promotes transnational movements of capital, money, goods, and labour is simultaneously 
the necessary condition which creates the wealth of modern nations (J. Comaroff and J. L. 
Comaroff 2005: 124). Certainly, migration, like other globalisation processes have strong 
deterritorializing effects (Alonso 2005: 28). In the face of these centrifugal force parts of the 
Greek society seem to develop a strong attachment to the Greek nation and its territory, 
ready to defend. The Greek public generally responds with a decreasing openness to 
foreigners, growing rejection, increasing hostility and even racism against migrants. “Today, 
xenophobia [in Greece] is so overdetermined by the economic and political insecurities 
generated by globalization” and it becomes frequently coupled with a call to the state “ to 
close and secure [the] national borders” (Brown 2010: 68). Recently, the Greek government 
has started to construct a fence at a frequently crossed border-stretch in the Evros region. 
This project is presented to the public as a security measure that will block the inflow of 
illegal migrants, deter smugglers and protect the nation from all kind of threats. The project 
is an aggressive form of border demarcation and a clear expression of the Greek state´s 
reterritroialisation efforts. Oppose to the government´s argumentation many national and 
international NGOs have criticised Greece´s attempted fortification. In this vein UNHCR 
information associate Mrs Nanou questions the functional effectiveness of this relative 
expensive project and raises concerns, that this wall is likely to “prevent people, particularly 
refugees by physical blockage to seek international protection” (Interview with Stella Nanou, 
public information associate at UNHCR Greece, March 28, 2012).  
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In the ethnography Walled States, Waning Sovereignty, Wendy Brown (2010) has thoroughly 
analysed motives, triggers and consequences of the recent walling practices that have re-
emerged in modern nation states. The insights of her research are highly informative in 
order to understand what is behind the Greek endeavour of fencing its sovereign territory. 
Brown underscores that the modern world is traversed by untameable powers that were 
unleashed by globalisation and that cannot be successfully governed by laws and politics of 
singular states. In the face of this ungovernability, modern states start to resort to various 
forms of surveillance such as policing and blockading in which the erection of walls is part of 
a whole strategic complex (Brown 2010: 24). Brown argues that the new walls are overt 
indicators of an eroding sovereign power while outwardly staging an image of state control. 
According to Brown, “[t]he new walls often function theatrically, projecting power and 
efficacy that they do not and cannot actually exercise [...]. [The new walls create] an imago 
of sovereign state power in the face of its undoing” (Brown 2010:25). Following Brown, 
Greece´s current fencing project at its borders, stages power which is in fact waning. The 
Greek fence is only a short flickering of spectacular sovereign power in a process of its 
decline. The wall only makes the circumstance overt, that the Greek state is unable to 
govern and control the movements across its borders. The Greek fencing can be explained as 
a strategy in which the state installs “a ceremonial by which a momentarily injured 
sovereignty is reconstituted. It restores that sovereignty by manifesting it [...] [in a] most 
spectacular [form]” (Foucault 1995:48).  
The construction of a wall along the Greek-Turkish border is an overt sign of Greece´s 
eroding state power. At the same time, the wall outwardly stages an image of state control 
and constitutes as such, a strategic move by the Greek government which sends important 
signals. It is a signal of blockage for unwanted immigrants and a signal of security for fearful 
Greek citizens. Precisely in the attempt to hold on to an increasingly fragile power the Greek 
state is urged to stage its power artificially, by impressive and excessive sovereign 
ceremonials. 
Also Aradhana Sharma and Akil Gupta have profoundly questioned modern states` abilities 
to guarantee their sovereignty, maintain security over a given territory and defend the 
sanctity of their borders (Sharma and Gupta 2006: 23). Yet, Sven Bislev underscores that 
despite the changing effects of globalisation on the role and workings of states, successful 
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defence, the maintenance of public security and the protection of a certain regime 
associated with social order still remain political core functions of modern states (Bislev 
2004). According to Alonso modern states tend to respond to this dilemma “by affirming 
sovereign power, developing techniques to recentralize authority and [...] [to recourse to] 
reterritorialisation” (Alonso 2005:29).  
Border fortification, became also the measure of choice by the Greek state. In this form the 
illusion of a secure and bounded nation shall be created. The Greek wall is a technique of 
reterritorialisation and evokes the false believe that the Greek nation state could be sealed 
off from external influences and transnational forces that have dissolved the Greek national 
economy, have rapidly changed the Greek society and demography, and have increased the 
social, cultural and religious diversity in the country.  
The construction of a physical barrier at the edge of Greek sovereign lands also fakes the 
existence of a clear dividing line between internal and external sovereign space. However, 
the opposite is the case and with increasing securitization techniques the clear distinction 
between inside and outside, police and military, such as law and lawlessness is increasingly 
blurred (Alonso 2005; Brown 2010; Rosas 2006). In the next step this argument will be 
backed by ethnographic material that indicate that also the edges of the Greek state 
constitute in fact zones of growing lawlessness and excessive state power.  
Greek Border Regions as Zones of Exception 
Greece´s border regions turned out to be a crucial space for investigations on the Greek 
state´s response to migrants and refugees. The interviews with my informants have drawn a 
picture of Greek migration management in which the affirmation of sovereign power by 
unlawful state practices, the routine denial of fundamental rights, and violent performances 
by Greek authorities seem to have a constant place. In accordance with Agamben, who 
argues that the state of exception has been generalized in western political culture, this 
section rests on the thesis that Greek border regions mark zones of exception. Glimpses into 
the border regions that opened up through the experience and stories of refugees, as well as 
other interlocutors, are the basis for this claim.  
Although numerous hints at roguish state behaviour in Greek borderlands have been given, 
it must be admitted that there is “the difficulty to find out what is actually happening” in the 
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border regions (Interview with Spyros Risakos, director of Aitima, March,2012). Moreover, as 
one of my informants enunciated in suspicion, it is likely that the “Greek government has an 
interest to suppress the revelation of what is going on” (ibid.). Also scholars like Jutta Lauth 
Bacas have underscored, that the Greek border region and the Aegean sea mark political 
empty spaces into which it is difficult to investigate and which are usually impenetrable for 
the public eye (Lauth Bacas 2010: 156). This problematic situation was frequently alluded to 
by many of my interlocutors. The leader of the Afghan Refugee Community in Athens (ARCA) 
also brought up this issue in an unsettling statement.  
I don´t know and nobody really knows what is happening out there in these 
places - it is all very murky. I mean, the regions at the borders are kind of grey 
zones. Beyond certain points no one is allowed to go and see what is actually 
happening there. I remember, one reporter he said, he had permission for 
filming and documentation by the ministries. He wanted to see exactly what 
Frontex and the Greek border guards are doing- but the team was not allowed 
to go and film. There are many things that we hear about, of course, but we 
cannot tell if it is true. For example in a Turkish Ministry two months ago, it was 
reported that Frontex killed an asylum seeker at the border but we don´t have 
evidence. We hear of course also many stories from refugees. Recently I spoke 
with an Afghan refugee. He lost his wife in the river Evros she drowned when 
they crossed it. He had also a small son, 5 years old. The men said when they 
crossed the river he was not able to save his wife and his son. So he had to 
decided and saved the child. The men said that there were police men around, 
he was shouting for help but they did not do anything, they were only watching 
from a distance. Although the man was shouting the police did not come for 
help, they did not do anything. It seems that these things really happen. We 
hear such stories from refugees. But there is no clear evidence and there are 
many things happening, that we cannot know, because it is forbidden to see 
what is going on at the borders.  
  
Interview with Yunos Daktar, leader of the ARCA, March 12,2012 
 
A cold shiver might run down one´s spine listening to what the community leader says. He 
states that the border regions are shield from the media and every day perceptions, marking 
zones in which lawlessness rules. In these zones along the Greek frontiers, the distinctions 
between inside and outside, law and violence get continuously blurred. The leader even 
bluntly states that in these zones of indistinction human beings are left to die or can be killed 
by state authorities without committing a crime. As Yael Navaro-Yashin put it bluntly 
“[c]rossing borders means either consigning to death or to giving up one´s rights “(Navaro-
Yashin 2005: 114). Thus it seems that in the Greek border lands the state governs over 
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refugees by using its power not only to discipline and punish but also to kill with impunity. 
The Greek state can strip off individuals from any rights and can rule with excessive violence 
in these spaces. At the borders as a zone of indistinction, it becomes impossible to clearly 
distinguish between the transgression of the law and the execution of the law. This reveals 
according to Agamben, the very core of sovereign power (Agamben 1998:57). Agamben´s 
point of departure is Carl Schmidt´s definition of sovereignty: “sovereign is he who decides 
on the exception” (Schmidt in Brown 2010: 55). According to Agamben, the essence of state 
sovereignty is the legal power to suspend law in order to create law. The legal authority to 
move beyond law, places the sovereign at the same time inside and outside the juridical 
order. In this significant fact lies the paradox of sovereignty which has remained the nucleus 
of sovereign power and is also deeply entrenched in modern democracies of the western 
world (Agamben 1998). 
The analysis of the Greek state´s practices in the realm of refugee management seems to be 
infused by this paradox of sovereignty. The Greek state´s power to move beyond law 
became observable in various stories and account of and about refugees. Also Gilberto 
Rosas, who has done ethnographic research on the US- Mexico border, underscores that, 
border lands are juridically empty spaces in which the state´s power can culminate at its 
absolute maximum- the power over life and death (Rosas 2006:338). Each space or stretch of 
land in which the normal juridical order is suspended is a materialization of the state of 
exception. In such exceptional zones life can be killed without committing a crime and 
“whether or not atrocities are committed depends not on law but only on the civility and 
ethical sense of the police who temporarily act as sovereign”(Agamben 1998:174). 
However, ethical conduct of authorities is overly fragile in exceptional spaces. The interviews 
with Afghan refugees and NGO staff have shown that Greek police officers are easily 
corruptable and use their power in abusive ways against refugees and migrants. According 
to Mrs. Ziaka “verbal blackmailing, harassment and violence by the police are common 
practices especially in detention centres but also generally”(Interview with Christina Ziaka, 
social worker at YRE, September 14, 2011). Also individual accounts of refugees have 
described police violence and abusive practices as a reoccurring theme. For example Ezat a 
young Afghan refugee was put under extreme psychological pressure in one of his first 
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interviews conducted by a border police officer in the Evros region. He recalls the situation 
as follows: 
I had no translator, and the interview was conducted in English. It was very 
harsh and rough. It was a fat fascist who interviewed me and he asked so many 
questions, like why did you come, who brought you here, where I came from 
and so on. It took nearly two hours. Whenever he did not like my answer the 
police officer was yelling at me. Sometimes, he was threatening me, he hit with 
his fists on the table or stood up and leaned towards me, shouting in my face: 
Tell me the truth! Tell me the truth! I told him that this was the truth but he 
always accused me of lying.  
Interview with Ezat, an Afghan refugee, March 17, 2012 
This form of interrogation can be regarded as a modern technique of torture that aims at the 
establishment of truth. It bears a strong resemblance with penal investigations in pre 
modern Europe, so eminently described by Foucault in Discipline and Punish (1995). The 
search for information and evidence by the Greek officer uses psychological pressure what is 
likely a routinized and regulated practice. These practices deliberately inflict mental pain or 
suffering for the purpose of information gathering. Such violent approaches and bully-boy 
tactics are clear manifestations of sovereign power and several refugees I spoke to have 
described similar experiences like the one of Ezat. Thus, these violent practices and 
sophisticated techniques seem to play an important role in the police´s investigations of 
refugees and migrants at the borders. The Greek state as an institution is substantiated by 
such routinized practices of the police. In these practices the state demonstrates 
unconstrained power over refugees and migrants. The offence of law due to illegal border 
crossing gives the state represented by the police officer the right to punish, use violence 
and make war on the declared enemy. With these performances “the dissymmetry between 
the subject who has dared to violate the law and the all-powerful sovereign who displays his 
strength” shall find its expression (Foucault 1995:49).  
These pages tried to show that the Greek state has established spaces in which imbalanced 
power and excessive state violence is exerted and can be legitimately performed on what 
has been previously declared as the enemy – in this case undesired migrants and refugees. In 
short, exceptionality and the suspension of the law seem to have become permanent 
elements in the Greek governance of migrants. In Greece, the place where democracy once 
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originated sovereign power and violent state practices are an important part in migration 
management. The following section will move on to the increasing application of biometrics 
in Greek and EU migration management and emphasises the intersection or combination of 
modern disciplinary power with sovereign power in the field of migration.  
New Security Technology and the Formation of Governable Subjects  
A general EU policy goal is the establishment and application of biometrics in migration 
management with the central aim of facilitating transnational data sharing. The research in 
Athens has shown that biometrics seem to have also become an important technology in the 
current management of migrants and refugees in Greece. Individuals who are caught and 
apprehended after having illegally entered the county are all digitalized by modern biometric 
information technologies and become electronically inscribed in large database or a 
disciplinary realm.  
Ezat made it to Greece together with a group of other migrants by crossing the river Evros 
from the Turkish side. For the trip he paid an amount of about 1000€ to the smugglers. In his 
account, Ezat describes the procedure that generally follows after the Greek police 
apprehend migrants in the border region.  
The police caught us shortly after we have crossed the border. I was together 
with some other refugees and my friend. Before they took us into a detention 
centre they immediately asked us questions, what´s your name, where are you 
from, who brought you and so on. We arrived at a police station, where I had a 
first interview and then, the police took pictures of me and also took my 
fingerprints. They saved everything together with my information.  
 
Interview with Ezat, Afghan refugee, February 2, 2012 
 
This, and many other refugee accounts, shows that account shows that migrants once 
apprehended by police guards and subsequently brought to a police station or a detention 
centre get registered by the Greek police through photographs, fingerprints, and other forms 
of individual data that is stored in a large database. Such modern individualized information 
systems bring the correlations between the human body and surveillance to the fore. 
According to Pamela Sankar (2001), the increasing application of biometrics in individual 
identification “[embodies] the belief that social threats are located within free-standing 
individuals” (Sankar 2001:274). A believe that seems to be particularly strong in the Greek 
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society and is greatly fostered through the current public and political discourse previously 
discussed. 
Nikolas Rose (1999) developed the concept of ‘the securitization of identity’(Rose 1999: 240-
246) by extensively elaborating on Foucault´s writings of governmentality. From a 
governmentality perspective, Rose notes that contemporary societies are characterized by 
multiplying contexts in which the exercise of freedom is predicated on proof of legitimate 
identity (Rose 1999:240). Rose stresses, those who lack such a proof like illegal migrants and 
potential refugees cannot exercise freedom and seem to be condemned to a live in 
insecurity and fear. The implications of a lacking legitimate identity are e.g. lacking political 
rights and lacking rights for social entitlements. For Grabska (2006) “[i]llegality equates with 
inability to claim justice” and illegality has an impact on all aspects of human live (Grabska 
2006:295). In a similar vein, Rose furthermore underscores, that modern projects of 
individual securitization give “conditional access to circuits of consumption and civility [...] 
[and establish] recurrent switch points to be passed in order to access the benefits of 
liberty” (Rose 1999:243). 
According to Colin Gordon, the modern practice of government in Western societies is 
characterised by the coupling of “individuation and control” or in Foucauldian terms, 
“individualization and totalization” (Gordon 1991:3). Numerous modes of identification are 
created to achieve this purpose ranging from modern biometric identification, to social 
security numbers, licenses or bank cards. In order to gain access to privileges and 
entitlements, an individual is required to present an official document which can be 
connected to a virtual identity in form of a database record that stores personal details. 
Many Afghan refugees in Athens, who have not, or could not yet enter the asylum procedure 
are devoid of any valid mode of identification in a foreign country, and are burdened by all 
the described consequences like no access to entitlements, lack of rights, justice and civic 
liberties. 
With biometric technologies migrants and refugees are inserted into the disciplinary realm 
of the Greek nation state and become at the same time also part of the transnational 
disciplinary realm of the entire EU. In opposition to the real body the biometric information 
of the individual can infinitely and instantaneously travel across national borders. EU wide 
data sharing is the strength of the so called EURODAC system. EURODAC was created in 2005 
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and stores information on individuals. Human identities are grasped in digital form of 
fingerprints, eye colour, physiological or even genetic data (Feldman 2012:62,120). The 
biometric data stored in this system can be anytime compared with the biometric data taken 
from a person and can proof the traveller´s identity. With this administrative technique a 
new mode of identification is created that also provides a new instrument for modern state 
surveillance. Biometrics are designed to identify human bodies that might move 
unauthorized through EU space and facilitate the management and regulation of the 
movements of people within and across the EU (Feldman 2012). With modern biometrics 
the human body is turned into a governable object of the nation state, and since it is 
detectable, it can be easier controlled. Also the individual´s status determination is 
facilitated by these biometric technologies (Feldman 2012:117-122). In consequence, the 
body under surveillance entails that “access and inclusion, and distribution of entitlements 
or powers may now depend on the display of some body features” (Lyon 2001:297). 
It is important to realize that with the application of new biometric technologies the Greek 
state turns illegal migrants and refugees into governable subjects. Moreover, with 
biometrics the Greek state has created a new tool of state control. It is also a tool that 
facilitates the state´s significant role of shaping and conditioning the identity of individuals 
that have arrived on its sovereign territory.  
 
Illegality and Sovereign Power 
It is the individual´s politically ascribed classification by the state that decides over access to 
social entitlements and rights. The political classification also decides on which side of the 
juridical order the individual stands and thus to which form of state power the human body 
can be subjected. Fuglerud has underscored that the foreigner inside the political order and 
the foreigner outside the political order are subject to two different modalities of state 
power (Fuglerud 2005:310). Illegal invaders into sovereign space are dwelling outside the 
normal legal-political order and can be subjected to excessive forms of state power and can 
even be eliminated by corrosive sovereign power. As such, illegal migrants resemble homo 
sacer, who can be killed without committing a crime. The foreigner inside the political order, 
such as migrants with a legal stay permit or asylum applicants with a valid pink card are at 
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least temporarily inserted into the normal political order. Thus these individuals are rather 
subjected to disciplinary power and techniques of domination and control instead of 
sovereign power (see Fuglerud 2005). The study in Greece has shown that the Greek state 
seem to recurrently slide immigrants and refugees in or out of the political order. It is very 
difficult for potential refugees who entered illegally to succeed in legalizing their status. It 
seems that the majority of migrants and refugees even those who could temporarily legalize 
their stay sooner or later fall back into illegality and remain excluded from the juridical 
political order. Notably, the Greek state assigns to all illegal migrants and refugees after their 
release from detention a temporarily semi-legal status. This state practice shows a point 
where the fault line between illegality and legality becomes strangely blurred. 
Greek authorities usually detain illegal migrants and refugees, and we have 
talked about the [horrible] conditions of Greek detention centres before. Well, 
after the release from detention, all migrants and refugees are given an official 
paper. We call it the “white paper”. It has some personal data on it, and the 
date of issue. Basically this paper is an order to leave the country within the 
next 30 days. So in other words it is a kind of postponed deportation order, and 
the migrant or refugees is given a little time to manoeuvre in the country, and 
he or she cannot be deported by the police before the deadline ends. According 
to our experience most or let´s say nearly all migrants don´t leave the country 
after these 30 days. They often stay for years only with this white paper and of 
course also for refugees it is usually not even possible to make an asylum claim 
within the time. Also what is important to note is, that this order is written only 
in Greek, so most of the recipients, don´t even understand it. 
 
Interview with Katherina Komita, lawyer at the GCR, March 20, 2012 
 
These descriptions given by a GCR lawyer sketch out how the Greek state gives illegal 
migrants and refugees for a short period of 30 days a semi-legal status in which the person is 
actually allowed to remain in Greece and is temporarily protected from forced deportation. 
Yet after this short reprieve illegal immigrants and also asylum seekers who could not yet 
submit an application and continue to stay in Greece fall back into illegality. After this point 
they can be arrested and deported anytime and can be subjected to violence and extreme 
forms of state power.  
Many refugees actually want to move on to another European country but without valid 
documents and money they are trapped in Greece. Due to a malfunctioning bureaucracy it is 
extremely difficult for them to enter the asylum procedure and the chances to obtain a legal 
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status in the process are very low. Those who are caught overstaying the 30 day deadline or 
got caught trying to leave Greece in order to reach other EU countries get often rearrested 
and must again face prolonged detention. However, according to the law migrants in Greece 
must be released from detention after a maximum period of three months - or in 
exceptional cases after a maximum of six months. How common forced deportations after 
arrests are, is hard to tell. Yet what is widely known is that the Greek state has difficulties 
executing deportation orders. In order to deport foreigners the Greek state must establish 
their identity. Besides, also a bilateral relation and correspondence must be established with 
the migrant´s country of origin. “This is all a very complicated procedure, especially from a 
diplomatic point of view let´s say, and for some people and for some nationalities it is just 
not feasible to deport them “(Interview with Stella Nanou, the public information associate 
at UNHCR Greece, March 28, 2012). If the Greek state fails to succeed with these tasks - 
establishment of migrant´s identity and bilateral correspondence with migrant´s home 
country- by the end of the maximum detention period the migrant must be set free again 
and cannot be forcefully repatriated. Similarly, a social worker of Praksis points out several 
issues pertaining forcefully returns, that he considers as problematic. 
It is very difficult for the state to deport illegal migrants back into their 
countries. Sometimes deportations are simply not possible due to technical 
problems like the lack of a functioning airport in the home country or you 
cannot send them back in countries in war, and of course very often the 
necessary [bilateral] relations [are lacking] [...]. Also, a favoured strategy of 
many migrants from Africa to protect themselves from forced deportations is to 
[fasely] claim to be Ghanian. Since there is no Ghanian embassy in Greece it is 
impossible for the Greek state to send illegal immigrants back to Ghana. 
They,[Greek authorities] only tell them you have to go back, but they cannot 
send them back. They give them a white paper, they don´t go and this problem 
remains. 
 
Interview with Aris Kondakas, social worker at Praksis, November 21, 2011  
 
What sounds like a paradox, is that illegal immigrants can be rearrested but after three 
month they must be released. They are re- issued another white paper by Greek authorities, 
with the order to leave the country within 30 days. This procedure can, according to my 
informants happen repeated times. It shows how migrants and refugees obtain temporarily 
a semi-legal status but they fall very soon back out of the political order. Regarding forceful 
returns the Greek state power to execute these political decisions is often impaired due to 
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diplomatic and practical difficulties. In this context illegal migrants and refugees cannot be 
removed from the Greek sovereign territory and continue to appear as disturbing elements 
in the Greek political order. A large number of these human beings seem to be condemned 
to inhabit a zone of the Greek political order that is characterised by the suspension of the 
law. 
Many Afghan refugees I have met in Athens have stayed for many years illegally in the 
country often keeping only an expired white paper as their only identification document in 
their pocket. Most of them have been previously arrested, fingerprinted, and detained, 
sometimes even multiple times. Yet as the practice of “white paper issuing” has shown, the 
political existence of these individuals is continuously denied by the Greek state although 
they continue to live amidst the Greek society. Yet, this procedure of individual classification 
that seems pointless and absurd on the surface is nevertheless a bureaucratic act. At a 
deeper level, it can be argued that this repetitive procedure “is [part of] these putatively 
technical and unremarkable practices that render tenable the political tasks of state 
formation, governance, and the exertion of power” (Sharma and Gupta 2006:11). In other 
words, state governance can be conceptualized as a material practice mediated by and 
negotiated with documents(Hull 2008:501). As Riles notes, “documents are paradigmatic 
artefacts of modern knowledge practice” (Riles 2006:2). In the making of knowledge, 
documents are generated not because they replace the reality, but because they constitute 
the reality. Despite the de facto existence of migrants and refugees in the Greek social 
reality the Greek state makes illegal migrants non-existent also by the bureaucratic act of 
“white paper issuing”. The Greek state refuses to insert illegal immigrants into the political 
order and forces them into a zone of indistinction. In consequence individuals, as illegal 
classified, can become the object of sovereign power, and are cut off from accesses to social 
welfare entitlements, fundamental rights and other forms of socio-political power. Many 
refugees who did not want apply for asylum due to mistrust in a fair asylum process, fear of 
rejection or were simply not able to enter the asylum procedure often live in extreme 
poverty in Greece - many of them are homeless, lack health care and other social services. 
Official documents, e.g. papers of their country of origin, the Greek pink card, and even the 
white paper can be for refugees and migrants a source of power and constitute a base for 
action. Those individuals who are devoid of a legitimate political status and lack any form of 
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official document issued by Greek authorities, can become the target of corrosive sovereign 
power. Without a clear and legitimate place in the political order the foreign body of Afghan 
refugees can be subjected to unrestrained state power. Being outside of the political order 
implies for illegal migrants and Afghan refugees that they can be anytime arrested, detained, 
deported, harassed and attacked by the police or xenophobic and racist citizens. Due to their 
illegal status they lack the power to protect themselves from violent practices perpetrated 
either by state officials or Greek citizens, and they cannot claim justice. 
Bilateral Exit through the Greek Turkish Readmission Agreement 
Illegal migration in Greece seems to undermine the political and social order and challenges 
sovereign territory and power. The Greek state hastens to defend both sovereignty and 
security. As demonstrated so far the state seeks to restore its power through various 
defence strategies and surveillance techniques. This final section will focus on Greece´s 
bilateral cooperation efforts on migrants with Turkey and its related practices which 
constitute another important element in Greece´s migration management. 
In order to make it easier to rid itself from undesired migrants and refugees on Greek 
territory, the Greek government signed in 2001 a bilateral agreement with Turkey. Several of 
my informants have confirmed that, on the basis of this treaty Greek authorities routinely 
return illegal migrants to Turkey after they have passed the Greek-Turkish border. However, 
due to tense Greek-Turkish political relations, Greece seems to have difficulties to 
consolidate this readmission agreement (European Commission 2008: 37). Greek authorities 
seem to compensate these problems by the recourse to informal deportation practices at 
the borders, where “migrants and refugees are regularly pushed back to the Turkish side” 
(Interview with Katherina Kamita, lawyer at GCR, March 20, 2012). The interviews and 
informal conversations leave no doubts that rigorous expulsions of migrants and refugees 
are common practices at the Greek Turkish border. It needs to be underscored, that in these 
practices the Greek border police expels not only illegal migrants with force but also 
potential refugees even in the case when they explicitly ask for asylum.  
For example Jaheed stated in his story that he knows “that the [Greek] police deported some 
people who arrived together [with him in Greece], [...] ignoring the fact that they asked for 
asylum. They were brought immediately back to Turkey. However, the next day some of 
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them have made it back to Greece again” (Interview with Jaheed, Afghan asylum seeker, 
March 22, 2012). Jaheed´s experience shows both the unlawfulness in the Greek deportation 
practice and the ineffectiveness of such aggressive push backs. The highly porous character 
of the Greek border makes it often possible for those expelled to return again to Greece only 
a few days later.  
Despite the impression of easily surmountable Greek-Turkish borders, one must not 
underestimate the high risks entailed in this journey. Not all who embark on this journey will 
actually make it to the other side. How common the phenomenon of drowning is at Greek 
shores became clear in the interviews with the Afghan community leader. During the 
interview, Yunos Daktar received a call of an Afghan family that has lost its 3 year old 
daughter a week ago in the Evros. Ending the call Mr. Daktar says that,  
the parents are still hoping to find their daughter, but of course there is no 
hope anymore for this little girl. The Greek authorities have pulled out many, 
many dead bodies from the river and just one hour ago when I contacted them 
again, I was told that they have just found a young woman and two men from 
Pakistan – they are all dead. 
 
Interview with Yunos Daktar, leader of the ARCA, March 12, 2012  
 
Also the director of the Greek NGO Aitima, has confirmed this dark picture and made a 
statement regarding the quantitative dimension of these tragedies. Following the director, 
“in 2011, 1.500 people are estimated to have drowned” in their desperate attempt to reach 
Greek soil (Interview with Spyros Risakos, director of Aitima, March 20,2012). The same 
number was also confirmed by the UNHCR associate in Athens (Stella Nanou, 28 March, 
2012).  
The preliminary investigations have shown that refugees easily fall prey to reckless 
smugglers and due to the geographically challenging area around Greece many lives have 
been effaced. On top of that, the indistinctive deportation practices and aggressive push-
packs by Greek authorities are likely to contribute further to an increasing death toll. In a 
recent asylum case of an Afghan applicant which Mrs. Komita prepared, it turned out that 
the Greek police seem even to expel minors who have applied for asylum in Greece back to 
Turkey. 
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I had a recent case of a minor who has his brother in Denmark. I made an 
application for a transfer to Denmark based on the family reunion principle. 
Since the applicant did not have any documents I did not expect that the 
authorities in Denmark would accept him. The applicant decided [...] not to 
wait for the decision and tried to go on his own to Denmark. Of course I did not 
know that and when I received the answer from Denmark which was positive I 
was trying to call him to prepare everything for the transfer and also the police 
tried to reach him but all without success. So I called his brother in Denmark 
and he told me that he had tried to leave Greece and he was caught at the 
borders by the Greek police and they returned him to Turkey. I don´t know 
how... because, this is illegal. He had a pink card, and from his fingerprints the 
police should have known that he is an asylum applicant so this is against the 
law. 
 
Interview with Katherina Komita, lawyer at the GCR, March 20, 2012 
 
Mrs. Komita and other informants have openly stated that the deportation practices by 
Greek authorities to Turkey, seems often to transcend the law. Fact is that most of the 
expelled individuals will try to cross Greece´s borders again, some will try it multiple times 
until they will succeed or existentially fail. Even if expelled refuges won´t embark on this live 
threatening journey to Greece again, their lives are nevertheless often placed in jeopardy 
due to their illegal status in Turkey. Referring to the Greek Turkish bilateral agreement the 
UNHCR public associate stresses that, 
 this readmission agreement is in conflict with international refugee law. A 
cornerstone of the Geneva Convention is the principle of non-refoulement, 
which means that a person cannot be send back to a country where his life or 
freedom might be threatened. If Greece returns refugees back to Turkey, then 
Turkey might expel them further to Irak or Iran let´s say. The person´s life might 
be threatened in this country and so this basic principle is violated. 
 
 Interview with Stella Nanou, public information associate at UNHCR Greece, 
March 28, 2012  
 
Mrs. Nanou points at a further important detail, which lies in the danger of chain-
refoulment. Refugees who become expelled by Greek authorities to Turkey can become 
affected by a second deportation in succession executed by Turkish authorities. The UNHCR 
associate highlights the fact that Turkey has not yet adopted the 1967 Protocol that 
removed the geographically limitation of the Refugee Convention and broadened the rights 
of refugees to people coming from outside of Europe. With this important detail in mind, the 
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dire and life threatening consequences for refugees due to impending chain refoulement 
entailed to the formal or informal expulsion practices of Greek authorities become clear.  
The research gave ground to suspect that even single mothers with minor children get 
deported by Turkish authorities to countries in war. This happened to Arifa, an Afghan 
woman in her early 30s. She belongs to the Hazara people who are one of the most 
oppressed ethnicities in Afghanistan. She fled as a single woman with three minor children 
from Afghanistan to Turkey. Before she was able to continue her journey to Greece she was 
apprehended by Turkish authorities and forcefully returned to Afghanistan. Only in a second 
journey she and her three sons finally made it safely to Greece where she is living now in one 
of Athens` refugee shelters. The experience of this woman underscores once more, the 
particular harmfulness of unlawful deportations or push backs by Greek authorities to 
Turkey. Even if it is conceivable that not all people who are expelled by Greek authorities to 
Turkey are refugees, the research has shown that by Greece´s indistinctive and aggressive 
deportation practice also people in need of protection are expelled. For refugees and 
especially for the most vulnerable among them, the life-threatening danger of chain-
refoulement in Turkey looms very large. 
The current Greek deportation practices severely violate the rights of refugees and hint on a 
silent escalation of human right abuse at the borders. These practices are in conflict with 
international laws and basic democratic principles. The formal and informal deportation 
practices which are of dire consequences for refugees are one aspect in a larger complex 
where the Greek state has the power to decide over live and death. The fact that the Greek 
state constantly breaches international and European law are the basis on which the 
argument rests that exceptionality does not only momentarily materialize but has become a 
constant element in the Greek migration management.  
Especially the border regions mark a space where law and violence have become 
indissolubly linked. With a political ideology that conceives illegal migrants and refugees as a 
threat and frames them as criminals, Greek state authorities seem to be predisposed 
towards violent performance against illegal immigrants. These practices are presented as 
aggression in defence that appears under this ideological light legitimate. The action of the 
operating police at the borders can violate the normal legal order with the aim to protect 
the Greek nation in order to restore security. As the ethnographic insights have revealed the 
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exertion of the Greek state´s power can even produce death which often goes on unnoticed 
and cannot be punished. Foucault argues that modern forms of governance that are 
characterised by biopolitics would measure and limit the excessiveness of sovereign power. 
However, recently growing literature on sovereignty have questioned Foucault´s notion of a 
clear distinction between disciplinary and sovereign power. Today, the whole world 
“continues to see and experience state massacres, state terror, and state torture” (Krohn-
Hansen and Nustard 2005:19). What the investigations into the Greek state´s governance in 
the field of migration have revealed is that a tidy distinction between sovereign and 
disciplinary power seems to be lacking. The explorations of the de facto practices of the 
Greek state have shown that the dividing line between these two concepts is rather blurred.  
In sum, the central aim in this chapter was to show on the basis of ethnographic descriptions 
that sovereign power and the transgression of the legal order by Greek state authorities 
have a firm place in Greece´s migration management. The exposure of rogue and unlawful 
state practices at Greek borders can be put in line with authors who argue for a subtle 
confusion and dangerous intersection of disciplinary and sovereign power in modern states 
(Agamben 1998; Alonso 2005; Brown 2010; Hansen and Stepputat 2005; Rosas 2006). In 
other words, excessive violence and spectacular performances of sovereign power cannot be 
relegated to the past but have remained a central constitute in modern states (Agamben 
1998; Alonso 2005; B. T. Hansen and Stepputat 2005;2006; Krohn-Hansen and Nustard 
2005).  
This chapter has shown that the Greek state employs in the management of refugees and 
migrants disciplinary power alongside to sovereign power. The selected ethnographic 
examples have illustrated that the dividing line between these two different modalities of 
state power is increasingly blurred. In other terms excessive state power and disciplinary 
power seem to intersect in many moments. Moreover, unlawful practices and rogue state 
actions have their firm place in Greece´s current migration management. Violence and 
excess of power on foreign bodies are legitimized since these practices aim at the protection 
of the Greek nation and the restoration of the Greek state´s political, juridical and social 
order. However at the same time with these excessive and violent performances of power, 
the Greek state seems rather to masquerade itself as the sovereign whose central authority 
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is eroding. The Greek state puts on a sovereign mask and stages its supreme power that is in 
fact in the process of its dispersion and decline.  
 
Chapter 6  Asylum Process and Practice  
 
Analysing state´s migration control and surveillance activities give crucial insights into 
migration practice of states in border zones and their political response towards foreigners. 
Border surveillance at the fringes of the nation is yet only one important activity intimately 
connected with the state´s sovereignty. The regulation of immigrants and particularly 
refugees through domestic laws and institutions empowered by the state is another 
important aspect. Such a perspective will provide a further angle from where the 
relationship between the Greek state and its refugees can be explored. 
The final chapter will investigate and examine the current asylum process and asylum 
practice in Athens. One must be aware, that the asylum process “is as much a social and 
cultural process as it is a legal and political one, and it takes place at the intersection of the 
often contradictory practices of [...] bureaucrats, lawyers,” judges, asylum seekers, 
interpreters, experts and other third parties (Kelly and Dembour 2007:2). The following 
pages will present an anthropological examination of the encounters between several 
actors, involved in the Greek asylum process. A special focus is put on the every day 
practices in institutions that are relevant in the context of asylum and the distribution of 
power in bureaucratic encounters. In particular, the aim is to shed light on the treatment 
and difficulties refugees and asylum seekers are facing within the bureaucratic and legal 
structures of the Greek state.  
Refugees and asylum seekers do certainly have some agency within these structures and 
processes that shape their lives in significant ways. Although this study does not deny the 
active role of refugees and asylum seekers as self reliant agents in political, social, and 
cultural processes, refugee´s agency was not the focus. It should be clear that due to 
numerous limitations (e.g. lacking social, political or financial assets) the power position 
from where refugees and asylum seekers manoeuvre is a great deal weaker than that of the 
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Greek state. The Greek state can act through sovereign power and with the long arm of the 
law. The key task in the following sections is to further illuminate the power relation 
between the Greek state and its refugees. By looking at the different stages in the asylum 
process I tried to carve out those moments and constellations in institutionalized encounters 
where the power asymmetry between the Greek state and refugees manifest. The 
ethnographic research could reveal several moments or particular social constellations in 
which power is considerably tilted towards the side of the Greek state.  
Ethnographic descriptions will illustrate how international refugee law is ruled out on the 
Greek turf and how refugees´ rights are translated, appropriated, deformed or resisted by 
state agents and other actors. The essential insight of these investigations is that sovereign 
states remain the primary agent in administering, implementing and enforcing laws and 
rights, including those conceived to be universally held (see Shafir in Brysk and Shafir 2004: 
4). The chapter concludes by illuminating some of the impacts and aspects of the wider 
social context refugees and asylum seekers are embedded in and will draw attention to the 
inhumane consequences of the underdeveloped Greek asylum system.  
The Asylum Application Process 
In the proceeding chapter it was argued that transnational processes like irregular 
immigration undermine and challenge the power of the Greek state. In this chapter it will be 
revealed that the Greek state regains considerable control over refugees and reasserts its 
power in the field of asylum. The following sections might have a lower level of theoretical 
abstraction and have remained more grounded in the concrete experiences. Yet, the 
investigations remain however centred on the question about the relationship between the 
Greek state and its refugees in terms of power. It seeks to provide some additional 
perspectives on debates on transnationalism, sovereignty, and the configurations of power 
within nation states. 
It must be acknowledged that the asylum process is the only path for refugees, to claim 
justice and become legally protected of abusive practices perpetrated by oppressive regimes 
or other militant agents (Dembour and Kelly 2007). In a first step the aim will be to provide 
evidence that the Greek state excludes refugees from this possibility by obstructing their 
access to the asylum procedures. 
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By directing the focus on the current asylum application process it will be demonstrated how 
administrative barriers and institutional structures make it extremely difficult for applicants 
to apply for asylum in Athens, where the overwhelming majority of refugees aggregates.  
The reception of asylum applications and asylum decisions at first instance are in Athens 
subjected to the Greek Ministry of Citizens´ Protection, hereafter MoCP. In other words 
asylum at the initial stage is in the hand of the Hellenic Police. In the introduction it was 
already described under which conditions refugees have to submit their asylum application 
in the asylum office which is located inside of the MoCP. On Saturdays at 6am, once per 
week, the Hellenic Police allow to a limited number of about 20 individuals access to the 
asylum office. Who gets in to submit an application “is mostly a matter of luck and strengths. 
There is no plan in place, [...] no plan at all. Certainly a fundamental problem [here, in 
Athens] is, that refugees don´t have access to the asylum procedure in the first place” 
(Interview with Stella Nanou, UNHCR public information associate, March 29, 2012). Some of 
my informants have also purported that the police who control the access to the asylum 
office is deeply corrupted. In exchange of bribe-money some people are given access to the 
asylum office and can obtain a pink card. “You want a pink card, and you can pay for it, so no 
problem then. Either you bribe the police, or there are also lawyers. You have to pay 200€, 
or 300€, I don´t know - but then they will get you a pink card immediately” (Interview with 
Yunos Daktar, leader of the ARCA, March 12, 2012).  
These people [who can pay for a pink card] are usually not genuine refugees; 
they are not persecuted, and just abuse the system and try to find a way to 
regularize their stay. Actually, I don´t want to blame them, since it is also very 
difficult for migrants to get a regularization. So they are looking for alternative 
ways. 
  
Interview with Spyros Risakos, director at Aitima, March 20, 2012 
 
The holder of a pink card can stay for 6 months legally in Greece and after this time the card 
must be renewed again in the MoCP for another 6 month period. The card allows free access 
to public health care and theoretically gives also access to the Greek labour market.  
Based on these findings, I argue that this form of governance in the field of asylum is an 
assault on refugee´s rights launched by the Greek state. It shows how the Greek state 
overrides its legal obligations towards refugees by a defective administration and large scale 
79 
 
exclusion of individuals in need of international protection from the asylum process. By 
physically obstructing refugees to access the asylum procedure the Greek state abrogates or 
minimizes its international responsibilities towards refugees and asylum seekers. The 
circumstances (e.g. extremely long waiting periods, limited opening hours, no public toilet, 
no shelter or sitting accommodation), described in detail in the introduction are deplorable 
and dehumanizing. The fact that improvements in some very basic aspects would not 
demand expensive measures further hint, that the Greek state lacks willingness to change 
these conditions. In Athens refugees who want to claim their rights are stamped down by 
the state´s power in form of police force, physical and administrative barriers that radically 
limit the access to vital asylum services and expose human beings to dehumanizing 
treatment.  
The hardships asylum seekers face due to these structures shall be further illustrated with 
Hamid´s story. Hamid is an Iranian asylum seeker in his 60s. I met him in a soup kitchen run 
by the NGO Helping Hands. Besides, we both regularly attend the Greek language classes. He 
is dressed in a worn out jacket, whose colour has long faded. His body posture is bent – 
obviously he is old, but I cannot refuse the impression his body posture is more bent by grief 
than by years. It is the first time we talk at length. In this encounter Hamid shares with me 
the story of how he managed to apply for asylum in Petrou Ralli. He tells me that it took him 
nearly 5 months, until he finally succeeded with his submission. For all these months he has 
never missed a single Saturday morning to show up in front of the gate´s of the MoCP. Every 
time he walked to Petrou Ralli by foot, since he lacked the money to pay for the bus (a single 
bus ticket in Athens costs 1,20 €). He has no money in his pocket since he has remained 
unemployed and the Greek state does not give any allowance to asylum seekers. In order to 
apply for asylum he headed off to the police station from the city centre in the middle of the 
night to make it there at around 4:30 am. Walking the distance took him about two hours. 
He walked sometimes in the pouring rain. One Saturday the police finally fished him out 
from the crowed and took him in. He feels somehow relieved since he has finally a pink card 
and the fear of deportation lost its tight grip. Yet apart from that he admits that nothing 
much has changed.  
These experiences made by an Iranian asylum seeker are of course only one example. 
However, this example is indicative and could have been replicated many times over, by 
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similar stories of other refugees, from other countries. Although their stories differ in form, 
they do not differ so much in kind. The struggle to apply for asylum in Greece is hard to win. 
These insights and research findings into the asylum application process are the basis on 
which I argue that the Greek state retains its power again over refugees, who have 
previously entered Greek territory illegally and uncontrolled. Through such regulatory 
mechanism and administrative processes in the field of asylum the Greek state regains 
sovereign authority over refugees by excluding them. Achille Mbembe (2006) writes that 
“precisely the situations of powerlessness [...] are the situations of violence par excellence 
(Mbembe 2006:395). 
 Although refugees in the asylum application process cannot be considered as absolutely 
powerless, their power position is considerable weaker than the power position from which 
the Greek state manoeuvres. The regulative and administrative practices of the Hellenic 
police have radically diminished refugee´s ability to access the asylum process. With these 
structures the Greek state has established regulative mechanisms that not only violate 
refugees´ rights but also insert them into a “regime of violence and domination” (ibid: 383). 
In a similar vein, Aihwa Ong (1999) has pointed out that the nation state “along with its 
juridical- legislative systems, bureaucratic apparatuses, economic entities, modes of 
governmentality, and war- making capacities - continues to define, discipline, control and 
regulate all kinds of populations, whether in movement or in residence” (Ong 1999: 15).  
Another aspect in this context, which must be stressed, is that the Greek state seems to 
keep refugees deliberately in a state of ignorance regarding the asylum procedure, 
international refugee´s rights and Greek bureaucracy. Foucault has prominently argued for a 
knowledge power connection and putting it in a simplified way that knowledge is power. 
Thus excluding refugees from essential forms of knowledge has disempowering effects on 
them. I argue that the Greek state is deliberately producing ignorance as a mode of 
governance of refugees. In this way the Greek state implements another regulative 
technique that aims at keeping refugees low in terms of power and hence under easy 
control. Many of my interlocutors, have frequently stressed that no information is given to 
refugees and asylum seekers by Greek authorities. Additionally, even official papers that are 
issued to migrants and asylum seekers are only written in the Greek language and thus, 
remain for most of the receivers incomprehensible. Refugees begin to suffer from a dearth 
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of information already at the borders and in detention centres. The problem of lacking 
information is similarly acute in Athens. Even in front of the MoCP where regularly up to one 
hundred refugees gather, Greek authorities do not provide much information on matters of 
asylum. No leaflets, brochures or any other information on asylum are available. Only a 
placard scantly informs about dates at which the asylum office will be closed, or about some 
recent legal changes. The minimalist information is pinned up only in Greek and a few other 
foreign languages. It entails absolute no information about the asylum process per se, or 
where to find, e.g. free legal assistance or other supportive services so essential to refugees.  
Thus, besides impairing refugee´s access to the asylum process the Greek state also 
withholds information on the asylum procedure and potential protective support services in 
this domain. “Not knowing the [international refugee regime and the national] bureaucracy, 
from immigration law to social services [...] can have effects that range from unimportant to 
disastrous” (Bohmer and Shuman 2007: 612). The Greek state produces conditions to keep 
refugees in ignorance over their rights and opportunities, and seems to strategically 
disempower refugees. The Greek state seems to deliberately hamper the individual´s 
knowledge production on the political asylum process. With this dearth of information on 
asylum and refugee´s rights the Greek state leaves a deep mark of its sovereignty on the 
political consciousness of refugees. Having only a vague idea of asylum disadvantages 
refugees profoundly who have to undergo complex bureaucratic, juridical and political 
processes.  
In summary the Greek state seems to employ different regulative mechanisms through 
which it governs over refugees and asylum seekers in an authoritative form and regains a 
high degree of control over those subjects. By limiting the access to asylum procedures and 
by putting constraints on refugees´ knowledge production on asylum and their fundamental 
rights, the Greek state secures its supremacy and tilts the power distribution further towards 
its own side. Through these regulative modes and oppressive structures the Greek state 
politically marginalizes refugees and tries to turn them into ignorant subjects which can be 
easily dominated and politically marginalized. 
In a last remark I want to heed to the scepticism about the Greek asylum system which is 
widespread among Afghan refugees. Many refugees actually hesitate to seek for asylum in 
Greece since they profoundly mistrust the system and have often made negative 
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experiences with Greek authorities or have listened to unsettling stories based on the 
experiences of their compatriots. Thus there seems to be a considerable number of potential 
refugees who don´t want to apply for asylum in Greece and remain for years illegally in the 
country. Many hope to be able to leave Greece again as soon as they have some savings with 
which to continue their journey to other European countries – a hope that remains very 
often unfulfilled. In these cases of unregistered but potential refugees conditions are created 
in which “daily social life separates the undocumented [in Greece] and the documented as 
surely as the bars of detention centres” (Bibler Coutin 2005:282). Furthermore, the lack of a 
political status excludes these individuals from any social services and usually condemns 
them to a live as political outlaws and impoverishment.  
 
Legal Aid for Asylum Seekers 
 
We have no right to call asylum a legal procedure as long as not every refugee 
in this country can get the legal assistance he needs and gets his asylum claim 
assessed in a fair and timely manner. 
 
 Interview with Spyros Risakos, director at Aitima, March 20, 2012  
 
Since the Greek state has outsourced essential state functions such as providing legal 
assistance to asylum seekers, NGOs have stepped into this vacuum and play a crucial role in 
the field of asylum. Local NGOs that provide free legal consultation and legal assistance are 
vital for asylum seekers. In Greece NGOs are the only agents that respond to refugees´ rights 
and protection needs. 
Seeking safe haven elsewhere requires the asylum seeker to undergo the process of asylum 
in which substantial proof must be provided by the applicant that he is in need of 
international protection (Shuman and Bohmer 2008). Afghan refugees and asylum seekers 
who arrive in Greece have at the beginning no knowledge about the country, and usually do 
not know much about asylum. They certainly know nothing about the asylum process in 
Greece and the legal and bureaucratic procedures involved. Nevertheless, since the moment 
of arrival, a refugee´s live and future is profoundly shaped by the receiving state´s 
bureaucracy, domestic laws and legal practices.  
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The political and legal terrain of asylum is highly complicated. Applicants can only steer 
themselves through the maze of juridical and administrative procedures with the support of 
legal experts (Good 2007: 21).The rights at stake in an asylum process can be matters of life 
and death and since the potential risks to asylum seekers are so serious their asylum claims 
should receive most thorough preparation and utmost scrutiny (Good 2007:187).  
This section will discuss the availability and provision of legal aid for asylum seekers in 
Athens. It will cast light on the conditions and quality in which free legal aid is provided to 
applicants. In an exploration of legal aid provision the aim is to reveal how refugees´ rights 
and protection needs become jeopardised. Looking closer to the legal treatment of asylum 
seekers and in which setting they have to express their claims will generate insights into 
quasi-juridical and political practices and questions about the liberalizing capacity and 
limitations of asylum law. These inquiring into the potency and limitations of refugee´s rights 
on the ground, will illuminate the power relations between the Greek state and Afghan 
refugees further which are the central concern in this research.  
Although the EU Directive 2005/85/ EC on Minimum Standards on Procedures in Member 
States for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status spells out the right to free legal 
assistance at appeal stage, most European states do not allocate sufficient means to 
implement it (Acer in Bianchini 2011: 391). Also in Greece the government does not provide 
legal representation for asylum seekers at 2nd instance, or at any other stage of the asylum 
process. It is clear that legal assistance is indispensible in order to safeguard refugee´s rights 
and to have a chance of a successful asylum claim (Skordas and Sitaropoulos 2004: 43). The 
only form of legal assistance asylum seekers can find in Athens is provided by less than a 
handful of local NGOs. As a consequence, “[l]awyers that represent refugees and provide 
free legal assistance in the asylum process are very rare and hard to find” (Interview with 
Christina Ziakas, social worker at YRE, September 14, 2011).  
Moreover, a big challenge is posed on asylum seekers who need to find out about the 
availability of NGOs that provide legal assistance due to a lack of information by state 
authorities, lacking advertisement on the side of NGOs, and other factors like language 
barriers or the unfamiliarity with the structures of the country. The process of finding a 
lawyer is difficult and burdensome. Firstly, most NGOs are very badly signed. Even if one 
knows the address it is not necessarily obvious where the NGO´s office is located and can be 
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entered. Moreover, since all NGOs in Athens remain understaffed, and have often very 
limited opening hours, refugees and asylum seekers face usually long waiting periods until 
they finally receive information and can benefit from the NGOs´ supportive services. 
The largest of all the NGOs which provides free legal aid to asylum seekers is the Greek 
Council for Refugees (GCR). At the time of my research the legal assistance unit consisted of 
7 lawyers that worked exclusively on asylum cases. My special involvement and supportive 
activities in the GCR allowed me to spend considerable time with some of the lawyers and 
other personnel (e.g. social workers, secretaries, interns). Thus, I had many opportunities to 
interview members of the GCR staff in more or less formal ways and I was able to observe 
the daily practices going on inside. Views were gleaned from the direct interactions with GCR 
personnel and various asylum seekers, and from encounters in which lawyers counselled or 
prepared applicants for the asylum hearing.  
The GCR is structured in such a way that administrative personnel decide on a first level 
whether an individual will get access to one of the lawyers or not. In rapid assessments what 
is called the “screening process” individuals are registered and interviewed for the first time. 
Subsequently the person is defined either as “eligible” or “ineligible” to legal aid. Only those 
who are not defined as “illegible” equating with the category of the “economic migrant” will 
receive an appointment with a lawyer. Others are excluded from further services provided 
by the GCR. What is problematic about these first level decisions is the fast pace and rapid 
assessment of the cases. Moreover migrant´s seem to lack the awareness of the major 
significance attributed to their answers. Furthermore, communication is severely impaired 
due to lacking professional interpreters. Migrants often depend on friends acting as amateur 
interpreters and in such arrangements translating mistakes, misunderstandings, or 
inhibitions to reveal very personal yet highly relevant facts are bound to occur. If the 
individual reveals in the questioning only economic reasons for leaving his home country, 
hasty conclusions will be drawn. The person will be turned down as an economic migrant, 
and legal services to him will be denied. The crucial decisions taken in these initial 
interrogations seem to be based on a tidy distinction between political refugees and 
economic migrants. However, it is fully legitimate for refugees to have besides the five 
conventional reasons also economic reasons for the flight. As Khalid Koser has underscored 
“it may not be accurate to distinguish so straightforwardly between political and economic 
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migrants, because of the need to recognise that all migrants in reality move for mixed 
motivations,” including economic reasons (Koser in Koser 2007:238). While the validity of 
this distinction between refugees and other migrants became questioned in international 
migration studies, the daily practice of the GCR continues to be structured around these dual 
concepts. Moreover, it must be stressed, that both, the expectation, that “applicants are 
prepared to open up straight after arrival, to complete strangers in a strange country” and 
the “assumption [...] that genuine applicants will mention all serious incidents of persecution 
at the earliest possible opportunity” are serious misapprehensions that guide the daily 
practice and decision making on GCR´s first operational level (Good 2007: 190).  
With the intention to filter out “economic migrants”and to “catch out” those applicants who 
are lying and whose stories are fabricated, lay persons seem to follow their personal 
interrogation strategies and can make decisions based on their own standards. Some of the 
staff members were overly concerned about catching out those migrants that come to abuse 
the legal aid system. Their form of conduct was rough, and authoritarian in its nature, 
climaxing at the banging of doors after individuals considered as economic migrants who 
masked themselves as asylum seekers. It truly seems that their “fear of “bogus” asylum 
seeker permeates [their daily interactions with migrants] [...] to the detriment of genuine 
asylum seekers” (Shuman and Bohmer 2008: 11). 
All in all, these rapid screening procedures are prone to lead to premature judgments on 
whose basis refugees can be excluded from vital legal services. The swift encounters in 
which refugees are expected to express traumatic experiences while being at the same time 
fully unaware of the significance attributed to their answers in this encounter, places asylum 
applicants in a highly disadvantaged position. There is a clear inequality between, on the one 
side, GCR low-level decision makers, who have the power to decide over refugees´ access to 
legal services, and on the other side, asylum applicants, who can lose in only a few minutes 
the chance to legal aid, which is an essential safeguard in the asylum process. 
Those applicants who make it through the first filter are regarded as eligible to GCR´s legal 
aid services and are given an appointment with a lawyer for a more substantial interview.  
Lawyer are indispensible in the preparation of an asylum claim, since only legal expertise can 
guarantee that an asylum claim is prepared in such a form that those elements in the 
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applicant´s story are highlighted which are of special legal relevance. The application of the 
law is in a way a complex art which demands for specialists. Also, the speed in which new 
laws are stipulated and introduced needs specialists who can keep their legal knowledge up 
to date.  
 
The Greek state has been among the early architects of the Refugee Convention and has 
signed the document in 1959. As mentioned the 1951 Convention is not per se part of Greek 
law, but its normative order was incorporated into the domestic legislation. Although the 
Greek state has committed itself not to violate these international standards, in practice it 
falls short with its legal obligations towards refugees and asylum seekers (Interview with 
Spyros Koulocheris, lawyer at GCR, March 22, 2012). The growing density and complexity of 
the national legal fabric, and the highly specific language of legal texts, makes asylum 
applicants extremely dependent on lawyers.  
GCR lawyers interview applicants about their cases and construct in a common effort 
together with the applicant a testimony. By writing down the applicant´s story in the 
necessary formal register, lawyers tell their applicants “what they need to emphasise or 
what they better omit in their story, since some aspects are more and other are less relevant 
for the legal viewpoint” (Interview with Katherina Komita, lawyer at the GCR, March 20, 
2012). In these complex legal and administrative processes asylum applicants are once more 
very dependent on others which disempowers them. Applicants have to “relinquish much of 
their individual autonomy in their reliance upon [...] other persons, and are therefore, for 
good or for ill, unable to present their claims in ways they themselves might have chosen” 
(Good 2007:21).  
In a country, like Afghanistan that has been in a condition of war for about three decades, 
people often have little or no access to formal education. Afghan refugees often only speak 
Farsi or Dhari which makes encounters between Afghans and lawyers especially challenging. 
In order to allow communication with a Greek lawyer, Afghan asylum applicants fully depend 
on interpreters. However, also in this stage where lawyers prepare the testimonies for the 
asylum process, professional interpreters are lacking and amateur interpreters must fill in 
the gaps. The observations have shown how common communication problems are, and 
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how frequently gaps of comprehensions or also misunderstandings occur. Thus, Afghan 
asylum applicants are not only dependent on lawyers in respect to their legal expertise, but 
are also highly dependent on interpreters and their skills. This situation leaves asylum 
applicants somehow double disempowered since they are forced to rely somehow blindly on 
lawyers and interpreters (see Good 2007). In similar vein, Bohmer and Shuman argue that in 
the context of asylum “applicants continuously have their stories taken out of their hands, 
first by the perpetrators of assaults against them, and then by the lawyers, witnesses, 
interpreters, and immigration officials” (Bohmer and Shuman 2007: 607).  
 
One major problem regarding the legal aid that is provided by the GCR, and also other NGOs 
is that the quality of the legal assistance is rather low. A fundamental problem is that 
lawyers have to deal with a huge caseload and have only very limited time to prepare each 
case. It seems that, “guaranteeing high-quality legal aid to asylum seekers remains a 
challenge and a low priority in most European states [and especially in Greece]” (Bianchini 
2011: 390,391).  
Moreover, a striking observation in the GCR was that some lawyers were very young (early 
20s) and had just finished with law school. These lawyers where obviously inexperienced 
with the legal process and the asylum practice. It is doubtful that they have established a 
solid knowledge on asylum and immigration laws which are vital assets in order to represent 
asylum claimants successfully in the process. Nevertheless, these inexperienced lawyers 
took, due to a lack of other more experienced personnel, sole responsibility for asylum 
claimants, prepared their cases and represented those applicants in the asylum process. It is 
likely, that an asylum applicant´s chances for a successful claim decreases considerably in 
case of lacking legal expertise and practical experience on the side of the lawyer. In this 
respect the level of quality of the legal representation that an asylum seeker gets is also 
purely a matter of luck.  
A further problem might be that legal unit of GCR did not split up its team in a way that 
certain lawyers could focus on applicants of certain countries or particular asylum cases. All 
lawyers worked with all applicants regardless of their country of origin or their reasons of 
persecution. Thus, it was often the case that lawyers had only very limited knowledge on the 
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asylum seekers´ home country and the conditions in this country. In order to check on the 
credibility and plausibility of an applicant´s story, lawyers frequently exchange their 
experiences with each other, or looked up information in UNHCR country reports. The 
primary source of information used by GCR lawyers was however the internet. Although the 
internet can reveal immediately background information on the countries in question, those 
internet based researches might not always provide reliable information. The information on 
important issues might not be up to date, be inaccurate or even false. This can lead lawyers 
to unsubstantiated assertions, on which they might question the truth of the applicant´s 
story which can in turn overshadow the interactions between asylum applicant and lawyer 
by feelings of mutual mistrust. The lawyers´ lacking background knowledge is also an 
obstacle since it considerably reduces the lawyers´ ability to contextualise a claim within the 
current local conditions (Good 2007:129-131). If a lawyer is not able to view the narrated 
events within the light of the particular environment, this will reduce the lawyers´ ability to 
regard the applicant´s actions and decisions as plausible which makes it difficult to forge the 
claimant´s story into a credible legal account. As a corollary this can further reduce the 
applicant´s chance for a positive outcome of his case. 
 Another discriminating aspect, already mentioned above is a great disproportion between 
only a few lawyers in NGOs and a vast amount of applicants. As a consequence GCR lawyers 
must keep their encounters with applicants at a minimum. Lawyers and applicants are not 
given time to build up a relationship of trust, which is however essential for asylum 
applicants who have to open up themselves. A certain degree of trust is often a precondition 
for applicants to narrate traumatic experiences and to speak about ineffable events. At the 
first meeting asylum seekers often focus in their stories 
more on the trauma of loss and the struggle to survive than on the details of 
persecution. However, it is these details, about persecutors, their 
interrogations, incarcerations, and torture, as well as the individual´s role in a 
larger political, religious or social conflict that interests the asylum officials. 
 
Shuman and Bohmer 2008:253 
 
In respect to the limited opportunities (in average twice) and the relatively short time of 
these legal encounters (approximately 1-1 ½ hours) it must be questioned that these 
conditions actually allow applicants to establish the necessary trust. Only when applicants 
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have enough time they can get to the point where they are able to convey the information 
and details of their persecution which allow lawyers to turn these personal accounts into 
successful political asylum claims.  
The Greek government does not provide legal assistance to asylum applicants. As discussed 
in this analysis, Greek NGOs can neither guarantee legal assistance for potential refugees nor 
can they provide high quality legal representations due to limited resources (financial, 
human, or temporal). The provision of legal aid is characterised by a range of deficiencies 
which might leave applicants with representations by badly prepared or inexperienced 
lawyers. The general legal aid structure and the legal aid scheme in NGOs set social dynamics 
in motion which can have disastrous effects for applicants. Asylum applicants are often 
caught in relations of non-transparency, dependency and imbalance of power. Since asylum 
applicants cannot successfully represent themselves in front of the Greek asylum authorities, 
they have to relinquish much of their individual agency. Thus their fate depends on various 
other people and is not in their own hands. Considering Afghan refugees´ starting position 
(no means, no language skills, often no formal education, no legal knowledge), asylum 
applicants can hardly sail around the described inequalities. All in all the exposed flaws, 
problems and shortcomings in the legal aid provision are likely to reduce the chances of a 
positive outcome of an applicant´s asylum claim. If the asylum process may be regarded as a 
sight of struggle between the Greek state and the asylum claimant, the investigations into 
the legal aid services have revealed, that asylum claimants are constrained by certain 
structures and social constellations to make use of the liberalizing power of the law. In this 
respect asylum seekers are sent unarmed or only very badly equipped into a large legal 
battlefield against the Greek state.  
The Asylum Process and Decision Making at First and Second Instance 
The process of refugee status determination is an essential aspect in the governance of 
refugees. The Greek state holds considerable power to decide whether an individual falls 
within the protection of the 1951 Convention or not. Many authors have stressed, that while 
refugees have the right to claim asylum, only states have the right to grant it (Albert 2010; 
Fuglerud 2005; Shuman and Bohmer 2010). The object of this section is to cast light on those 
state institutions and various agents that are involved in the process of status determination 
and play an important part in the assessment of asylum claims. Since asylum hearings in 
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Athens happen behind closed doors, I was not able to observe the process per se. However, 
through the direct experiences of asylum applicants and detailed accounts of lawyers 
representing applicants in the asylum process, the presented views and insights could be 
gleaned.  
Initially it must be stressed, that the Greek state has recently embarked on a series of legal 
reforms which have improved the asylum system. In August 2010 the Greek government 
presented the Greek National Action Plan on Migration Management, hereafter, Action Plan 
to the European Commission. The Action Plan gives a clear outline of a gradual reform 
process in order to reconstruct within three years Greece´s migration policies and practice. 
One of its goals is the complete overhaul of the Greek asylum system (Ministry of Citizen 
Protection 2010). Several of my informants have confirmed that “a major asylum reform is 
under way, and the Greek government has already made the first steps by implementing 
new services [...]. There is already some visible progress and [...] clear improvements” can be 
seen (Interview with Stella Nanou, public information associate at UNHCR Greece, March 28, 
20012).  
An important step forward was taken at the end of 2010 with the Presidential Decree 
114/2010. Based on this law the so called transitional period was introduced which will be in 
place until the new asylum system can be fully enacted. In the following, attention will be 
directed to both, the positive recent changes and the remaining flaws or inequities in the 
current asylum system and its transitional or re-arranged practices. 
First Instance  
The responsibility of the initial asylum interview at first instance has remained also in the 
transitional system in the hand of the MoCP. The asylum applicant is interrogated by a single 
policeman, ranked as the secretary general of the MoCP. The secretary general conducts the 
initial interview and decides on the applicant´s claim. A recent improvement is that a UNHCR 
legal consultant observes the asylum examination and can make suggestions, regarding the 
outcome of the decision.  
 
This initial interview used to last only a few minutes in the past, and nearly 
all applicants were rejected. Actually the police did not know anything 
about asylum, they gave no explanation to applicants and they did not do a 
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real interview. So many claimants have not even understood that this was 
the first interview, since it was no interview. The policemen often just made 
the applicant sign a paper on which it was written the person came to 
Greece for economic reasons, and he was rejected.  
Now things are different. The police work differently, they received some 
training, they have a certain knowledge [...] and they cannot reject all 
applicants anymore. I think this is exactly because a UNHCR officer is 
present, even though his suggestions are not binding. I mean you don´t 
know how the police men would act and decide if there was nobody else 
present, maybe the same police men would be a completely different 
person.  
 
Interview with Katherina Komita, lawyer at the GCR, March 20, 2012 
 
 
This statement of a GCR lawyer illustrates the degree of power and arbitrariness with which 
the Greek state could rule until recently over asylum claimants. Mrs. Komita stresses that 
the UNHCR official´s present in the asylum process has somehow tempered the abusive use 
of state power and has disciplined unsubstantiated assertions of state authority which used 
to serve the state´s interests very well. The lawyer underscores that even though the UNHCR 
consultant can only make recommendations that are of a non-binding nature, his presence 
has a positive influence on the asylum practice and the decision taken by the police.  
An aspect which is highly important in this context and deserves attention is the double 
responsibility of the Hellenic police´ in the migration management. Fact is that the police 
have on the one hand the responsibility to defend the borders and keep illegal migrants at 
bay and on the other hand the responsibility to decide on asylum seekers´ claims and 
identify those individuals entitled to international protection. I argue that this double task is 
conflicting and actually incompatible. The police´s double responsibility must hinder a fair 
and objective assessment of asylum claims. The police are likely to be inclined to criminalize 
asylum claimants as illegal border crossers and to adapt a very restrictive position on asylum. 
This is why I argue that the police in the role of the decision maker on asylum claims are 
inadequate and highly problematic. In such constellations it can hardly be avoided that the 
police “as agents and guardians of the nation, [...] are creating epistemologies and ethics of 
ignorance” (Bohmer and Shuman 2007: 623). Moreover, the police´ sufficient expertise on 
asylum must be questioned. Many of my informants have stressed that despite special 
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training seminars for police officers organized by the UNHCR, and the availability of various 
study material like the UNHCR´s Handbook for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on 
International Protection (which offers guidance in how to interpret and apply the 
international refugee law on a practical basis), the police´ competence has remained 
insufficient for the complex task of status determination. Various commenters have 
underscored that decisions on asylum require legal expertise in order to apply the law 
correctly and endorse international legal standards in the everyday practice. Further, it must 
be stressed that the legal adjudication is also to a high degree an interpretative process 
(Good 2007; Kelly and Dembour 2007; Shuman and Bohmer 2008; Skordas and Sitaropoulos 
2004). In this vein also the lawyer Mr. Koulocheris has stated: 
The law is not a dogmatic text. Actually it needs to be interpreted and this 
demands an education that somehow goes beyond a merely legal realm. I 
would say in order to apply and interpret the law correctly it also needs a moral 
consciousness, certain social values, and a sensitiveness for justice. In my 
opinion the police lack all these qualities. 
 
Interview with Spyros Koulocheris, lawyer at GCR, March 22, 2012 
 
The Greek police was widely criticized to lack key competences and must be deemed as 
misplaced in the role as the decision maker on asylum claims. The persuasive argument that 
“the law [on asylum] is more liberal than the [asylum] practice”, which was pointed out by 
Bohmer and Shuman, seem to hold particularly true in the Greek context (Shuman and 
Bohmer 2008:78).  
Lawyers in Athens have underscored that the assessment and adjudication of asylum claims 
is centred on the principle of credibility. However, they have equally stressed that the 
assessment of credibility in the asylum process is a highly problematic endeavour. In general 
asylum applicants are supposed to make all efforts to provide written documents to 
corroborate their claims with more “objective” evidence. The process of providing such 
documents where yet described by many of my Afghan interlocutors as extremely difficult 
and uncertain in their outcomes. The conversations with refugees hinted also to the 
circumstance that not only issuing such documents is difficult, but that the Greek authorities 
also seem to set the standards of proof at a level that is far too high to be reached. Jaheed´s 
story illustrates how the Greek state demands from a privileged position for corroborative 
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documents while the asylum applicants are in the disadvantaged position struggling to meet 
the state´s expectations and deliver the requested documents. 
I used to be a member of the Maoist Communist Party in Afghanistan, which is 
illegal and not tolerated by the Taliban. For the asylum claim here I could 
manage to collect some documents as evidence- it was very difficult but I had 
some contacts and good friends back in Afghanistan and Pakistan who helped 
me on that. For example I managed to get a confirmation of the party about my 
active engagement. The Greek police asked for all kinds of documents. There 
was also this statement, the police demanded for an official statement by the 
UNHCR in Afghanistan and they should send it to them. But that was something 
that could not be done, and this request was also totally absurd it did not make 
any sense at all.  
  
Interview with Jaheed, Afghan asylum seeker, March 22, 2012  
 
In order to increase the chance for a successful outcome, asylum seekers need to 
corroborate their claims with official documents and official statement. As Jaheed´s story 
illustrates this task ranges from difficult to absolutely impossible. Afghan refugees seem to 
have special difficulties with the provision of official documents, since a war-torn country 
like Afghanistan does not issue documents in the same scale or meticulous manner as 
European countries usually do. Nevertheless, in the Greek asylum practice, the lack of official 
documents is likely to become the claimant´s Achilles’ heel.  
Because of this difficulty of providing documents, asylum applicants with credible stories 
should according to the law be given the benefit of doubt even in the absence of such 
evidence (Good 2007: 242; Shuman and Bohmer 2008: 116). But when is an applicant´s 
account credible and what does “credible” actually mean? The UNHCR Handbook (1992) 
gives some elucidation on these questions and suggests how credibility can be assessed. In 
the UNHCR´s view an applicant´s story should be regarded as credible, “unless there are 
good reasons to the contrary” and as long as the applicant's statements are “coherent and 
plausible” and do “not run counter to generally known facts” (UNHCR 1992: : ¶196,¶204). 
The following task is to demonstrate on the basis of my ethnographic findings how these 
specifications remain of little practical value in the process of status determination. Through 
my informants´ statements the hypothesis was fostered that with “proper” interrogation 
strategies even applicants with good claims can be rejected. The ambiguity in the 
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assessment of credibility leaves enough room for interpretation through which the Greek 
state can forge the asylum practice in accordance to its own interests.  
A key insight which crystallized from the various interviews is that in the Greek asylum 
process claimants without corroborative evidence can be easily rejected on various factors 
related to credibility. Mr. Spyros Koulocheris put it bluntly “if the Greek police want to reject 
a case due to a lack of credibility, it is very easy to do so, they just need to ask the right 
questions.”(Interview with Spyros Koulocheris, lawyer at GCR, March 22, 2012). It seems that 
asylum seekers especially at first instance, where a police officer interviews them, are in a 
similar position like criminals in the penal investigation (see Fuglerud 2005: 311). Although 
asylum seekers whose accounts appear credible should receive the benefit of doubt, in the 
eyes of the Greek police it seems that all “asylum seekers are guilty until proven innocent” 
(Shuman and Bohmer 2008:11). Like the penal investigation, the asylum process is an 
interrogation, dominated by the search for the “truth” (see Foucault 1995). Similarly to what 
Bohmer and Shuman wrote about the asylum process in the US and the UK, in Greece the 
asylum interview seems to be less a fact finding inquiry than a search for inconsistencies on 
whose basis the applicants´ credibility can be attacked (Bohmer and Shuman 2007:607). 
Also Mrs. Komita´s statements capture the asylum practice in the same light.  
Actually in the procedure it is very easy to say for the police the applicant is not 
telling the truth and to cast doubt on his credibility. The police might say I don´t 
believe you because the applicant was asked about, let´s say the name of some 
mountains in the area which he stated to have lived and he does not know, or 
the distance between two cities that he mentions in his story, or also because 
he cannot clearly explain why he became the target of persecution by his own 
government or by other groups let´s say. But, how? You cannot know 
everything. Ask me now which are the names of the mountains around Attika - 
maybe I won´t be able to answer correctly. Actually applicants are very 
frequently asked about such things and about so many details, and if a refugee 
does not know his inability to answer what they [the police] might regard as a 
basic question, or also when he answers incorrectly this can be all a reason for 
rejection. This ability to answer may really decide over a rejection or an 
acceptance. 
 
 Interview with Katherina Komita, lawyer at the GCR, March 20, 2012 
 
These statements show very clearly how problematic the assessment of credibility in the 
asylum practice is. A (cultural) misconception of those facts that should be “generally 
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known” or investigations into details, which sometimes lie unsurprisingly outside the 
applicant´s own comprehension, e.g. the motives of his persecutors, can provide the basis on 
which the police can reject an asylum seeker. The Greek asylum investigation seems to be all 
about “ asking for memories, [and] the questioners identify what the appellants have 
forgotten” (Bohmer and Shuman 2007:606). If the police can find gaps in the applicant´s 
memory or an inadequate knowledge of what is regarded as a “generally known fact”, it 
poses a dilemma to the potential refugee. Either he can admit that he does not know or 
cannot remember, or he might risk giving an answer, which will turn out to be incorrect or 
might proof incoherent with other parts of his story. In both cases the credibility can be 
questioned and the asylum claimant can be rejected due to lack of credibility.  
 
Another aspect that causes frequently confusion in the asylum process and can easily 
weaken the claimant´s credibility regards dates. A clear outline of important dates and their 
stringent correlation to important events, such as the adherence to a chronological order in 
the account, are however aspects scrutinized most carefully by Greek asylum officials 
(Interview with Katherina Komita, lawyer at the GCR, March 20, 2012; Interview with Spyros 
Koulocheris, lawyer at GCR, March 22, 2012; Interview with Spyros Risakos, director at 
Aitima, March 20, 2012). For most asylum seekers it is very difficult to remember the exact 
date of certain events. However, the fixation on dates is more a cultural and particular a 
Western concepts than common sense. Dates in connection with events are not naturally 
remembered but rather actively memorised (Good 2007; Shuman and Bohmer 2008).  
Asylum seekers who have difficulties in clearly remembering dates due to their cultural 
origin, are clearly disadvantaged in the asylum process. They are confronted again with a 
dilemma. Either the applicant admits to be unable to answer or he tries to answer in order 
to fulfil the expectations of the asylum officer and guesses at dates that might turn out to be 
false in the end. Whatever an asylum applicants decides to do it can easily cast doubt on his 
credibility (Kalin in Bohmer and Shuman 2007: 608). Afghan asylum seekers are in this 
respect especially disadvantaged. Many of them are very low educated and furthermore 
Afghans follow a different calendar. The calendric system which Afghan asylum seekers 
follow is in years and months out of the phase of the Western Gregorian Calendar. Even if 
dates are remembered by Afghan applicants converting these dates into Western dates 
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results often in erroneous transpositions. All this is further exacerbated when dates must be 
correctly transposed, while it must be simultaneously translated from Farsi or Dari into 
Greek. Thus, even if remembered, dates are, particularly for Afghan refugees due to 
different calendric systems, like a minefield in the asylum process. Each chronological 
mistake or inconsistency can have detonating effects on a case.  
Other aspects which were also frequently stated as being likely to have negative impacts on 
the outcome of a case were whenever the applicant has lived for many years in transit or 
when he was smuggled into the country. Many Afghan refugees for example have lived 
sometimes for several years, e.g. in Iran, Pakistan or Turkey prior to their journey to Greece 
which might be used against them. However, in these countries Afghan refugees can usually 
only live illegally and additionally there are no rights in place that could protect Afghan 
refugees from forced repatriations which put their lives in jeopardy. 
There were also some clues on dubious and also illegal state practices in the context of 
asylum. Firstly, several of my informants have indicated that the Greek state has installed a 
backdoor for an arbitrary asylum practice at first instance. Although the general secretary of 
the police has to reveal his decision on an application in front of the asylum seeker and the 
UNHCR consultant, this is not necessarily the final decision. Lawyers have stated that this 
decision must subsequently be confirmed by another authoritative body of the MoCP. At this 
stage a previous “positive decision can be turned into a negative decision. According to Mrs. 
Komita,“this is not an exceptional practice, it happens” (Interview with Katherina Komita, 
lawyer at the GCR, March 20, 2012). With this possibility to overturn a positive decision into 
a negative decision the Greek state seems to have preserved a considerable degree of 
bureaucratic arbitrariness and authoritarian power in the asylum practice. 
Moreover, there were also several voices that have reported that the Greek authorities have 
conducted several times instant interviews at the MoCP, without previously announcing 
them to the applicants (Interview with Vasilis Ververis, legal consultant at the group of 
lawyers, February 12, 2012; Interview with Katherina Komita, lawyer at the GCR, March 20, 
2012; Interview with Spyros Risakos, director at Aitima, March 20, 2012). It was stated that 
the Greek police cleared up public places in the city centre from illegal immigrants and 
brought those who had pink cards or claimed to be refugees to the MoCP in order to 
interview them immediately. In these procedures, “applicants were left without legal 
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assistance, they had no time to prepare themselves, could not bring additional documents, 
and interpreters were lacking so that sometimes the interview was conducted in a language 
which was not the applicant´s mother tongue” (Interview with Spyros Risakos, director at 
Aitima, March 20, 2012). “In sweep operations by the police, which happened as far as I 
know at least 3 times, people were taken from the streets straight to Petrou Ralli in order to 
interview them there immediately. In these procedures of course the vast majority got 
rejected” (Interview with Katherina Komita, lawyer at the GCR, March 20, 2012). In this 
course of action the Greek state severely overrode refugee law. Asylum seekers´ protection 
needs were violated and refugees´ right to a fair procedure of their claims was denied. Even 
if these illegal state actions might not have been pursued in a systematic way and on a large 
scale, yet it demonstrates once more how easily the Greek state can break the law. 
Moreover, it shows how illegal state behaviour is likely to go even unnoticed and leaves the 
authorities who were responsible for the breach of law unpunished. It demonstrates the 
unequal distribution of power between the Greek state and Afghan refugees. It reveals the 
degree of authority by which the Greek state can rule over human beings and can deny 
fundamental rights, while it keeps its own state officials protected by a gigantic shield of 
sovereignty.  
Some Numbers 
Statistical data on asylum in Greece has remained thin and fragmentary. The statistics 
published by the UNHCR show that since the implementation of the transitional system 
there is a minor increase in recognition rates. In 2010 the recognition rate for refugees 
increased to 1,73% , after at least four consecutive years where it has never exceeded 
0.05%. In 2011, the recognition rate for refugees fell again to 0.52%(UNHCR 2011b). In the 
same year recognition rates for alternative form of protection have according to Eurostat 
slightly increased. In 2011 Greece has ruled out 8.670 decisions in total. 8.490 claims were 
rejected and 180 accepted. Full refugee status was granted to 45 individuals or 0,52%. The 
rest received either subsidiary protection (85 individuals, or 0,98%) or humanitarian status 
(45 individuals or 0,52 %) (Eurostat 2012). For comparative purposes, while Greece 
registered in 2011 9.300 new applications in total, France registered 56.250 which was the 
highest registered number in the EU. One can surmise that France might due to the pressure 
on its asylum system be inclined to adopt a restrictive stance on asylum, reflected in a 
relatively low recognition rate. Yet, the recognition rate for refugee status at first instance in 
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France in 2011 is with 7.9% still considerable higher than the recognition rate in Greece with 
0.52%, or 1,73% of the previous year. The EU27 average acceptance rate for refugee status 
at first instance is 12%, for subsidiary protection 9% and for humanitarian status 4% which 
once more emphasizes how low Greece´s recognition rates in fact are (Eurostat 2012). 
Reforms have been made only very recently and the changes in Greece´s acceptance rates 
can yet not be regarded as indicators for new trends. Developments in the next years must 
be observed with heightened attention. The developments especially regarding the 
recognition rates for refugee status must be carefully monitored. The recent shift away from 
full refugee status to alternative protection should also be carefully observed for the future. 
The Greek state could try to supplement the refugee status by alternative forms of 
protection which has been described by several authors as a common strategy of states to 
escape from international obligations (Agier 2011; Koser 2007). Subsidiary or humanitarian 
protection status in Greece grant fewer rights and are temporarily more restricted than full 
refugee status (2 or 3 years instead of 5 years). This makes it easier for the state to rid itself 
again from undesired people and keep costs and responsibilities as low as possible. 
Furthermore, alternative forms of protection are not enshrined in international law and with 
such a manoeuvre the Greek state might try to re-locate protection benefits firmly into its 
own executive power and might try to install a backdoor from where to escape from 
international laws and its ensuing legal obligations (see Agier 2011:22-23; see Koser 
2007:239-240).  
Although the Action Plan initially declared to disengage the police until January 2012 from 
the asylum procedure this has not yet happened. A second deadline was set in September 
2012, which was also not adhered to. The Greek government has announced clear and 
detailed plans until when and how an improved asylum system can be establish which will 
be finally independent from the police. Yet until today it is unclear when the state and the 
EU can actually provide the necessary resources (financial and human) to realise the plans 
for the new asylum system. In the time of the crisis it is likely that the implementation of the 
new reforms will be further delayed. As long as the asylum decision at first instance remains 
in the firm hand of the Hellenic police it is doubtful that asylum seekers will get a fair 
assessment of their claims. 
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Second Instance  
Until recently asylum seekers who were rejected at first instance had only 10 days to submit 
an appeal. The legal reforms extended this severely limited time window and allow 
nowadays 30 days for appeals. However, in case an applicant´s claim is regarded as clearly 
unfounded, his case will be processed in an accelerated form, where he has only 15 days the 
right to appeal. The decisions for the “fast track” seem to be mainly guided by stereotypic 
assumptions and by some country lists (Interview with Spyros Koulocheris, lawyer at GCR, 
March 22, 2012). The accelerated procedure needs to be viewed critically, since as several 
authors have cautioned “[m]aking the process faster, is likely to make it less fair” (Shuman 
and Bohmer 2008:73).  
In case the asylum seeker missed his appointment for an appeal hearing he is excluded from 
the asylum procedure. Refugees can miss such appointments for various reasons. Sometimes 
they seem not to have fully understood the importance of their attendance and dire 
consequences of their absence in these interviews. In other cases, asylum seekers lacked the 
financial means to attend the hearing at the given date. While staying in Athens I have 
personally experienced the frequency with which the public transport system in Athens 
collapsed due to strikes. This has corrosive effects on the mobility of citizens and especially 
of asylum applicants. Some asylum applicants I met in Athens have actually missed their 
interviews because they could not afford to pay for a taxi to get to the MoCP at a time where 
public transport system was out of service. Even if asylum authority can allow for 
exceptional reasons that applicants can re-enter the procedure such practical reasons as 
mentioned here will not be accepted.  
In contrast to the first instance, the general asylum procedure at second instance was 
assessed by all my expert informants as a great progress. With the introduction of the 
transitional system at the end of 2010 new appeal committees have been installed. These 
committees conduct the interview at the appeal stage, and examine and assess the cases in 
a joint effort. According to the lawyer Mr. Risakos, “at second instance, asylum seekers get a 
largely fair examination of their claims, in respect to European standards” (Interview with 
Spyros Risakos, director at Aitima, March 20, 2012).  
At the time of my research a total of 10 appeal committees have been established. 3 
committees were dealing with new incoming appeals, while 7 ones were clearing up 
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Greece´s large backlog. Meanwhile the country´s asylum backlog could be reduced from 
about 47 000 cases at the end of 2010 down to an estimated number of 32 000 pending 
cases (Interview with Stella Nanou, public information associate at UNHCR Greece, March 
28, 20012).  
All appeal committees at second instance consist of one state official and two independent 
experts, one from the UNHCR and one from the National Commission for Human Rights 
(NCHR). My expert informants have stressed that the interviews at the appeal stage are 
substantial and much more thorough than interviews at first instance. An important detail 
should be added here.  
Whatever an applicant said at first instance is in a file and matters also at 
second instance. It will be examined all together. It is always difficult to change 
what was said in the initial interview. Whenever the applicant changes 
something in his story he must have good reasons and explain why, otherwise it 
can be turned against him. 
 
Interview with Spyros Koulocheris, lawyer at GCR, March 22, 2012 
 
Inconsistencies or conflicting statements between the initial interview and the interview on 
appeal stage can give a basis on which credibility can be questioned. This can weaken the 
applicant´s claim considerably, regardless under which conditions the applicant was 
interrogated initially. 
However, on appeals not a single state official has the power to decide, but the whole 
committee decides in a majority vote. It must be stresses that to all who are not directly 
involved in the decision making process, the question how these decisions are actually 
reached remains fully unclear. “There is no way for outsiders to know how decisions were in 
fact reached, and even decision makers themselves may not be fully able to reconstruct that 
process” (Good 2007: 240). Decision making on asylum claims in Greece seems to resemble 
a kind of black box. Yet, since there is only one state representative and two non-
governmental experts, it may be presumed that the state´s influence and arbitrary power in 
the decision making process on appeal stage could be diminished. Informants consistently 
stressed that the recognition rates have risen. However, the number of processed cases has 
remained low and statistical data on asylum is as mentioned very thin. In 2010 the refugee 
recognition rate soared up to 85,3%. However, this number cannot be regarded as 
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representative, since in this year only 45 appeals in total have been processed. Out of this 
number 35 appellants received a positive decision and were all granted full refugee status 
(UNHCR 2011b).  
According to a report by Human Right Watch, the refugee recognition rate for first and 
second instance stood in Greece at 12,35% in the first 7 months of 2011. Compared to the 
year 2010 with 3.453 total examined cases and only 41 appeals, Greece could profoundly 
increase the total number of examined appeals and pending cases. With the second instance 
appeal committees in place Greece makes clear progress with the backlog clearance 
(Interview with Stella Nanou, public information associate at UNHCR Greece, March 28, 
20012).  
While there are considerable improvements at second instance some problems still remain. 
One major shortcoming in appeal hearings and also in first instance interviews is the lack of 
sufficient and competent interpreters in Greece. It must be underscored, that the role of 
interpreters in the asylum process can hardly be overestimated. “[M]ost asylum applicants 
are utterly dependent on the skills of interpreters ” (Good 2007:153). Interpreting in the 
asylum process is a complex and demanding task and it entails much more than merely 
translating. One must acknowledge that subliminal meanings can be conveyed through a 
particular use of language or a specific mode of translation which might be crucial in its 
cumulative effect. Minor translation mistakes or inaccuracies can create a lot of confusion 
and can have a corrosive impact on the outcome of a case. Inaccurate or false interpretation 
can drastically reduce the credibility and/or the plausibility of an asylum story. The effects of 
inadequate interpretation on the outcome of a case can range between negative to absolute 
destructive (Good 154-170; Shuman and Bohmer 2008). Mrs. Komita has loudly lamented 
over the low quality interpretation asylum claimants usually get in Athens. She points at 
roots and frequency of translation problems in the Greek asylum process and how she 
conceives herself as a lawyer.  
We have a big problem with interpreters here in Greece, since not all of them 
have sufficient skills. I mean, first of all the interpreters are usually not 
proficient in Greek, then the asylum seeker might speak a particular dialect 
which is slightly different to the dialect the interpreter speaks. So often they 
don´t translate correctly and misunderstandings come up very easily. Also, 
some of the refugees have been tortured and it is very difficult for them to 
speak about all their traumatic experience, especially in front of the authorities. 
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Then, there is easily confusion also for the interpreter. So, I feel many times 
compelled to interrupt or to interfere in order to correct some details, which 
were not translated right or to clarify the whole thing. Sometimes I think it is 
necessary to give further explanations or add something that was left 
unmentioned, because otherwise it would cause misunderstandings. Somehow 
I feel like a saviour. What I see as one of my main missions in the interviews is 
actually to make sure that the story is told correctly and that important details 
are pointed out.  
 
Interview with Katherina Komita, lawyer at the GCR, March 20, 2012 
 
Interpreters who lack proficiency in the Greek language and also in the applicants´ dialect 
are a widespread problem in the Greek asylum process. Defective interpretations can create 
pitfalls for asylum applicants from where they cannot dig themselves out alone. Even minor 
inconsistencies in an applicant´s claim can cast doubts on the plausibility and credibility of an 
applicant´s story. Thus, imprecise interpretation can in the worst case lead to a rejection and 
put the claimant´s life at stake. Since lacking clarity or precision in the applicant´s story can 
have dire effects for the asylum decision the GCR lawyer considers herself as “a saviour” and 
is compelled to interfere in these moments where important aspects must be clarified.  
In general asylum examinations easily fall prey to lacking understanding, prejudices, and 
ethnocentric views due to differences in cultural, political and social backgrounds. 
Sometimes additional explanations must be provided in order to avoid misunderstandings or 
premature judgements. All this, once more underlines how disadvantaged asylum seekers 
are in the Greek asylum process, which is exacerbated by unskilful interpretation. 
In short, besides the frightening frequency of imprecise interpretations the discussion and 
ethnographic data has revealed how often applicants´ stories get narrated through others, 
and are misunderstood, messed up, clarified or explained by others.  
Mrs. Komita, also pointed at another problem many authors have elaborated on: it is the 
circumstance that “stories of the horrors of persecution often don´t lend themselves to the 
kind of presentation demanded by the authorities” (Shuman and Bohmer 2008:5). The 
victim´s memories of traumatic experiences remain often fragmented and unclear. Lack of 
details of such traumatic experiences and blurry memories often prompt the asylum 
authorities to raise doubts on the credibility of the story (Turner in Good 2007:193). Those 
details seem to be yet of the utmost importance in the asylum process and are likely to 
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decide on the outcome of the case. According to Mrs. Komita, a Kurdish applicant with a 
story of trauma was turned down at first instance due to a lack of credibility.  
He has been tortured in a police station in a city of Turkey 10 years ago. He had 
a problem with his eyesight and he has been tortured for many hours. He was 
asked [by a Greek asylum officer] about how many hours he has been tortured 
and of the exterior of the building of the police station - which could be anyway 
very different from now. He was seriously asked these two questions and he 
could not answer. They rejected him because of lack of credibility. 
  
Interview with Katherina Komita, lawyer at the GCR, March 20, 2012 
 
 
In conclusion, this chapter directed the attention on the current asylum process and its 
related practice at first and second instance. The ethnographic research in Athens has 
revealed two major aspects: First, the difficulty to enter the asylum process and secondly, 
which kind of difficulties or inequities asylum applicants generally face at different stages of 
the asylum procedure. A major problem in Greece is on the one side the underdevelopment 
of the state´s institutional underpinnings for asylum such as severe shortages in qualified 
personnel in this field. On the other side also NGOs suffer from very limited resources 
(financial, personnel or institutional) so that they cannot compensate the state´s deficits. 
The effects are that the enforcement of refugee´s rights is seriously weakened, a highly 
asymmetric power distributions between the Greek state and Afghan refugees is create and 
a fair asylum jurisdiction is impeded.  
The established structures, state institutions and quasi-juridical bodies in the context of 
asylum seem to serve the state´s interests much better than they serve Afghan refugee´s 
needs and rights. Through these institutional foundations the Greek state seems to find 
modes through which it can dominate refugees and asylum seekers, transcend legal 
frameworks on national and international levels and govern in antidemocratic ways and with 
sovereign power.  
For most Afghan refugees the asylum process is a deeply distressing or even traumatic 
experience. I would like to make some final remarks that try to capture the position of the 
asylum seeker within a wider social context and in relation to the essential question of 
power distribution. Once more it must be emphasized that refugees and asylum seekers in 
Greece are left with hardly any state support. As described in detail in this chapter there is 
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no legal assistance provided by the Greek state to asylum applicants and the situation is 
similar in respect to social welfare benefits. Asylum applicants do neither receive any basic 
allowance, nor does the Greek state provide sufficient reception places for them. There is a 
crude mismatch between available reception centres in Greece, estimated at 1.000 places 
and registered asylum applications, estimated at more than 30.000. (Interview with Spyros 
Risakos, director at Aitima, March 20, 2012; Interview with Anastasia Papa, social worker at 
MSF, November 24, 2011). Even though some refugee communities like the Afghan 
community in particular have built strong supportive national or ethnic networks in Athens 
in order to mitigate their predicaments and livelihood problems. Yet, Afghan refugees` 
general condition remains characterised by severe impoverishment that takes on inhuman 
dimensions. Many refugees are homeless, even women with their children and babies sleep 
outside on the streets and in parks. Those who manage to find accommodation usually live 
like Ezat in cramped and under-facilitated apartments.  
After some weeks I found some Afghans who helped me. Now I am living at 
Victoria Square, in a small apartment with 18 other Afghans. We share two 
rooms, but we have no electricity or hot water. Anyway it is still better than 
sleeping outside.  
  
Interview with Ezat, an Afghan refugee, March 17, 2012 
 
Ezat´s housing condition was either exceptional nor the most shocking story I have heard in 
Athens or what I have seen in Athens with my own eyes. In Greece and in particular in 
Athens the conditions in which Afghan refugees and “asylum seekers live [...] prior to a 
decision on their application are increasingly dehumanising” as Koser has aptly stated (Koser 
2007: 235). In Athens Afghan refugees are preoccupied with the challenges associated with 
mere survival. In their daily live they struggle to sustain life, to supply for their essential 
needs, to find food, clothing, housing, health care, some education opportunities for their 
children and many other daily and essential tasks. On top of all that, many Afghan refugees 
have not arrived in their best condition and most of them are full of worries, mentally 
unstable and many are traumatised. Yet, asylum applicants in Athens have not only to make 
all efforts to meet their daily subsistence needs, but they are also confronted with the 
Herculean task to fight the Hydra of the Greek asylum system. “Applicants for asylum are 
caught between exile and legitimate status, a liminal state” which is psychologically gruelling 
for any human being entwined in such a state(Bohmer and Shuman 2007: 624). This 
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existential insecurity is prolonged due to the extremely slow moving cogs in the Greek 
bureaucratic apparatus. This liminal and insecure state lasts for refugees in Greece often for 
many years for some it even lasts more than a full decade. 
 I have applied for asylum in September 2001. I was rejected. Until today I am 
waiting to get a second interview but I still don´t know when. They haven´t said 
anything. When I came here I was still young, now I feel old, I am so exhausted. 
For everything here I was fighting so hard, and I could always lose it anytime 
again. They can still take it away from me. They have already taken all these 
years, yes they have stolen all these years of my life.  
 
Interview with Mubarak, Afghan Asylum seeker, March 6, 2012 
 
The overly slow asylum process and Greece´s ineffective legal and bureaucratic processes 
produce crudest forms of social and political exclusion of human beings. Refugees genuinely 
in need of protection are in Athens incarcerated by the bars of bureaucracy in “a lengthy 
asylum procedure [that] [...] hardly [gives] evidence for fulfilling a humanitarian obligation” 
(Koser 2007: 240). The asylum process is a struggle between asylum applicants and the 
Greek state about rights and obligations. The ethnographic insights have shown that this 
struggle between asylum applicants and the Greek state resembles somehow the battle of 
David against Goliath. However in contrary to the biblical story, in the stories which I have 
heard in Athens the refugees never have emerged out of this battle as the heroic victors.  
What was attempted in this chapter was to cast light on the many aspects where the power 
distribution in the asylum process is clearly tilted towards the side of the Greek state. In 
many ways asylum applicants are overly disadvantaged and the capacity to change certain 
parameters in political, legal, and institutional structures is exclusively reserved to the Greek 
state. Even if the Greek state has improved several aspects in its asylum system, in the 
context of the Greek economic crisis it will be hard to pull the full implementation of the 
action plan through. Greece steep economic downturn seems to have minimised the 
sympathy to strangers. It is a time of increasing social tension and societal anguish in which 
the suffering of foreigners has not the same currency as the suffering of Greeks, which is 
certainly not to underrate either. Personally, I think that Greece will still need several more 
years to profoundly improve and restructure its migration and refugee management and 
ensure compliance with European standards and international laws.  
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Conclusion: Danger and Prospects 
 
I am still waiting for a decision on my asylum claim. I am tired and I feel 
mistreated. It is simply unjust. I mean I am not asking for much, but this is my 
right as a refugee, but here I don´t have anything. There is no place here for 
me. But every human being needs a place to be. Not just humans, if you are a 
bird and your nest is destroyed you will fly somewhere else to build a new nest. 
I tried, but it seems I can´t.  
 
Interview with Mubarak, Afghan Asylum seeker, March 6, 2012 
 
After more than 10 years the Greek state has not ruled out a final decision on Mubarak´s 
asylum claim. The Afghan man in his late 30s has been living for more than a decade every 
single day in political insecurity. He is one example that illustrates the crude form of political 
exclusion the Greek state inflicts on asylum seekers. This protracted political insecurity 
seems to destroy every possibility to lead a normal life. Even if Mubarak will be finally 
granted the right of protection nobody can ever pay back theses years where he has been 
living under the sword of Damocles- a common lot of asylum seekers in Greece.  
The increased mobility and increased scale of international migration certainly poses 
challenges to modern states and their governance (Good 2007: 267). In the recent past, 
Greece has also become affected by increased numbers of immigrants and refugees. The 
persisting human influx seems to have overburdened the state´s institutional and 
bureaucratic capacities and exposed a rudimentary developed migration regime devoid of 
essential political and legal structures. However, even with intensified border surveillance 
and expanding gate keeping practices, Greece just like any other modern state cannot seal 
off its borders from human beings on the move. The movement of people and refugees 
across national borders will persist and it is one result of the dynamic and complex processes 
of today´s globalized world (see Nyers 2006; see Papademetriou 2011b).  
The overall goal of this study was to explore how the Greek state currently governs over 
Afghan refugees and asylum seekers on its territory. This work tried to shed light on the 
relationship between the Greek state and Afghan refugees in terms of power and 
constituted an attempt to trace the various ways in which the state´s power is exerted over 
alien bodies. It must be clear that this small scale qualitative study is not sufficient for a 
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complete understanding and full analysis of the whole complex of various techniques by 
which the Greek states actually manages and controls migrants on its territory. However, 
some preliminary findings and conclusions have emerged through the course of this study 
that will also provide a basis for some prospects. 
The present analysis suggests that the relationship between the Greek state and Afghan 
refugees is fundamentally a relationship of violence and highly unbalanced power. In the 
governance of refugees the use of violence and excessive exertions of power by the Greek 
state play an important role. The ethnographic inquiry has revealed several moments in 
which the Greek state employs sovereign power on the bodies of refugees leaving physical 
and psychological marks. Besides, the sovereign power employed by the Greek state can 
decide over life and death. In Greece human beings from outside who are deemed 
dangerous, unnecessary or burdensome can be eliminated by state authorities. Especially at 
the borders, sovereign power manifests through the practices of powerful authorities that 
rule with excessive and arbitrary violence over refugees. The Greek border regions have 
emerged through the ethnographic inquiry as an exceptional space where gross human 
rights violations have their permanent place. In the hidden zones of the border regions the 
state´s agents and guardians of the nation transgress the legal order with impunity.  
While investigations into the border regions might be difficult and also dangerous only 
further research in situ can shed more light on the de facto practices in these exceptional 
spaces and can reveal the full extent of this disturbing concurrence of modern political 
practices with archaic violence and life effacing injustice against migrants. However although 
the Greek state combines modern techniques of migration management with excessive and 
violent performances of power it has remained strangely impotent against illegal immigrants 
that continue to cross its borders. Even the Greek state´s wasteful, irrational, arbitrary and 
ruthless use of power, yet, cannot stop or deflect the transnational movement of people 
away from Greece.  
Besides, there is this point of friction that the Greek state is actually in demand of large scale 
immigration since it is the most feasible means to stabilize and maintain the country´s 
economy in future. Greece is in need of immigrants not only because of their cheap labour 
force but also to bridge the demographic gap of an aging Greek population in the long term. 
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The study has also shown that while the Greek state seems to be due to its porous borders 
on the one side territorially penetrable, Greece´s political community seems to be on the 
other side, nearly impenetrable for immigrants. Asylum seekers who remain unregistered 
are totally unprotected and are an easy target for violence that might originate from police 
or other state authorities or also from members of the Greek society. Yet even applicants 
who undergo the asylum procedure suffer from protracted political liminality and social 
exclusion. Prior to a final decision of an asylum claim applicants encounter various 
constraints in enforcing their rights and the struggle to become included into the political 
community and be fully inserted into the political order of the Greek state is long and hard 
to win.  
All this seem to lead to the circumstance that Afghan refugees who take flight from violence 
and persecution originating in their home countries are in Greece again threatened by 
violence and suppression of a foreign government. Afghan refugees can only assert their 
right for international protection in Greece under extreme difficulties due to an 
underdeveloped asylum system whose recent acceptance rates for refugees has been below 
0,1%.  
Potential refugees and unregistered asylum seeker who have entered the country illegally 
are perceived with other illegal immigrants as an assault on the Greek state and its political 
order. Foreigners without a fixed national belonging and without an ascribed status by the 
Greek state are politically and socially excluded and are stripped off of essential rights. Due 
to their lacking political status, undocumented asylum seekers and refugees can become the 
target of state violence, police abuse, detention, deportation, racist violence and any other 
possible form of crude social injustice – all of it is usually left unpunished. It can be suspect 
that the Greek state will not be able to solve its problems by its current recourse to state 
violence, increased incarceration and deportations of undesired migrants and refugees. The 
increased numbers of immigrants on Greek territory cannot be regarded as a transitional 
phenomenon and this is why the Greek government must finally drop the inclusive exclusion 
of Afghan refugees and find a more constructive and a more inclusive response to 
immigrants living in the Greek society.  
Although the Greek government has driven forward wide-ranging asylum reforms which 
have considerably improved the current asylum system and practice, the analysis has still 
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revealed that several shortcoming and severe deficits remain in the transitional system. 
Moreover, it is relatively predictable that any further reforms will be delayed in the context 
of persisting economic problems and the strict austerity policies the Greek government has 
to impose on its population irrespective of massive protests.  
A key problem in the area of asylum remains insufficient institutions and lack of qualified 
staff that that are given the necessary resources to do a good job. As a result asylum 
applicants are stuck in the asylum system for years. Even though the reforms have increased 
the quality and operational pace of the Greek asylum system, it must be stressed that most 
applicants live prior to a decision of their claim in dehumanising conditions. As long as the 
institutional and personnel provisions are not established asylum seekers will be kept in a 
prolonged state of political and social insecurity concurring with poverty, marginalisation, 
poor physical and mental health.  
The Greek state will need time and resources to fully restructure its asylum system and build 
up the necessary institutions with qualified personnel. Although the deplorable conditions in 
which refugees and asylum seekers suffer from in Greece are widely known, the EU remains 
apart from admonishing Greece for its non-compliance with EU standards remarkably 
inactive. When it comes to realising refugee rights there seems to be a problem of 
accountability between Greece and other EU member states. Many of my informants have 
stressed that since Greece is overburdened by the increased number of refugees and 
migrants, it can no longer manage these people in technical and ethical ways. While Greece 
can be blamed for having failed to build up the necessary institutions, the refusal of 
assistance in the field of asylum by other EU member states turns them into accomplices of 
the violence that is performed by Greek authorities on the body and souls of refugees and 
asylum seekers.  
Due to a decision by the European Court for Human rights, since the beginning of 2011 most 
EU countries have suspended the Dublin II regulation on whose basis asylum seekers could 
be previously returned to Greece. As an instrument for EU migration management the 
Dublin II Convention was designed to prevent asylum seekers from submitting more than 
one application in several member states, and reduce the number of processed asylum 
applications in the EU. According to the regulation an asylum application must be examined 
by the state the applicant has set first foot on, when he entered the EU. After the decision of 
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the EU court most EU countries have stopped sending asylum seekers back to Greece, since 
the Greek government does not comply with EU standards for asylum. This is a progress, 
however, as a political measure it does not go far enough, since it does not alleviate the 
deplorable and dehumanising conditions in which most asylum seekers continue to live in 
Greece. In my opinion the only political measure which could assure a fair and ethical 
treatment of asylum seekers who are stuck in Greece without any subsistence aid and very 
limited job opportunities would be, if other EU countries took in asylum seekers from Greece 
and assessed their cases in their national asylum systems in a timely manner. Yet such 
political concern and such an act of human compassion in respond to the suffering of 
strangers is very unlikely in the current political practice of the EU, whose member states are 
primarily concerned with overcoming economic impasses, stimulate economic growth while 
cutting down welfare services.  
All this shows once more how difficult it is to find a balance between rational politics and 
human ethics, and the political rights of sovereign states to control and manage individuals 
and populations on the one hand, and the pressing human needs of human beings who try 
to escape situations of persecution and violence on the other. 
It is obvious that not all asylum applicants in Greece are genuine refugees, however the 
current asylum practice in Greece and the non-intervention of other EU member states are 
hollowing out the whole idea of asylum. As the work has stressed at the beginning the 
concept of asylum itself already suffers from internal contradictions. It seems that 
transforming the current refugee regime is highly advisable but it can only be fully successful 
with a restructuring of the current world order. Yet, regarding these issues there might be 
more cause for pessimism than optimism. 
Also the overall developments in Greece are deeply concerning. Refugees and asylum 
seekers in Greece are not given a real chance to move on with their lives. Living in a political 
grey zone and at the same time at the margin of society often precludes access to 
employment and the basic means to sustain a life in dignity. At the same time more and 
more Greek citizens live under conditions of increasing economic and social uncertainties. 
Rising numbers of Greeks are unemployed or work in temporal and instable conditions. A 
rising proportion of the population live without social insurance or any other welfare 
benefits; individuals and families who lost their homes live in cramped conditions with 
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parents or other relatives. These developments lead to growing social anguish, and 
intensifying social tensions. In this context of lasting political and social uncertainties 
xenophobia and hostility towards foreigners have surfaced and also racism and hate crimes 
against migrants in Greece seem to have reached an unprecedented frequency. Geek 
citizens struggling with their own life, often show very limited concern or understanding for 
the plights of refugees. Furthermore, Greeks and migrants live increasingly segregated from 
each other and their social interactions hardly overlap. The hospitality and sympathy left for 
foreigners and their predicaments seem to have decreased to a minimum. 
The sharp inequalities that have also emerged among Greek citizens due to the persisting 
economic downturn and the political measures in response seem to have profoundly 
destabilized the whole social and political order in Greece. Also the lives of many Greek 
citizens is nowadays characterised by a radical insecurity and relative poverty. “[P]olitical 
democracy does not necessarily generate a rule of law that is democratic” (Holston 2008: 
273). Following Agamben even democratic politics fundamentally rest on a deeply 
antidemocratic form of rule. The analysis has shown that the mode of governance with 
which the Greek state operates on the bodies of refugees and asylum seekers is in many 
aspects violent and ruthless. Also in many other areas of the Greek society, the Greek state 
has increased social injustice and power asymmetries. The danger seems to be that with 
sharpening social and political injustices produced by the governance of the Greek state 
democracy itself will be increasingly hollowed out and might wither away. It seems that 
democracy is already in various political and social arenas in the process of corrosion. The 
study seems to confirm, that there is a deeply arbitrary aspect in the state´s “legitimate” 
power and maybe Friedrich Nietzsche´s bashing critique on the concept of the state was 
hinting at it? “The state is the coldest of all cold monsters” (Nietzsche 2003: 75).  
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Appendix 
Abstract 
Greece and its Refugees: Protection Problems of Afghan Refugees in Athens is an 
ethnographic study that explores and analyses the modalities by which the Greek state 
governs over Afghan refugees and asylum seekers. It seeks to problematise the relationship 
between the Greek state and Afghan refugees in terms of power. Through a reading of key 
texts by Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben critical theoretical perspectives were 
developed. Grounded in the everyday experiences and protection problems of Afghan 
refugees and asylum seekers in Athens, the study sets off for investigations into two 
particular aspects of the Greek refugee regime: the migration management at the Greek 
borders and the asylum process and asylum practice in Athens. By focusing on these aspects, 
the work will reveal that refugees and asylum seekers in Greece can be subjected to 
arbitrary state practices as well as to violent and excessive forms of state power. In the 
governance of refugees the use of modern disciplinary power intimately intersects with the 
use of archaic sovereign power. The present analysis suggests that in the governance of 
refugees, the Greek state can act outside of the law with impunity and the use of violence 
and excessive exertion of power play an important role. The relationship between the Greek 
state and Afghan refugees is fundamentally one of violence and highly imbalanced power 
relations. This small scale qualitative research can only provide preliminary insights and is 
not sufficient for a complete understanding and full analysis of the modalities and 
techniques by which the Greek state rules over immigrants on its territory. The presented 
findings should be deepened or re-assessed by follow-up studies that carefully scrutinise the 
full strategic complex of state practices installed in the political realm of migration.  
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Greece and its Refugees: Protection Problems of Afghan Refugees in Athens ist eine 
ethnographische Studie um die Modalitäten der Machtausübung des griechischen Staates 
über afghanische Flüchtlinge und Asylsuchende zu erkunden und zu analysieren. Es geht 
darum die Machtverhältnisse zwischen dem griechischen Staat und afghanischen 
Flüchtlingen zu problematisieren. Vor allem durch das Lesen von Schlüsseltexten von 
Michel Foucault und Giorgio Agamben konnten kritische theoretische Perspektiven 
entwickelt werden. Die Studie ist verankert in den Alltagserfahrungen und 
Schutzproblemen von afghanischen Flüchtlingen und Asylsuchenden in Athen, von wo sie 
ihren Ausgangspunkt nimmt um zwei spezielle Aspekte des griechischen Flüchtlings 
Regimes zu untersuchen: der staatliche Umgang mit Migranten an den griechischen 
Grenzen und dem Asylprozess und der Asylpraxis in Athen. Der Fokus auf diese beiden 
Aspekte in der Forschung wird zeigen, dass Flüchtlinge und Asylsuchende in Griechenland 
willkürlicher Staatsausübung und gewaltsamer und exzessiver Staatsherrschaft 
unterworfen werden können. In der staatlichen Herrschaft von Flüchtlingen 
überschneidet sich die Anwendung von moderner biopolitischer Macht mit archaisch 
uneingeschränkter Gewalt des Souveräns. Die vorliegende Analyse zeigt, dass der 
griechische Staat in der Herrschaft von Flüchtlingen, sich ungestraft außerhalb des 
Gesetzes bewegen kann und dass zudem Gewalt und exzessive Machtausübung eine 
wichtige Rolle spielen. Das Verhältnis zwischen dem griechischem Staat und afghanischen 
Flüchtlingen ist fundamental von Gewalt und stark unausgeglichener Machtverteilung 
geprägt. Es muss betont werden, dass diese qualitative Forschung in einem kleinen 
Rahmen durchgeführt wurde und somit nur vorläufige Ergebnisse präsentieren kann. Die 
Forschung bleibt noch unzureichend für ein volles Verständnis und eine umfassende 
Analyse von den Modalitäten und Techniken mit denen der griechische Staat über 
Migranten auf seinem Territorium regiert. Die herausgearbeiteten Ergebnisse sollten 
vertieft und durch weitere Studien erneut geprüft werden, die darüber hinaus 
genauestens den gesamten strategischen Komplex der Staatspraktiken im politischen Feld 
der Migration untersuchen.  
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